Spencer v. Sun Oil Co.

94 F. Supp. 408, 1950 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2147
CourtDistrict Court, D. Connecticut
DecidedNovember 30, 1950
DocketCiv. 3134
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 94 F. Supp. 408 (Spencer v. Sun Oil Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Spencer v. Sun Oil Co., 94 F. Supp. 408, 1950 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2147 (D. Conn. 1950).

Opinion

SMITH, District Judge.

In this anti-trust action by fifty-eight individual Meriden gasoline dealers against Sun Oil Company and four of its retail gasoline dealers, lessees of stations owned or leased by the Company in the Meriden case, application was made for a temporary injunction.

The complaint seeks damages and injunctive relief based on alleged violation of the Borah-Van Nuys section of the RobinsonPatman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 13a.

The individual defendants move to dismiss.

The defendant company moves for summary judgment.

The first defense contention is that 13a is a penal provision only, since it does not purport within itself to apply civil sanctions and since the definition of antitrust laws in the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 12 et seq., was not expanded to include the new sections which the Robinson-Patman Act became. However, 13a attacks the problem of monopoly and obstruction of competition in interstate commerce, and is, therefore, an “anti-trust law” for violation of which civil remedies are given by Title 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 15 and 26.

Section 13a does not apply, however, to the actions of the dealer defendants, for while the Sherman Act, 15 U.S. C.A. § 1-8, 15 note, applies to agreements affecting interstate commerce, the Robinson-Patman Act applies only to interstate commerce itself.

In order to avail themselves of Section 13a, which is part of the RobinsonPatman Act, it is necessary for the plaintiffs to show that the defendants are engaged in interstate commerce, with respect to the transactions complained of. The defendant Sun Oil operates no refineries in Connecticut. Its gasoline is shipped into the state from refineries located outside the state and placed in storage-tanks here. It remains in the storage-tanks until delivered by truck to the retail distributors, including the individual defendants. Some of the retail distributors, like the individual defendants, lease or sub-lease the filling-stations which they operate from Sun Oil; others own their stations or lease them from third parties. All of the retail dealers have contracts under which they agree to buy from Sun Oil monthly at least 75% of the amount of gasoline used by them in the corresponding month of the previous year.

For the plaintiffs to prevail against the Sun Oil Company they must necessarily show that the sales of gasoline by Sun Oil to its dealers are transactions in interstate commerce, and to prevail against the individual defendants they must establish that the sales by the retail dealers are in interstate commerce. The transactions involved are, therefore, at two different levels in the chain of distribution, the wholesale level' and the retail level. First we shall consider whether the wholesale transactions between Sun Oil, on the one hand, and its dealers, on the other, constitute interstate commerce.

The gasoline which is the subject matter of these transactions is derived entirely from outside the state. It does not move into the state pursuant to the orders of the individual dealers, but is transported here by Sun Oil to fulfill a reasonably predictable demand from the retail dealers. The bulk storage-plants merely serve as receptacles for the gasoline when it reaches Connecticut. The title to the gasoline at all times before final delivery to the dealer remains in Sun Oil. The break in transportation which occurs when the gas is stored in the bulk plants does not necessarily break the stream of commerce. Sun Oil is faced with the problem of transporting its gasoline from the refineries where it is produced to the retail outlets where it is sold to the dealers. The manner in which it solves this problem, whether it adopts a practice of shipping the gasoline directly from the refinery to the retail *411 outlet or whether it stores the gasoline in bulk plants in the course of its transportation, does not alter the essentially interstate nature of the distribution process. There is a continuous flow of commerce from refinery to retail outlet and this flow is in no sense interrupted by virtue of the fact that Sun Oil finds it expedient to store the gasoline temporarily in bulk plants in Connecticut. Standard Oil Co. v. F. T. C., 7 Cir., 1949, 173 F.2d 210; Stafford v. Wallace, 1922, 258 U.S. 495, 42 S.Ct. 397, 66 L.Ed. 735. Therefore, the sales by Sun Oil to its retail dealers are transactions in interstate commerce.

The question of whether the retail sales by the individual dealers to their customers constitutes interstate commerce involves other considerations. The moment the gasoline is delivered to the dealer’s filling-station, title thereto passes to him. As an independent merchant, he has complete control over the process of merchandising. He is in much the same position as a retail grocer, some of whose products are derived from outside the state; such a merchant is not engaged in interstate commerce because the moment the products reach his shelves “they come to rest and cease to be ‘in the flow’ of interstate commerce”. Smith Metropolitan Market Co. v. Food and Grocery Bureau of Southern California, D.C., 1939, 33 F.Supp. 539, 540; A.L.A. Shechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 1935, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 837, 79 L.Ed. 1570. The retail sales of gasoline are transactions consummated locally, involving a commodity which had been previously siphoned-off from the current of commerce and brought to rest within the state. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. v. Keen, 8 Cir., 1946, 157 F.2d 310. These transactions are intrastate in nature and not within the purview of the RobinsonPatman Act.

The plaintiffs have suggested that the retail sales acquire the attributes of interstate commerce since many of the customers are transients who travel over state lines and commercial users who are engaged in interstate transportation businesses. They have not referred to any authority to support their argument and it would seem that what would otherwise be a purely intrastate transaction cannot be transformed into a transaction in interstate commerce merely because the commodity sold is taken by the purchaser across state lines and used in another state.

No violation may be established, moreover, under the allegations of the complaint unless it is shown by plaintiffs that defendants are engaged in interstate commerce, that, in the course of that commerce, l-(a) they sold or contracted to sell gasoline in Meriden at prices lower than those exacted by them elsewhere in the United States, (b) for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor in Meriden, or 2 - (a) that they sold or contracted to sell goods at unreasonably low prices (b) for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor.

Plaintiffs have failed to show directly that the prices are lower in Meriden than elsewhere in the United States. They appear to depend on points 2(a) and (b) above.

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Bluebook (online)
94 F. Supp. 408, 1950 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2147, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/spencer-v-sun-oil-co-ctd-1950.