Spears v. State of Washington

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA MARCUS ISAIAH SPEARS, CASE NO. 3:22-cv-05898-LK Petitioner, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO v. REOPEN CASE Respondent.

This matter comes before the Court on pro se Petitioner Marcus Isaiah Spears’ Motion to Reopen Case. Dkt. No. 66. Mr. Spears asks the Court to reopen his federal habeas petition pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). Id. at 2. For the reasons explained below, the motion is denied. Mr. Spears is currently confined at the Coyote Ridge Corrections Center. Dkt. No. 4 at 1. In September 2015, Mr. Spears pleaded guilty in Pierce County Superior Court to three counts of child molestation in the first degree and was sentenced pursuant to a Special Sex Offender Sentencing Alternative (“SSOSA”). Dkt. No. 47-1 at 2–19, 36–45. The sentence imposed included, among other things, six months in jail followed by a term of 124 months of community custody. Id. at 7. In July 2016, the court modified Mr. Spears’ sentence to impose 60 days of confinement in light of his failure to comply with the terms of his community custody. Id. at 24–28. On October 9, 2020, due to ongoing violations, the court revoked Mr. Spears’ term of community custody and

imposed a 130-month suspended term of imprisonment with credit for time served. Id. at 30–32. Two years later, in October 2022, Mr. Spears filed a personal restraint petition challenging his guilty plea and sentence. See Dkt. No. 47-1 at 51–129. The Washington Court of Appeals dismissed his petition in January 2023 because it was filed more than one year after his sentence became final and he failed to show that his petition fell within the exceptions enumerated under Section 10.73.100 of the Revised Code of Washington. Id. at 131–32.1 Mr. Spears then filed a motion for reconsideration and other submissions which the court of appeals construed as a motion for discretionary review under RAP 16.14(c) and transferred to the Washington Supreme Court. Dkt. No. 47-1 at 134–50, 156. On February 23, 2023, the Washington Supreme Court denied Mr. Spears’ motion for discretionary review, and on May 3, 2023, the court denied his subsequent

motions to supplement the record and modify its prior ruling. Id. at 159–60, 243; see also id. at 245 (certificate of finality from Washington Court of Appeals indicating that its January 24, 2023 decision became final on May 3, 2023); Dkt. No. 35 at 3 (same). Mr. Spears filed a habeas petition in this Court on November 21, 2022, claiming that due to ineffective assistance of counsel he did not know he had a right to appeal or file a personal restraint petition, and that his cognitive disabilities and suffering as a victim of child abuse were not properly addressed during his criminal proceedings. See Dkt. No. 1; Dkt. No. 4 at 3–15. He also alleged due process violations and that his counsel coerced him to sign his plea agreement.

1 As part of Mr. Spears’ post-conviction proceedings, the state court also denied Mr. Spears’ efforts to compel his trial counsel to produce his case file. Id. at 262–80; see also Dkt. No. 49 at 3 n.1. See Dkt. No. 4 at 3, 7. Judge Leupold issued an R&R recommending dismissal with prejudice because the one-year statute of limitations under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) expired for Mr. Spears on November 10, 2021, and therefore his petition was time-barred. Dkt. No. 49 at 4–5, 8; see Dkt. Nos. 19, 39 (Judge Leupold’s orders imposing and

lifting the stay in this case). The R&R also recommended denying an evidentiary hearing and a certificate of appealability. Id. at 7–8.2 Mr. Spears did not object to the R&R’s conclusion that, absent the application of statutory or equitable tolling, his habeas petition was time-barred. Dkt. No. 50; Dkt. No. 52 at 6. On October 31, 2023, this Court adopted the R&R, overruled Mr. Spears’ objections to it, and independently determined that his petition was time-barred: First, Mr. Spears filed his federal habeas petition on November 21, 2022, more than one year after the AEDPA statute of limitations began to run following the expiration of the period for him to seek direct review on any of his claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); Dkt. No. 4 at 2 (noting that Mr. Spears did not appeal from the judgment of conviction); see also Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 150 (2012) (under Section 2244(d)(1)(A), a judgment becomes final when the time for seeking direct review in state court expires). And Mr. Spears does not object to the R&R’s conclusion that his subsequent untimely pursuit of post-conviction relief in state court beginning in October 2022 did not toll AEDPA’s statute of limitations under Section 2244(d)(2). See Dkt. No. 49 at 5; see also Pace, 544 U.S. at 417 (“Because the state court rejected petitioner’s [state] petition as untimely, it was not ‘properly filed,’ and he is not entitled to statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2).”); Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[S]ection 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state petition was filed.”).

