Spencer v. Hylton-Spencer

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Spencer v. Hylton-Spencer

247 A.D.2d 461, 668 N.Y.S.2d 104, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1034

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedFebruary 9, 1998

StatusPublished

This text of 247 A.D.2d 461 (Spencer v. Hylton-Spencer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Spencer v. Hylton-Spencer, 247 A.D.2d 461, 668 N.Y.S.2d 104, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1034 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1998).

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Opinion

The court erred in denying that branch of the appellants’ motion which was for renewal of their motion for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint. The appellants proffered a bank appraisal of the subject property that was unavailable at the time of the original motion because it could not be found by the mortgagee who possessed it (see, Schumann v City of New York, 242 AD2d 616; Matter of Bernstein v Mitgang, 242 AD2d 328; 12 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac ¶ 5701.24). However, even when the appraisal is considered, the appellants are not entitled to summary judgment. There are issues of fact as to whether the conveyance was made with the intent to hinder or delay the respondent’s effort to enforce her interest in the subject property (see, CPLR 3212 [b]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562).

The appellants’ remaining contentions are without merit.

Miller, J. P., Sullivan, Pizzuto and Florio, JJ., concur.

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The court erred in denying that branch of the appellants’ motion which was for renewal of their motion for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint. The appellants proffered a bank appraisal of the subject property that was unavailable at the time of the original motion because it could not be found by the mortgagee who possessed it (see, Schumann v City of New York, 242 AD2d 616; Matter of Bernstein v Mitgang, 242 AD2d 328; 12 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac ¶ 5701.24). However, even when the appraisal is considered, the appellants are not entitled to summary judgment. There are issues of fact as to whether the conveyance was made with the intent to hinder or delay the respondent’s effort to enforce her interest in the subject property (see, CPLR 3212 [b]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562).

The appellants’ remaining contentions are without merit.

Miller, J. P., Sullivan, Pizzuto and Florio, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

247 A.D.2d 461, 668 N.Y.S.2d 104, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1034, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/spencer-v-hylton-spencer-nyappdiv-1998.

Opinion

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