Speaks v. Metropolitan Street Railway Co.

166 S.W. 864, 179 Mo. App. 311, 1914 Mo. App. LEXIS 198
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedMay 4, 1914
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 166 S.W. 864 (Speaks v. Metropolitan Street Railway Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Speaks v. Metropolitan Street Railway Co., 166 S.W. 864, 179 Mo. App. 311, 1914 Mo. App. LEXIS 198 (Mo. Ct. App. 1914).

Opinion

TRIMBLE, J.

Plaintiff, as the widow of Orville Speaks, sues for damages sustained by reason of her husband’s death which she charges was caused by de[314]*314fendant’s negligence. The jury found in favor of one of the defendants and for plaintiff in the sum of $2000' presumably against the other, upon which judgment was rendered against the receivers of both. A motion for new trial was filed which the court sustained on thfe ground that under the evidence plaintiff was not entitled to recover and that the court erred in not sustaining defendant’s demurrer. Plaintiff appealled; and the correctness of the court’s ruling is now the question before us.

The husband’s fall and death occurred shortly after midnight on Septemer 3> 1911, at the Mulberry Street station on the elevated street railway between Kansas City Mo., and Kansas City, Kansas. The platform and station house is about 30 feet from the ground. It is reached by a stairway leading from the ground to the south side of the station or shelter house, the station platform being on the north side thereof, so that one coming up> the stairway must go through the shelter house and through a doorway opening on to the platform and then out upon the platform before reaching the track upon which cars pass and where they stop to let off and take on passengers. At the east end of the platform there was a railing or fence extending from the southeast corner of the station house to the track and approaching so closely and at right angles to it that a passing car comes within eight or nine inches of the end of the fence. Prom the door of the station to this guardrail or fence nearest the track is 16 feet and 10 inches. On this fence was a sign bearing these words in letters three inches high: “WARNING. DO' NOT ATTEMPT T.O BOARD CAR WHILE IN MOTION.”

The car which deceased attempted to board was 44 feet long and the station patform 49 feet in length. The car was, therefore, almost long enough to occupy the entire length of the platform when fully on it with its front end even with the guardrail or fence at the [315]*315east end. And this was its proper and usual place to let off and take on passengers at that station. Different cars bound for different points and sections of the ■city ran over this' track and passed this station, so that persons on the patform would not board a car at that point unless it was the particular car they wanted. The car which deceased attempted to board, and from which he fell and was killed, was an east bound car.

Deceased, in company with his two brothers, came up the stairway in single file to the station house. Deceased was in front and went through the station house out on to the platform. His brother, Arthur, was a step or a step-and-a-half behind him and the other brother, William, a similar distance behind Arthur.

At the rear end of the car was a step' from which a boarding passenger could reach the rear platform or vestibule and from thence pass on into the car proper. At the edge of the rear platform or vestibule was a gate made of iron net work movable on its joints so that it could be opened by pushing it together to one side or could be closed by stretching it across the opening and fastening it there thus forming a fence or barrier to an entrance upon the platform or vestibule of the car.

It is undisputed that plaintiff’s husband got upon the step of the car while it was moving and shortly before the rear vestibule or car platform had passed ,the fence or guardrail at the east end of the station platform, and that just after the rear vestibule of the car passed this fence or guardrail, he fell thirty feet to the ground below and was instantly killed.

There were three specifications of negligence in the petition. The first two of which charged the conductor of the car with negligence. These, however, could not be relied upon as the testimony of plaintiff’s own witnesses did not support either of them and the court very properly instructed the jury that no negligence of the conductor had been shown. The conductor could [316]*316not be guilty of negligence in ordering tbe car to start, since all the testimony shows tbe car was in motion and leaving tbe station platform before plaintiff’s husband attempted to board it by getting upon tbe rear step- of tbe car.

Tbe third and remaining* specification of negligence was against tbe motorman, charging him with starting tbe car forward suddenly thereby causing plaintiff’s-husband to lose bis balance on tbe step or runboard of tbe car and fall to tbe pavement below. And, since it was admitted that tbe car was in motion and at least three fourths of tbe car bad passed beyond the east edge of tbe elevated station platform at tbe time deceased stepped upon tbe runboard, tbe sudden starting* of tbe car complained of was not its initial starting but was a starting up of the car from a slow to a more rapid movement, and made at a time when tbe rear end of tbe car was at or near tbe guardrail or fence at tbe -edge of tbe station platform, that is, while tbe car was moving away from and bad almost left tbe station platform, at which time tbe motorman bad a right to presume that tbe gate to tbe rear vestibule of said car was closed, according to rule, and that no one would attempt at that perilous place to get upon tbe car while in motion in violation of tbe rule of tbe company and tbe warning not to do so, conspicuously posted on tbe guardrail. A sudden acceleration of tbe speed of tbe car at that time would not be negligence on tbe part, of tbe motorman unless be knew or bad reason to believe that a passenger bad attempted to board, or was-in tbe act of boarding, a car at that point and under those dangerous circumstances, and bad not yet bad time to get safely inside of tbe car.

We have examined tbe evidence offered in plaintiff’s behalf carefully to see if there is any substantial evidence tending to show, or from which an inference could be drawn, that tbe motorman knew or bad reason [317]*317to believe those facts, and we must hold that there is none.

It must be borne in mind that the motorman was on the front or east end of the car wholly unable to see plaintiff’s husband at the time he got upon the rear step of the car. Even if plaintiff’s husband standing by the track on the station platform as the front end of the car, containing the motorman, passed the station house door so that the motorman saw or might have seen him, yet, as it is conceded that the track was used by cars going in the same direction but bound for different destinations, and as it is further conceded that deceased did not signal the motorman or give him any intimation that he desired to board that particular car, and as plaintiff’s witnesses say the car did not stop at the station, therefore the motorman would have a right to proceed and also to presume the rear gate was closed according to rule. It would be requiring superhuman powers of the motorman to charge him with the duty of knowing that deceased would attempt to board the car at such a place and under such dangerous circumstances when every intimation to the motorman was to the contrary. And unless the motorman had reason to believe that deceased would and did board the car and must therefore have a reasonable time to get safely upon it before the speed of the car could be accelerated, it w;as not negligence for him to resume the ordinary speed of his car usual between stations.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
166 S.W. 864, 179 Mo. App. 311, 1914 Mo. App. LEXIS 198, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/speaks-v-metropolitan-street-railway-co-moctapp-1914.