Spears v. United States

221 F. Supp. 990, 1963 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6746
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Oklahoma
DecidedAugust 2, 1963
DocketCiv. No. 5226
StatusPublished

This text of 221 F. Supp. 990 (Spears v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Spears v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 990, 1963 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6746 (E.D. Okla. 1963).

Opinion

DAUGHERTY, District Judge.

This is a civil action brought by the plaintiff, David L. Spears, for his personal injuries and death of his wife against the defendant, the United States of America, under the provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act, Title 28 United States Code §§ 1346(b) and 2674.

On November 15, 1960, the defendant, the United States of America and the State of Oklahoma entered into a written contract (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 19) for the relocation of certain portions of Oklahoma State Highways No. 9 and No. 9 Alternate, which interfered with the development of the Eufaula dam and reservoir being constructed by the United States pursuant to an Act of Congress.

[991]*991Under the provisions of the contract which are pertinent to the issues here involved, the State of Oklahoma obligated itself to close the Canadian River section of Oklahoma State Highway No. 9 and to maintain a portion of existing Oklahoma State Highway No. 9 Alternate for use as a satisfactory detour for Oklahoma State Highway 9 which was closed. Further upon completion of the relocation work by the United States, the State of Oklahoma agreed to convey to to the United States those portions of Highways 9 and 9 Alternate which would be inundated by water from the reservoir. The United States was obligated under the contract to convey to the State of Oklahoma its rights of way obtained in connection with the relocated portions of State Highways No. 9 and 9 Alternate, and further at no cost to the State of Oklahoma to place 600 tons of crushed rock per mile to the existing surface of that four mile part of Oklahoma State Highway 9 Alternate to be used as a detour and to stock-pile 2500 tons of crushed rock near Oklahoma State Highway 9 Alternate for use by the State of Oklahoma in maintaining said Oklahoma State Highway No. 9 Alternate as a detour.

Thus the purpose of said agreement is to enable the United States of America to acquire those portions of Oklahoma State Highways 9 and 9 Alternate which will be flooded by the waters of the reservoir and to provide the State of Oklahoma with proper substitute facilities in place of the flooded portions of Oklahoma State Highways 9 and 9 Alternate, and for the State of Oklahoma to provide a suitable detour for Oklahoma State Highway 9 during the period of construction.

Conforming to said agreement the defendant through an independent contractor caused the crushed rock to be spread on the four miles of detour and stockpiled the 2500 tons of crushed rock for subsequent use by the State of Oklahoma. This spreading of crushed rock and stock-piling of crushed rock was begun on October 29, 1960, and completed by the defendant on November 13, 1960. After the date of November 13, I960-, the United States furnished no materials or work or supervision and had nothing further to do with the maintenance or control of Oklahoma State Highway 9 Alternate, which was in use as a detour. On or about January 15, 1961, Oklahoma State Highway 9 was closed for public use by the State of Oklahoma and all trafile by the public was routed over a portion of Oklahoma State Highway 9 Alternate for a considerable period of time, including the date of the accident involved herein. The State of Oklahoma barricaded Oklahoma State Highway 9-when the same was closed and erected the signs designating Oklahoma State Highway 9 Alternate as such and as a detour.

The defendant began construction work on relocating Highways 9 and 9-Alternate shortly after Highway 9 was closed and as of the date of trial herein such work had not been fully completed and there had not been a transfer or exchange of rights of way between the United States and the State of Oklahoma pursuant to the provisions of the-aforementioned agreement.

Oklahoma State Highway 9 Alternate-when put in use as a detour with increased traffic, became dusty at times. Such dusty condition was detrimental to-traffic and required cautious driving.

On March 10, 1961, the plaintiff herein, David R. Spears, was severely injured and his wife, Imogene Spears, was-, killed as a result of an automobile accident on said Oklahoma State Highway 9-Alternate detour which occurred when the automobile in which the said plaintiff and his wife were riding, collided head-on with an automobile approaching from the opposite direction. The plaintiff and his wife were riding as passengers in a car driven by the plaintiff's-son in an easterly direction on said detour. The car in which the plaintiff was riding entered the detour on said date- and proceeded a distance of approximately two miles along the road before the-collision occurred at a point described as-one-quarter mile east of the Gaines Creek. [992]*992¡bridge. The other car involved in the -collision was being driven in a westerly ■direction. From the evidence it appears "that the car in which the plaintiff was riding was following a station wagon and that both of said vehicles passed a third "vehicle which was traveling on said detour in the same direction. The plain"tiff’s car was traveling in a cloud of dust raised by the station wagon. As the plaintiff's car was in the act of passing the third car and traveling in a cloud -of dust it collided head-on with the car traveling in the opposite direction, which collision occurred in the lane of traffic ■of said car moving in a westerly direction. As a result of the accident the wife ■of plaintiff was killed and the plaintiff ■suffered substantial and permanent personal injuries.

In bringing this suit the plaintiff asserts liability on the part of the defendant, United States of America, under alternate theories of the State of Oklahoma being an agent of the defendant, the 'State of Oklahoma and the defendant being engaged in a joint venture, the location of the accident being on land of which the defendant was the equitable owner and soon entitled to be the legal ■owner, and that the road where the accident occurred being what is known as an access road under the provisions of Title 33 United States Code § 701r-l(b).

After the trial, plaintiff makes the .additional assertion of liability on the part of the defendant on the grounds that the State of Oklahoma was acting as an independent contractor of the United States in the maintenance of the detour and that said detour was improperly maintained so as to constitute a nuisance for which the United States was liable for failing to remedy the same .after having knowledge of said nuisance .■and the same being in violation of the .■statutes -of the State of Oklahoma.

Following the trial herein, the plaintiff, by letter addressed to the Court and dated July 2, 1963, which is attached hereto as Inclosure 1, abandons his position that the defendant is liable and responsible herein under the agency, joint ■venture -or -equitable ownership positions. Plaintiff thus rests his case on the defendant being responsible on the proposition of the detour being an access road under Title 33 U.S.C. § 701r-1(b), and the proposition that the State of Oklahoma was acting as an independent contractor of the United States of America in maintaining said detour.

With reference to the access road proposition, the evidence in the case clearly demonstrates that this detour cannot be considered as an access road under the above mentioned provision of the United States Code. On the contrary, it appears that this detour was a part of the Oklahoma State Highway system. This detour was many miles from the dam-site. It was and still is owned by the State of Oklahoma.

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Related

§ 701r-1
33 U.S.C. § 701r-1(b)
§ 701r
33 U.S.C. § 701r

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Bluebook (online)
221 F. Supp. 990, 1963 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6746, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/spears-v-united-states-oked-1963.