Spencer v. City National Bank

43 Fla. Supp. 74
CourtCircuit Court of the 11th Judicial Circuit of Florida, Miami-Dade County
DecidedSeptember 18, 1975
DocketNo. 74-25348(11)
StatusPublished

This text of 43 Fla. Supp. 74 (Spencer v. City National Bank) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Circuit Court of the 11th Judicial Circuit of Florida, Miami-Dade County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Spencer v. City National Bank, 43 Fla. Supp. 74 (Fla. Super. Ct. 1975).

Opinion

MILTON A. FRIEDMAN, Circuit Judge.

Final judgment: John C. Spencer, Virginia O. Beverly and William A. Van Nordick, Jr., as trustees for Fidelity Mortgage Investors, Cabot, Cabot and Forbes, a land trust, and Hospital Mortgage Group filed suit to foreclose their first mortgage upon Sailboat Key, an island located in Biscayne Bay, connected to the mainland by a causeway. Sailboat Key, Inc., the owner of the land was joined as defendant as was Continental Mortgage Investors, holders of a subordinated mortgage. Continental, claiming an outstanding balance on its mortgage of $550,000, claiming priority, sought foreclosure against Sailboat Key, Inc. It was to this crossclaim for foreclosure that Sailboat Key, Inc. replied and raised its claim of usury.

[76]*76Full discovery was afforded all parties. By order of this court, final hearing as to all matters was set for June 3, 1975. Plaintiffs appeared and proved their case. At the conclusion of the plaintiffs’ case, Continental Mortgage Investors moved for a severance of the crossclaim and for a continuance. They waived their mortgage lien, but not their claim on the mortgage note. Motion was granted and the crossclaim was re-set for trial June 13, 1975.

On June 12, 1975, finding that preliminary issues of an accounting nature required determination, this court referred that portion of the case to Sydney Lefcourt, as special master of this court, and continued the final hearing. The formal order of reference was entered nunc pro tunc on July 16, 1975. The original reference was agreed to by Continental’s attorneys when they appeared before this court on the morning of June 12, 1975, and by letter to this court, hand delivered late in the afternoon of June 12, 1975.

On June 13, 1975, the issues of computation of interest were tried before the special master. On July 14, 1975, the special master’s report was filed finding interest on the loan exceeded 15%. On July 25, 1975, Continental filed its exceptions to special master’s report, objecting for the first time to the original reference.

Final hearing of the crossclaim and Continental’s exceptions to report of special master was set for August 1, 1975.

Sailboat Key Inc., claimed that Continental Mortgage Investors had exacted over 25% interest for a loan in the principal amount $2,225,318.84, that in return for lending that amount Continental received from it in interest, discount, bonus and kickers, the sum of $660,962.03, plus $550,000 that Continental asserts is still owing on the mortgage note. The principal of the loan was completely repaid in less than two years. The average outstanding balance was $1,723,011.01. These numbers were never in dispute. Nor, considering the discount, bonus and kickers as interest, is the basic arithmetical computation that Continental received interest on this loan of 37.40% per year. Continental’s defense consisted of the claim that the transaction was governed by Massachusetts law, that Florida has no usury law governing transactions exceeding $500,000, and that this action was barred by the Florida statute of limitations.

Findings of fact and conclusions of law

In January, 1970, Continental Mortgage Investors entered into a loan agreement with Sailboat Key, Inc. The term of the loan was two years, the maximum amount to be disbursed $3,350,000. Interest was 14% per year. A 2% discount was taken on the face amount of the note would never be disbursed. Continental’s records, made at the time they entered into the loan transaction, showed [77]*77that they contemplated that the loan would yield 17 % interest per year. Their records, after disbursal, showed it had yielded 16.47% interest.

In addition to this yield, in itself an exaction of usurious interest under Florida law, the loan agreement provided —

“As additional consideration for making this loan C. M. I. shall receive a fifty (50%) percent interest in the project, to be evidenced by that percentage of stock of the borrowing corporation or in such other form as the borrower and G. M. I. shall agree upon...”

Pursuant to this provision, 50% of the borrower was conveyed to Continental Mortgage Investors. The testimony as to the value of this interest was unopposed. Continental put on no testimony, nor introduced any evidence which contradicted Sailboat Key’s valuation. Continental’s records supported the valuation. It was agreed upon between the parties that the equity in the project at the time Continental exacted its 50% was $1,975,000. Continental’s bonus for making this loan was $987,500 when they took it. This is interest under the applicable statute.

Continental’s loan did not provide funds for actual construction of the project. They had the right, but not the obligation to make such a loan, nor did the value of their interest depend on the success of the project. In the early summer of 1971, they declined to do so. They then sent a default notice and hired an attorney to foreclose on the island. They refused to cooperate with any attempts to refinance. They offered to purchase the balance of the project for $750,000. Their actions in these respects can only be characterized as economic blackmail.

Finally they agreed to a repayment of principal, payment of all the interest plus an additional $750,000. During the course of these negotiations, their officers did not disagree that the loan was usurious, but insisted that this was the price. It was paid. Continental received $2,225,318.84 as repayment of principal, $460,926.02 as payment of interest and discount, $10,000 for their “equity interest”, $190,000 by their documentation for waiving the right to make the construction loan, and a note with a balance of $550,000. Continental then satisfied their mortgage and reconveyed half of the project back to the borrower.

This court finds that the 2% discount was charged and collected. This court finds that the $10,000 payment, the $190,000 payment and the $550,000 note were additional interest on this loan. This court finds that interest in excess of 25% was exacted by Continental Mortgage Investors.

[78]*78MASSACHUSETTS LAW

Continental claims that this was a Massachusetts transaction and that Massachusetts law should apply. Massachusetts has no usury statute applicable.

The testimony, unopposed, reflects that the loan was to a Florida borrower upon security of Florida real estate. The loan was negotiated in Florida. The loan documents were prepared in Florida by the advisor to the trust which approved all loans. The advisor was located in Florida and was headed by a Florida lawyer. The money was disbursed to the borrower in Florida. The only connection with Massachusetts was that the borrower, its attorney and Continental’s officer who handled the transaction took all of the loan documents which had been prepared in Florida, got on a plane at Miami International Airport and flew to Logan Airport in Boston, Massachusetts. There they got off the plane, went to the offices of Continental Mortgage Investors, signed the documents, took the documents with them, got back on the plane and flew back to Miami. The documents provided that Massachusetts law should apply.

Such a provision, as here contained, will be given effect unless its purpose is to evade the usury laws of the forum, or the state whose law is chosen has no real contact with the transaction. United Divers Supply Co. v. Commercial Credit Co., C. C. A., Fifth Cir., 289 F. 316, Continental Mortgage Investors v.

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Bluebook (online)
43 Fla. Supp. 74, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/spencer-v-city-national-bank-flacirct11mia-1975.