Spence v. State of New York
Opinion
18-3140 Spence v. State of New York
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 27th day of July, two thousand twenty-two.
PRESENT: JON O. NEWMAN, GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges.*
THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, KENNETH R. HUNTER, ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, MARY REID, ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, CALVIN THAYER, ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, RAYMOND FERRARO, ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, AFL-CIO,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. No. 18-3140-cv
KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, AS GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, PATRICIA A. HITE, INDIVIDUALLY, REBECCA A. CORSO, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ACTING COMMISSIONER, NEW YORK STATE CIVIL SERVICE DEPARTMENT, CAROLINE W. AHL, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, J. DENNIS HANRAHAN, INDIVIDUALLY, LANI V. JONES, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, ROBERT L. MEGNA, INDIVIDUALLY, ROBERT F. MUJICA, JR., IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF THE BUDGET, THOMAS P. DINAPOLI, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMPTROLLER OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, MICHAEL N. VOLFORTE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE NEW YORK STATE GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF EMPLOYEE RELATIONS,
Defendants-Appellees.**
D’Agostino, J.) granting summary judgment to Defendants-Appellees, various State officials (collectively, “the State”), on all claims in this contractual and constitutional dispute growing out of the State’s 2011 decision to alter its rates of contribution to retired former employees’ health insurance plans. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts, the procedural history of the case, and the specifications of issues on appeal, which we set forth only as necessary to explain our decision.
We reserved decision in this case pending disposition of Donohue v. Hochul, No. 18-3193-cv, which was designated both in the district court and in this Court as the lead case of eleven related cases alleging breach of contract and constitutional contract-impairment claims based on the alteration of State health insurance contribution rates for retirees. Following this Court’s final disposition of Donohue, we directed the parties in this and the other related cases “to file letter-briefs stating their views on how their case should be resolved in light of Donohue v. Cuomo (‘Donohue II’), 980 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2020), Donohue v. Cuomo (‘Donohue III’), 38 N.Y.3d 1 (2022), and Donohue v. Hochul, [32 F.4th 200 (2d Cir. 2022)] (‘Donohue IV’),” addressing in particular “the extent to which anything in the collective bargaining agreements at issue in the case, or any other
circumstances specific to the case, distinguish the case from Donohue.” ECF No. 139 at 2. In response, the PEF Plaintiffs conceded that they “see no substantive difference between PEF’s collective bargaining agreement (‘CBA’) and [the Donohue plaintiffs’] CBA regarding retiree health insurance,” and referred us to the arguments made in their original brief. Appellants’ Supp. Letter-Br. at 1.
The PEF Plaintiffs’ breach of contract and contractual impairment claims, like those in Donohue, necessarily fail absent provisions guaranteeing a lifetime vested right to continuous contribution rates from the State for retirees. See Donohue IV, 32 F.4th at 206. Moreover, because the PEF Plaintiffs now concede that their CBAs are materially indistinguishable from those in Donohue and simply refer us to their original brief, the PEF Plaintiffs may succeed only on the merits of any independent argument in that original brief that was not made in Donohue. The only CBA provision cited in the PEF Plaintiffs’ original briefing not parallel to a provision discussed in Donohue provides that “[t]he State shall continue to provide all the forms and extent of coverage as defined by the contracts in force on [the date of the CBA] with the State’s health insurance carriers unless specifically modified by this Agreement.” J. App’x at 1351.
While not identical, that provision is similar to one at issue in Donohue,
which provided that “[e]mployees covered by the State Health Insurance Plan have the right to retain health insurance after retirement upon completion of ten years of service.” Donohue II, 980 F.3d at 72 (alteration in original). In Donohue II, before we had the benefit of the New York Court of Appeals’s guidance, we noted that if “a ‘right to retain coverage after retirement’ is properly understood as a vested right . . . it is ‘plausible’ that the scope of a vested right to coverage would encompass a right to fixed costs such as co-pays or, perhaps, contribution rates.” Id. at 73, quoting Kolbe v. Tibbetts, 22 N.Y.3d 344, 355 (2013). The same logic would seem to apply to a provision concerning “the forms and extent of coverage.” J. App’x at 1351. But the New York Court of Appeals made clear in Donohue III that such language cannot “establish a vested right to lifetime fixed premium contributions” that extends past the duration of the CBA, 38 N.Y.3d at 19, and we accordingly held in Donohue IV, applying New York law, that it cannot support an inference of ambiguity, 32 F.4th at 208. In other words, the provision that the PEF Plaintiffs cite in their original brief is silent on a continuing right to a particular level of contribution payments, and thus, like the plaintiffs in Donohue, the PEF Plaintiffs “ask us to infer ambiguity from what the CBAs do not say rather than anything they do say,” which, as a matter of New
York law, we may not do, Donohue IV, 32 F.4th at 208; see Donohue III, 38 N.Y.3d at 17-18.
We therefore hold that the district court correctly granted summary judgment to the State on the PEF Plaintiffs’ claims for the same reasons explained in Donohue IV, 32 F.4th at 206-11.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
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