Sperber v. Boesky

672 F. Supp. 754, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10378
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedNovember 5, 1987
Docket86 Civ. 9232 (GLG)
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 672 F. Supp. 754 (Sperber v. Boesky) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sperber v. Boesky, 672 F. Supp. 754, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10378 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).

Opinion

OPINION

GOETTEL, District Judge.

This is a putative class action, brought on behalf of all persons who purchased the common stock of, or call options on the stock of, six corporations (the “class corporations”) during the period of November 3, 1986 to November 14, 1986. These six corporations are Time Incorporated, USX Corporation, Gillette Company, Holiday Corporation, Public Service Corporation of Indiana, and CooperVision Incorporated. Jurisdiction is based on 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).

The motion before us is the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint under Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. For the reasons discussed below, the motion is granted.

FACTS

On a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true the facts alleged in the complaint, and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Dahlberg v. Becker, 748 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084, 105 S.Ct. 1845, 85 L.Ed.2d 144 (1985). We have culled from the 53 pages of the complaint its most salient allegations. They are as follows.

One of the putative class representatives, Isabel Sperber, purchased 40 CooperVision calls on November 5, 1986, which expired unexercised on November 22, 1986. Her co-plaintiff, Aline K. Halye, purchased 100 shares of Time Incorporated, on November 7, 1986. The complaint alleges that Ms. Halye sold her shares at a loss, but does not indicate when she did so.

The defendant, Ivan F. Boesky, has been engaged in the business of risk arbitrage since 1966. Although his success between 1975 and 1982 was spotty, his success from 1982 until 1986 was extraordinary. Throughout this latter period, Boesky consistently attributed this success to hard work and business acumen, but it later became known that during that time Boesky had engaged in insider trading. On Friday, November 14, 1986, the SEC and the United States Attorney announced that Boesky had agreed to plead guilty to one *756 count of insider trading and to pay $100 million in fines and disgorged profits.

The stock market reacted quickly to that Friday’s revelation. According to the plaintiffs, by the following Monday, prices of the class securities had declined from 7 percent to as much as 32 percent. By this time, however, Boesky had sold his investments 1 in the class corporations. With leave of the Securities Exchange Commission, he had begun selling them in September.

The morass of allegations in this most verbose complaint makes it difficult to pinpoint the plaintiffs’ claim. There are several possibilities. The claim most strongly suggested by the entire thrust of the complaint is one for insider trading, based on Boesky’s knowledge of the impending SEC announcement when he sold the stocks in the class corporations. 2 However, the plaintiffs disavow any intention to make such a claim. In their memorandum submitted in opposition to this motion, they clearly state that “the complaint is based on the link between the predicate acts and the inflated purchase price, prior to the disclosure of the misconduct, not the November 1986 [pre-announcement] sales.” Plaintiffs’ Memorandum at 26-27, n. 17. We therefore make no comment on the sufficiency of any insider trading claim based on the pre-announcement sales. 3

The other claim strongly suggested by the complaint can be framed as follows: because Boesky was extremely successful, and because he attributed his success to hard work and talent, many people copied his investments. Because so many people followed his trades, Boesky’s decision to invest in a particular corporation would necessarily drive up the price of that corporation’s securities. However, because Boesky’s success allegedly was not based on legal methods, but rather on a pattern of racketeering activity, the inflation that his investments caused was “artificial.” The plaintiffs’ claim thus would appear to be that because Boesky invested in the class corporations before the plaintiffs did so, the plaintiffs necessarily paid an “artificially” inflated price for their own investments in those corporations. 4

However, at oral argument, the plaintiffs “clarified” their claim to be one which reaches even further than the one just described. At oral argument, the plaintiffs acknowledged that at the time they purchased their securities, they had no knowledge of whether Boesky had invested in these corporations — they therefore did not base their own investments on any such knowledge — and indeed were not even aware that he owned securities in the class corporations until after the SEC announcement. 5 This revelation leads us to a third interpretation of the complaint. Under this third construction, the plaintiffs’ claim is not based on the allegation that Boesky’s “presence in a takeover stock acted as a recommendation to investors” which drove up the price of that security. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum at 14. Rather, their claim is based on the allegation that Boesky’s activ *757 ity in the market for takeover securities affected prices in that market as a whole. Their claim is, in effect, that by being a successful arbitrageur and attributing his success to legal methods, Boesky attracted many others to invest in takeover securities and thereby drove up prices throughout the takeover securities market — for securities in which he had invested as well as securities in which he had not. 6 However, because his success could be attributed to illegal insider trading, the inflation caused by his popularization of the takeover market was “artificial.”

Under either or both of these preriiises, the plaintiffs seek to recover under RICO for having paid allegedly inflated prices for their securities, and for alleged injuries arising from the drop in the prices of the class securities following the SEC announcement. 7

The complaint, and the plaintiffs’ memorandum, most strongly support the former reading of the complaint. That is, the complaint raises a claim that Boesky inflated prices in those securities in which he invested, rather than a claim that Boesky raised prices throughout the takeover securities market as a whole, for securities in which he did invest as well as for securities in which he did not. However, the latter claim arguably can be fashioned out of those documents as well. We need not devote much effort to unraveling this mystery, because under either interpretation of the complaint, the plaintiffs do not state a cause of action under RICO.

DISCUSSION

We address first the plaintiffs’ claim that Boesky is liable to them for the depressing effect the SEC announcement had on the prices of the class securities.

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Bluebook (online)
672 F. Supp. 754, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10378, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sperber-v-boesky-nysd-1987.