Spencer v. Flynn, et al.

2005 DNH 156

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: November 18, 2005
• Docket: 03-CV-424-SM
• Status: Published

Opinion

Spencer v . Flynn, et a l . 03-CV-424-SM 11/18/05 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Geraldine Spencer, Plaintiff

v. Civil N o . 03-cv-424-SM Opinion N o . 2005 DNH 156 Linda Flynn and Daniel Ballargeon, Defendants

O R D E R

This case consists of Geraldine Spencer’s claim, filed under

42 U.S.C. § 1983, that her Eighth Amendment right to be free from

cruel and unusual punishment was violated by Linda Flynn’s and

Daniel Ballargeon’s deliberate indifference to her serious mental

health needs during her incarceration in the New Hampshire State

Prison for Women. Defendants move for summary judgment on both

procedural and substantive grounds. Plaintiff has not objected.

Because the factual record is undisputed, and defendants are

entitled to judgment as a matter of law, their motion for summary

judgment is granted.

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals “no

genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R . CIV. P .

56(c). When ruling on a party’s motion for summary judgment, the

court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that

party’s favor. See Lee-Crespo v . Schering-Plough Del Caribe

Inc., 354 F.3d 3 4 , 37 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing Rivera v . P . R .

Aqueduct & Sewers Auth., 331 F.3d 183, 185 (1st Cir. 2003)).

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on procedural

grounds, under the doctrine of res judicata. Based upon the

affidavits from attorneys Michael Brown and Orville Fitch

describing the hearings in plaintiffs’ two state court cases

(Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J . , Exs. F and I ) , it is clear that M s .

Spencer has previously litigated the mental health treatment

issues raised in this case in the state courts and, consequently,

is barred from doing so again.

Moreover, even if Spencer’s claim was not procedurally

barred, defendants would be entitled to summary judgment on the

merits. They have produced medical records, unchallenged by

plaintiff, demonstrating a level of attention to her serious

2 mental health needs that easily surpasses the requirements of

Estelle v . Gamble, 429 U.S. 9 7 , 106 (1976). Among other things,

those records include thirteen pages of mental health notes which

include fifteen separate entries, from February 6, 2004, through

May 2 8 , 2004. These treatment records effectively refute

Spencer’s claim that her mental health issues went untreated.

Regarding Spencer’s claim that the medication prescribed for her

depression was inappropriate, Linda Flynn’s affidavit explains

the rationale behind the shift from Paxil to Zoloft, with

Spencer’s informed consent. Plaintiff, by failing to respond to

defendants’ summary judgment motion, has failed to create a

triable issue of material fact on that issue. Based upon the

undisputed factual record, Spencer’s Eighth Amendment rights were

not violated by the mental health care she received from

defendants.

For the reasons given, defendants’ motion for summary

judgment (document n o . 29) is granted. The clerk of the court

shall enter judgment in accordance with this order and close the

case.

3 SO ORDERED.

___________^ ^^ Steven J . McAuliffe :hief^ Judge

November 1 8 , 2005

cc: Geraldine Spencer, pro se Nancy J. Smith, Esq.