Spencer Others v. Pierce Others

5 R.I. 63
CourtSupreme Court of Rhode Island
DecidedSeptember 6, 1857
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 5 R.I. 63 (Spencer Others v. Pierce Others) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Spencer Others v. Pierce Others, 5 R.I. 63 (R.I. 1857).

Opinion

Ames, C. J.

The first class of exceptions, to which we direct our attention, consists of those made, on both sides, to the allowances and disallowances by the master of the items of the claim of Benjamin Cozzens, the largest claim preferred against the mortgaged estate. This claim, in great part, arises out of a sealed contract, entered into between Cozzens and Patterson on the 4th day of February, 1856, determinable by either party upon three months notice, by which Cozzens covenanted to aid Patterson in getting up the styles of prints to be printed at the works of the latter, superintending that branch of the business in Providence and New York; to assist him in the purchase of cloths, drugs, and coals; to make needful arrangements with Patterson’s selling agents, and to superintend the sales and the rendition of the accounts of sales of prints by them; to aid in the procuring of job work, and generally to advise him in his business* except professionally. In compensation for these services, Patterson stipulated to pay Cozzens a commission of one and three quarters per cent, on the cost price of the gray cloths of all job work printed at Patterson’s works, and three quarters of one per cent, on the gross sales of all other goods printed at said works, with the privilege of obtaining from the commission merchants of Patterson an allowance sufficient to make the latter allowance up to one per cent., so that no arrangements were *66 made by Cozzens with any commission house of Patterson, for the purpose of procuring this allowance, detrimental to the interests of the latter. The contract stipulated, that Cozzens’s commissions on the job work were to be paid as the lots were finished, and upon the other goods printed at the works, from time to time, as the sales were rendered, to the order of Samuel D. Cozzens of New York, trustee, and for the sole use and benefit of Mrs. Mary S. Cozzens, wife of the said Benjamin Cozzens.

The main item of the claim made by Mr. Cozzens under the second clause of the trusts created by the mortgage, is the sum of $1,312.83 for his commissions of three quarters of one per cent, on the gross sales of goods printed at the Manchester print works, stipulated to be paid to him by Patterson, by the sealed contract aforesaid, for his services in getting up the styles of prints, &c.

According to the master’s report, no objection to this portion of Mr. Cozzens’s claim was made before him, except that, because Mr. Cozzens had, it was said, violated the contract, under which he claimed, in some respects, he had thereby lost all title to claim under it. Inasmuch as the failure of service was not claimed to be total, and there was no clause of forfeiture in the contract, the master very properly overruled this objection, except so far as it might be a ground for set-off, which does not appear to have been insisted on. The master allows this item in full, as one fairly within the scope of the contract.

Another item of Mr. Cozzens’s claim is the sum of $40.42, for commissions stipulated by the contract on the cost of gray cloths printed by the job at said works, which was also allowed by the master.

Now to the allowance of these two items in Cozzens’s claim, three exceptions are filed by the plaintiffs; the two first going to both items, and the other to the last item only. These are,

“ 1st. That all the items of claim allowed to said Cozzens arise under a written contract, referred to in said report, and on the files; and that no claims under said contract are secured by the mortgage named in the plaintiff’s bill.

“2d. That no sum is due to said Benjamin Cozzens under said agreement.

*67 3d. That on a true construction of said agreement, the third item of said Cozzens’s claim (being the above item of $40.42 for commissions on job work) allowed by said master, was erroneously allowed.”

With regard to the first of these exceptions, that the claim for service arises under a written contract, we do not see the force of it, so that the character of the service be such as to bring it within the scope of the mortgage. The getting up the styles of prints to be printed at the works was certainly a service in the business of or connected with the print works; ” being the most important to success in that business of all service that could be performed; and the mortgage expressly secures such service, whether performed “ there,” that is, at the print works, or “ elsewhere.” The same may be said in general, although not with so much force, of the other services stipulated to be rendered by Mr. Cozzens, — all directly connected with the business of the works, and usually performed by the owner of them; the contract being evidently made, to secure to Patterson, in carrying on his business as a calico printer, the aid of the well known experience and tact of Mr. Cozzens in that line.

The second of these exceptions, that no sum whatever is due to Mr. Cozzens under this agreement, refers to defect of proof of service, for which no ground is laid in the master’s report, or to the fact, that by the contract, whatever was due to Mr. Cozzens for his services, was to be paid, not to him, but to Samuel D. Cozzens, as trustee for Mrs. Mary S. Cozzens. As the sums due, or to become due for labor or services, are secured by the mortgage, and not any particular individuals by name, we cannot see the force of this last objection, as a matter of substance. The fact, that by express stipulation, Patterson agreed to pay what should be due to Mr. Cozzens for his services to the use of one whom Mr. Cozzens chose should enjoy the fruits of his labors, in no manner affects the question, whether the claim for these services is embraced within the mortgage, but only the question, of the person to whom the claim is to be allowed and paid. As a matter of form, the master has, we think, properly overruled the objection; inas *68 much as it is not necessary that the cestuis should be made parties to the bill, and this claim has been properly represented before him, and is allowed by him, payable to Samuel D. Coz-zens, as trustee for Mary S. Cozzens.

The third, and last, exception of the plaintiffs, appears, by coupling the terms of the exception with the clause of the report relating to it, to be, that Cozzens could not claim his commission on job work, when the goods printed by the job belonged to him. This is clearly groundless; since the contract gives him, in terms, his commission on “ all job work printed at the works during the continuance of the contract,” as a mode of compensating him for his various services in the business, without reference to the ownership of the goods printed by the job, or to his connection with the procuring of the work to be done.

The exceptions of the plaintiffs to the master’s report, all confined to Mr. Cozzens’s claim, are therefore overruled.

We next come to the exceptions of Mr. Cozzens to the master’s report, filed, on the ground, that certain items of his claim were wrongfully disallowed.

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Bluebook (online)
5 R.I. 63, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/spencer-others-v-pierce-others-ri-1857.