Spencer Schwartz v. Jorge Rodriguez

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: July 17, 2024
• Docket: 2023-1976
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed July 17, 2024. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D23-1976 Lower Tribunal No. 23-30614 SP ________________

Spencer Schwartz, Appellant,

vs.,

Jorge Rodriguez, et al., Appellees.

An Appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Natalie Moore, Judge.

Spencer Schwartz, in proper person.

Jorge E. Rodriguez and Clara Reed, in proper persons.

Before EMAS, SCALES and GORDO, JJ.

GORDO, J. Spencer Schwartz ("Schwartz") appeals a final judgment entered

after a non-jury trial in favor of Jorge Rodriguez ("Rodriguez") and Clara

Reed ("Reed"). We have jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A).

Because the trial court’s factual findings are the basis of its legal

conclusions that no contract was formed and Schwartz has not provided us

with a transcript, we are compelled to affirm.

On appeal, Schwartz argues the trial court’s determination that no

contract was formed is erroneous because its factual findings are not

supported by the evidence.

“In reviewing a final judgment rendered from a non-jury trial, the trial

court's findings of fact are clothed with a presumption of correctness.” La

Ley Sports Complex at City of Homestead, LLC v. City of Homestead, 255

So. 3d 468, 469 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018). “We apply a clear error standard to

the findings of fact, and a finding will not be disturbed unless it is totally

unsupported by competent and substantial evidence . . . .” Id. Because

Schwartz has not provided us with a trial transcript or presented any

evidence to challenge the trial court’s factual findings, we find no clear error

in the final judgment. See Emaminejad v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 156

So. 3d 534, 535-36 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (“Under Florida law, ‘when

reviewing a judgment rendered after a nonjury trial, the trial court's findings

2 of fact come to the appellate court with a presumption of correctness and

will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous’ . . . Absent a

transcript, it is all but impossible for this Court to review what was

presented to the trial court as evidence and what arguments were made . .

. . All of the challenges made by the [appellant] basically rest on this

Court's review of the evidence and arguments made at trial, neither of

which can be done in the absence of a transcript.”) (citation omitted);

Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150, 1152

(Fla.1979) (“Without knowing the [whole] factual context, neither can an

appellate court reasonably conclude that the trial judge so misconceived

the law as to require reversal. The trial court should [be] . . . affirmed

because the record brought forward by the appellant is inadequate to

demonstrate reversible error.”).

Schwartz also argues the trial court abused its discretion in allowing

Rodriguez to amend the complaint and add Reed as a necessary party to

the claim. We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing

Rodriguez to amend the complaint. See Impulsora De Productos

Sustentables, S.A.P.I. De C.V. v. Garcia, 347 So. 3d 470, 471 (Fla. 3d DCA

2022) (“Refusal to allow an amendment is an abuse of the trial court's

discretion ‘unless it clearly appears that allowing the amendment would

3 prejudice the opposing party, the privilege to amend has been abused, or

amendment would be futile.’” (quoting JVN Holdings, Inc. v. Am. Constr. &

Repairs, LLC, 185 So. 3d 599, 601 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016))); Video Indep.

Med. Examination, Inc. v. City of Weston, 792 So. 2d 680, 681 (Fla. 4th

DCA 2001) (“The primary consideration in determining whether a motion for

leave to amend should be granted is a test of prejudice, and such leave

‘should not be denied unless the privilege has been abused or the

complaint is clearly not amendable.’” (quoting New River Yachting Ctr., Inc.

v. Bacchiocchi, 407 So. 2d 607, 609 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981))); Lage v. Blanco,

521 So. 2d 299, 300 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (“Parties may be added by order

of court on its own initiative or on motion of any party at any stage of the

action and on such terms as are just.” (quoting Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.250(c))).

Affirmed.