Second, the R&R properly addressed Mr. Spears’ arguments regarding equitable tolling. Dkt. No. 49 at 6–7. As Judge Leupold observed, the Ninth Circuit has made clear that “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling under AEDPA is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (cleaned up). A petitioner bears the burden of showing that this “extraordinary” remedy should apply. Id. at 1065. As Judge Leupold explained, ignorance of the applicable law generally does not constitute the type of “extraordinary circumstance” that warrants equitable tolling. Id. (citing Rasberry v.

2 Judge Leupold declined to reach Respondent’s exhaustion arguments based on his recommendation that Mr. Spears’ petition be dismissed as time-barred. Id. at 7 n.2. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006)). Moreover, “[a]n unadorned failure to advise about a limitations period would, at best, be simple negligence” on the part of counsel and does not entitle a petitioner to equitable tolling. Holemen v. Ryan, No. CV12-02350-PHX-SRB, 2013 WL 3716603, at *10 (D. Ariz. Jul. 15, 2013); see also Doe v. Busby, 661 F.3d 1001, 1012 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that when petitioners allege that their attorneys were the cause of the untimeliness, “courts must examine if the claimed failure was one of mere negligence by the attorney, such as inadvertently miscalculating a filing deadline in a non-capital case, . . . or a sufficiently egregious misdeed like malfeasance or failing to fulfill a basic duty of client representation.” (citations omitted)). As a whole, Mr. Spears’ conclusory assertions in his petition, reply, and objections do not show that any extraordinary circumstances stood in his way or prevented him from timely filing his habeas petition, even assuming he acted with reasonable diligence. See Smith v. Davis, 953 F.3d 582, 600 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (“[I]t is only when an extraordinary circumstance prevented a petitioner acting with reasonable diligence from making a timely filing that equitable tolling may be the proper remedy.”); see also Mathison v. Obenland, No. C18-0661-JLR-MAT, 2018 WL 7252943, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 7, 2018) (denying equitable tolling where petitioner’s tolling arguments merely reiterated the substance of his claims for relief and failed to explain why he waited to file a federal habeas petition), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 485095 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 7, 2019).

Dkt. No. 52 at 5–7. Mr. Spears did not object to Judge Leupold’s recommendations that the matter be decided without an evidentiary hearing and that the Court deny a certificate of appealability. See Dkt. No. 49 at 7–8; Dkt. No. 50; Dkt. No. 52 at 7–8. The Court agreed with Judge Leopold that (1) it was not necessary to hold an evidentiary hearing because the petition could be resolved on the existing state court record, and (2) a certification of appealability was not warranted because Mr. Spears had not demonstrated that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. Dkt. No. 49 at 7–8; Dkt. No. 52 at 7–8. Mr. Spears then sought a certificate of appealability from the Ninth Circuit. His request was denied on September 13, 2024. Dkt. No. 65 at 1 (“[A]ppellant has not shown that ‘jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.’” (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000))). On October 10, 2024, Mr. Spears filed a motion “To Attack Integrity of Proceedings ‘Reopen Habeas corpus case’ pursuant to Rule 60(B)(6).” Dkt. No. 66. Mr. Spears argues that the Court failed to (1) review “the Answer, any Transcrip[t]s and

records of state court proceedings, and any materials submitted under Rule 7 to determine whether an evidentiary hearing is warranted”; (2) “review the claims submitted to determine whether the State Court’s ruling on the issues was the result of unreasonable factual findings or an unreasonable application of Federal Pursuant to: 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(i) ‘AND’ the AEDPA, Rule ‘8’”; (3) conduct an evidentiary hearing; and (4) appoint him an attorney. Dkt. No. 66 at 4–7. He argues that these failures violated his rights to Due Process and Equal Protection under the under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, as well as his First Amendment rights. Id. at 4–6. Rule 60 allows the Court to provide relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly

discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The Supreme Court discussed the relationship between Rule 60(b) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 and 2241 in Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005). There, the Court explained that the Rules of Civil Procedure apply to habeas corpus proceedings only to the extent they are not inconsistent

with applicable federal statutory provisions and rules. Id. at 529 (internal citations omitted). When a petitioner has previously filed a federal habeas claim, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1)–(3) imposes three requirements on second or successive habeas petitions: (1) any claim adjudicated in a previous petition must be dismissed; (2) any claim not already adjudicated must be dismissed unless it relies on either a new and retroactive rule of constitutional law or new facts showing a high probability

of actual innocence; and (3) before the district court may accept a successive petition, the court of appeals must determine that it presents a claim not previously raised that is sufficient to meet Section 2244(b)(2)’s new-rule or actual innocence provisions. Id. at 529–30. Failure to meet these requirements deprives the district court of jurisdiction to consider the merits of a second or successive petition under 22 U.S.C. § 2244(b). United States v. Washington, 653 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir. 2011). If a petitioner is asserting a claim that either on its face is a habeas claim, or is similar enough to a habeas claim that failing to subject it to the same requirements would be inconsistent with the statute, he cannot circumvent the “second or successive” requirement that the claim be pre-certified by the court of appeals as falling within an exception to the successive- petition bar. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 531–532.

The Court also explained that determining whether a Rule 60(b) motion advances one or more claims subject to the second or successive certification requirement generally will be simple. Id. at 532. A motion that seeks to add a new ground for relief, or attacks a previous court’s resolution on the merits, is barred. Id. But if a Rule 60(b) motion attacks not the substance of the federal court’s resolution on the merits, but some defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings, the motion is not barred. Id. Examples of claims that seek to add or reassert grounds for relief include assertions that excusable neglect resulted in the omission of constitutional claims in a previous habeas petition. Id. at 530–31. On the other hand, contentions that a fraud on the habeas court took place or that the court erred in making a procedural ruling, which precluded a

determination on the merits, are legitimate under Rule 60(b). Washington, 653 F.3d at 1063. Even assuming without deciding that Mr. Spears’ motion is a legitimate Rule 60(b) motion, it lacks merit. Rule 60(b)(6) is to be “used sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent manifest injustice and is to be utilized only where extraordinary circumstances prevented a party from taking timely action to prevent or correct an erroneous judgment.” Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & Co.,

452 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2006). “Such circumstances will rarely occur in the habeas context.” Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535. Mr. Spears falls far short of showing the exceptional circumstances required to trigger relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6). First, he identifies no error in the Magistrate Judge’s original analysis or conclusion that he was not entitled to have an attorney appointed during his federal habeas proceeding; he merely asserts his disagreement with the decision, which does not entitle him to relief here. Dkt. No. 66 at 5; see also, e.g., Brault v. Trans Union, LLC, No. GJH-18-3244, 2019 WL 7293396, at *4 (D. Md. Dec. 27, 2019) (“mere disagreement with a court’s legal analysis does not justify extraordinary relief under Rule 60(b)(6)’s catchall provision.” (quotation marks omitted)). Second, Mr. Spears asserts that the Court applied the wrong standard when deciding

whether to hold an evidentiary hearing, citing Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) as the correct standard. Dkt. No. 66 at 5. Under Townsend, “a federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing to a habeas applicant” where, as Mr. Spears contends happened here, “the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing.” 372 U.S. at 313; Dkt. No. 66 at 5. But Townsend was overruled in relevant part by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 9 (1992), which itself was largely displaced by AEDPA’s “more stringent requirements” codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). See Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366, 381 (2022). Under the current scheme, even where Section 2254(e)(2)’s requirements are satisfied, “a federal habeas court still is not required to hold a hearing or take any evidence.” Id. The Court correctly followed applicable law in denying

Mr. Spears’ request for an evidentiary hearing. Dkt. No. 49 at 7–8; Dkt. No. 52 at 7. For the reasons explained above, the Court DENIES Mr. Spears’ Motion to Reopen the Case. Dkt. No. 66. Dated this 18th day of November, 2024.

A Lauren King United States District Judge