Specie v. Howerton Electric Company

344 S.W.2d 314, 1961 Mo. App. LEXIS 646
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedMarch 6, 1961
Docket23298
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 344 S.W.2d 314 (Specie v. Howerton Electric Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Specie v. Howerton Electric Company, 344 S.W.2d 314, 1961 Mo. App. LEXIS 646 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961).

Opinion

ELMO B. HUNTER, Presiding Judge.

This is an appeal from the judgment of the Circuit Court of Randolph County, Missouri, affirming an $8,379.10 award of the Industrial Commission in favor of ■claimant-respondent, Joseph P. Specie, against appellants, Howerton Electric Company, as employer, and Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Company, the insurer.

The disputed question is whether or not claimant is an independent contractor. The parties agree that if he is an independent contractor he is not an employee within the , meaning and provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act so as to entitle him to the compensation and benefits for the injuries sustained by him. See, Rucker v. Blanke Baer Extract & Preserving Co., Mo.App., 162 S.W.2d 345; Sargent v. Clements, 337 Mo. 1127, 88 S.W.2d 174; Hackler v. Swisher Mower & Machine Company, Mo.App., 284 S.W.2d 55. If he is not an independent contractor, appellants tacitly concede the judgment for claimant should be affirmed.

The referee and the Industrial Commission of Missouri, found claimant to be an employee within the coverage of the Workmen’s Compensation Act and not to be an independent contractor, and the Circuit Court on review of the record affirmed that finding.

The word “employee” is defined in the Workmen’s Compensation Law, Section 287.020 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., as “every person in the service of any employer * * * under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written * * * ” and the word employer has been defined in Section 287.030 as “every person * * * corporation * * * using the service of another for pay.” In Baldwin v. Gianladis, Mo.App., 159 S.W.2d 706, 708, the court said: “These definitions as well as the whole of the Workmen’s Compensation Law should be broadly and liberally construed by the courts in order to effectuate the legislative intent to afford compensation to an employee * * See, also, Dost v. Pevely Dairy Co., Mo.Sup., 273 S.W.2d 242-44.

Our state constitution requires the findings of the Industrial Commission to be supported by “competent and substantial evidence upon the whole record.” V.A.M.S. *316 Const., Article V, Sec. 22. On review of questions of fact decided by the Industrial Commission, our inquiry, as that of the circuit court, is limited to whether the findings of the commission are supported by competent and substantial evidence upon the whole record. As stated by our Supreme Court, en Banc, in Kansas City v. Rooney, 363 Mo. 902, 254 S.W.2d 626, 628: “This ‘does not mean that the reviewing court may substitute its own judgment on the evidence for that of the administrative tribunal. But it does authorize it to decide whether such tribunal could have reasonably made its findings, and reached its result, upon consideration of all of the evidence before it; and to set aside decisions clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.’ ”

Additionally, decisions of the commission which are clearly the interpretation of or application of the law, as distinguished from a determination of the facts, are not binding on the reviewing court and fall within the court’s province for review and correction. Williams v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Mo.App., 332 S.W.2d 296(2); Vaseleou v. St. Louis Realty & Securities Co., 344 Mo. 1121, 130 S.W.2d 538.

We proceed to set out from the record evidence pertinent to the question presented.

Prior to September, 1957, the appellant, J. IT. Howerton, doing business as Hower-ton Electric Company, was awarded the subcontract for the electrical work on the South Park School at Moberly, Missouri, by Scheperle Construction Company, the general contractor. After receiving this contract, Howerton was the successful bidder for the electrical work on a job in Springfield, Missouri, and Mr. Howerton contacted respondent Joseph P. Specie, doing business as Specie Electric Shop, Mo-berly, Missouri. Specie had been an electrician by trade since 1928, had his own place of business in Moberly and employed some six men with whom he worked. As testified by Mr. Howerton:

“I called him * * * asking him if he would consider handling part of the work until such time as we could move on the job with our own crew.”’ * * * “I knew he was familiar with the job, and asked him by phone if he would be interested in furnishing men for as long as we required his services — ultimately that is the basis of our agreement * * * we came to an agreement that he was to charge xxx-dollars for a foreman and xxx-dollars for helpers, * * * he was to include his insurance and any markup that he thought that he ought to have for running the job. * * *
“Q. * * * you asked him if he would consider handling part of the job — I assume that you meant labor part — ‘until I (Howerton) could move in with my own crew?’ A. That is correct.
“Q. How long did you contemplate that would take? A. Well, it was an intangible item because of the weather. ⅝ ⅜ ⅜ )> ¾⅞ ⅜ ⅜
“Q. Could you have moved in sooner under the terms of your agreement with Mr. Specie? A. Yes, I could have if I had wanted to.
“Q. Could you have moved in at any time you wanted to ? A. According to our agreement, yes — that was the understanding, that I could move in any time I wanted to.
“Q. Now, when you say you could move in at any time you wanted to— do you mean that you would then, with your employees, take over the work that was then being performed by Mr. Specie and various other men? A. Well, that’s what we did do. We did do that in March, we actually moved in en masse, and his men left the job. * * *
*317 “Q. Then the agreement with Mr. Specie covered no particular length of time, it was merely a continuing agreement from week to week? A. That is correct.”

Howerton also agreed to and did place on the premises a van which served as an office and headquarters for Joseph Specie, and from which van all materials were supplied. These materials were provided and placed there by Howerton and kept up to date by him as the job progressed.

The plans and specifications for the project, prepared by the architect, were given to Mr. Specie by Mr. Howerton. Howerton stated that normally he would prepare in addition to the plans and specifications such things as notations as to height, sizes, routing and so forth, but in this instance no changes were needed or made. Howerton went to the job site and made periodic inspection of the work in progress being done by Specie. Hower-ton’s superintendent, Mr. Sullivan, also made some inspections.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Fitzgerald v. Meyer
820 S.W.2d 633 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1991)
Todd v. Goostree
493 S.W.2d 411 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1973)
Pratt v. Reed & Brown Hauling Company
361 S.W.2d 57 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1962)
Brotherton v. International Shoe Company
360 S.W.2d 108 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1962)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
344 S.W.2d 314, 1961 Mo. App. LEXIS 646, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/specie-v-howerton-electric-company-moctapp-1961.