Speedway/Super America v. Elias

285 S.W.3d 722, 2009 Ky. LEXIS 156, 2009 WL 1819419
CourtKentucky Supreme Court
DecidedJune 25, 2009
Docket2008-SC-000873-WC
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 285 S.W.3d 722 (Speedway/Super America v. Elias) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Kentucky Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Speedway/Super America v. Elias, 285 S.W.3d 722, 2009 Ky. LEXIS 156, 2009 WL 1819419 (Ky. 2009).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

The court determined in Bevin Coal Co. v. Ramey, 947 S.W.2d 55 (Ky.1997), that home healthcare services provided by an injured worker’s spouse were compensable if they were medically necessary, performed competently, and provided cure and relief from a work-related injury’s effects. Relying on the decision, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) awarded the claimant benefits for his spouse’s services from the date of injury, including future benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Board (Board) vacated portions of the *724 award and remanded the claim for additional fact-finding but affirmed otherwise. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Appealing, the employer asserts that the ALJ lacked jurisdiction to enter the award; that the entire award should be vacated because none of the Forms 114 was “fully completed;” that the award through August 20, 2003, should be vacated because the Forms 114 were untimely; and that the ALJ failed to base the award on substantial evidence. We affirm for the reasons stated herein.

The claimant was severely injured in a work-related motor vehicle accident on December 1,1999. He sustained a head injury, ruptured spleen, injured adrenal gland, and fractures to his right hip, femur, pelvis, scapula, and right foot. Six unsuccessful orthopedic surgeries left his left leg one and one-half inches shorter than the right. As a consequence, he has ongoing pain, difficulty walking, and must use a wheelchair when away from his home. He also suffers from dementia and a neurocogni-tive disorder that produces anxiety, depression, short-term memory loss, slurred speech, and impaired judgment.

On October 20, 2003, the claimant’s attorney submitted a letter and Form 114 to the employer requesting $104,660.00 in payment for “convalescent care” that the claimant’s spouse, Deana Elias, provided from January 1, 2000, through October 20, 2003. 1 Although the form did not list specific services that Deana performed or the name and address of the physician who ordered the services, the letter provided additional information. It explained that Deana had spent numerous hours providing extensive convalescent care since her husband’s accident.

According to the letter, the employer provided a professional home health nurse from 7:00 a.m. through 3:00 p.m. each day from January 1, 2000, through February 2002. Deana cared for him from 3:00 p.m. through 7:00 a.m. each day. She administered medications and nightly injections, assisted throughout the night with trips to the restroom and whatever else was necessary for his comfort, and transported him to and from numerous medical appointments.

The letter indicated that Deana provided round-the-clock care from February 2002 to December 2002, after the employer stopped providing a nurse. Among other things, she changed dressings, administered injections and medications, and monitored IVs; assisted with bed baths, shaving, and shower baths, which involved using a hoist; assisted with bedside toilet needs and cleansing afterwards; cleaned and dressed bed sores and surgical wounds; helped the claimant to dress; and attended continuously to his personal and medical needs. After Deana returned to work in December 2002, she continued to transport the claimant to medical appointments and to assist him with dressing his lower extremities and using the stairs.

The letter requested payment for Deana’s services at the rate of $10.00 per hour for eight hours per day from January 1, 2000, through February 1, 2002, although she was “on duty” for 16 hours per day; for eight hours per day from February 1, 2002, through December 1, 2002, although her actual “on duty” hours increased; and for six hours per day from December 1, 2002, to October 20, 2003.

After the claimant’s attorney submitted a Form 114 for the following 60 days, the employer responded. The employer denied the request with respect to the period *725 prior to August 21, 2003, on the ground that it was untimely because 803 KAR 25:096, § 11(1) requires a Form 114 to be filed within 60 days after services are initiated and every 60 days thereafter. The employer “conditionally” denied payment for services provided after August 21, 2003, and requested a physician’s statement demonstrating the medical necessity for any services Deana provided; a physician’s statement that the claimant could not perform the services himself; and a detailed list of the various activities that Deana performed, including the date, time, and duration of each, in order to evaluate the request.

The claimant’s attorney continued to submit Forms 114 approximately every 60 days thereafter, and the employer continued to deny payment because the requested information was not provided. On August 30, 2004, counsel submitted a handwritten note from Deana, stating as follows:

Degree of help depends on condition. Time of accident full care.
After each injury he required a lot of care.
Now he is recovering from last injuries [sic] and needs moderate care.
Dressing (lower extremities); bathing, to the bathroom[,] excersies [sic] (physical therapy would have him do at home) Medications, injections and IVs (He is not on these now, but was for about 2 months)
Cleaned and dressed wounds
Dr. appointments
Therapy appointments.
Help in & out of house, car, heat, ice, massaged muscles (back & legs)

The employer responded that in order “to fully evaluate whether (1) the services [Deana] is providing are compensable and (2) to determine the amount of time spent in such activities,” she should provide a daily breakdown of the activities she provided, “such as a medical provider would keep records.” The employer requested her to note “the date, activity, the time the activity began, and the time that the activity ended, along with a description of how Mr. Elias is responding.” Despite the request, the claimant’s attorney continued to submit Forms 114 that were similar to the previous forms.

The claimant filed a formal application for workers’ compensation benefits in May 2007. Deana testified that he required less care over time and was able to take care of more of his personal needs by late 2002. He did, however, continue to have difficulty with walking and balance. He had fallen several times, fractured his wrist once, and continued to need assistance with basic activities of daily living, which required about six hours of her time per day. She stated that at some point the employer offered to allow him to work from home but that he declined because he was having memory problems and “was concentrating on getting better.” She described a typical day as follows:

In the mornings he has some medications he has to take on an empty stomach so usually I give those to him. He has to wait an hour. Other medicines he needs to have with food so therefore I have to wait and give him something in the morning to eat and then give him his food [sic]. That’s what we do before — his medicine I mean. We also keep an eye on his blood pressure.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
285 S.W.3d 722, 2009 Ky. LEXIS 156, 2009 WL 1819419, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/speedwaysuper-america-v-elias-ky-2009.