Spence v. Durham

Court of Appeals of North Carolina

Spence v. Durham

191 S.E.2d 908, 16 N.C. App. 372, 1972 N.C. App. LEXIS 1708

CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina

DecidedOctober 25, 1972

Docket7221DC564

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 191 S.E.2d 908 (Spence v. Durham) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Spence v. Durham, 191 S.E.2d 908, 16 N.C. App. 372, 1972 N.C. App. LEXIS 1708 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972).

Pincite

Opinion

VAUGHN, Judge.

Among other things, the trial judge held that “the document entered on June 2, 1969 in Cobb County, Georgia does not constitute a judgment entitled to full faith and credit. ...” To so hold constituted patent error. However, the judge did correctly conclude that, even if the judgment was entitled to full faith and credit, the courts of this State have jurisdiction to enter orders providing for the custody of minor children when they are physically present in this State. G.S. 50-13.5 (c) (2) a and G.S. 50-13.7.

It is well settled that upon appropriate findings of fact showing changed circumstances substantially affecting the welfare of the children, the court may modify a prior order awarding custody. The burden is upon the party seeking modification of the order to show the changed circumstances which substantially affect the welfare of the children.

The record on appeal in this proceeding consists of 403 pages. It is neither necessary nor desirable to review the evidence set out in this record and, because of its nature, we have elected not to do so. It suffices to say that the evidence does not support the findings of fact and that the findings of fact do not support the judgment. The judgment of the Superior Court of Cobb County, Georgia remains in full force and effect. The judgment and orders of the District Court of Forsyth County purporting to modify the same are reversed.

Reversed.

Judges Parker and Graham concur.

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VAUGHN, Judge.

Among other things, the trial judge held that “the document entered on June 2, 1969 in Cobb County, Georgia does not constitute a judgment entitled to full faith and credit. ...” To so hold constituted patent error. However, the judge did correctly conclude that, even if the judgment was entitled to full faith and credit, the courts of this State have jurisdiction to enter orders providing for the custody of minor children when they are physically present in this State. G.S. 50-13.5 (c) (2) a and G.S. 50-13.7.

It is well settled that upon appropriate findings of fact showing changed circumstances substantially affecting the welfare of the children, the court may modify a prior order awarding custody. The burden is upon the party seeking modification of the order to show the changed circumstances which substantially affect the welfare of the children.

The record on appeal in this proceeding consists of 403 pages. It is neither necessary nor desirable to review the evidence set out in this record and, because of its nature, we have elected not to do so. It suffices to say that the evidence does not support the findings of fact and that the findings of fact do not support the judgment. The judgment of the Superior Court of Cobb County, Georgia remains in full force and effect. The judgment and orders of the District Court of Forsyth County purporting to modify the same are reversed.

Reversed.

Judges Parker and Graham concur.

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Bluebook (online)

191 S.E.2d 908, 16 N.C. App. 372, 1972 N.C. App. LEXIS 1708, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/spence-v-durham-ncctapp-1972.

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