Sparrow v. American Fire & Casualty Company

89 S.E.2d 800, 243 N.C. 60, 1955 N.C. LEXIS 718

• Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Decided: November 2, 1955
• Docket: 307
• Status: Published

Opinion

JohnsoN, J.

The plaintiff insists that he is entitled to recover under the comprehensive clause — “Coverage F,” which binds the insurance company to pay for “any direct and accidental loss of or damage to the automobile. . . .” However, to recover under this clause, it is noted that the loss or damage must be both “direct” and “accidental.” In the case at hand, the facts agreed establish no element of “accidental” loss or damage as that term is commonly understood and also well defined in our decisions. See Fletcher v. Security Life & Trust Co., 220 N.C. 148, 16 S.E. 2d 687; Kirkley v. Merrimack Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 232 N.C. 292, 59 S.E. 2d 629.

Nor is the plaintiff entitled to recover under the “Theft (Broad Form) clause — Coverage I,” which binds the insurance company to pay for loss or damage to the automobile caused by “theft, larceny, robbery or pilferage.” The facts agreed do not bring the case within the meaning of this clause. See Funeral Home v. Insurance Co., 216 N.C. 562, 5 S.E. 2d 520; Auto Co. v. Insurance Co., 239 N.C. 416, 80 S.E. 2d 35.

Where, as here, a case is tried on an agreed statement of facts, such statement is in the nature of a special verdict, admitting there is no dispute as to the facts, and constituting a request by each litigant for a judgment which each contends arises as a matter of law on the facts agreed, and consequently the court is not permitted to infer or deduce further facts from those stipulated. Auto Co. v. Insurance Co., supra.

The decisions relied on by the plaintiff are distinguishable.

The judgment below is

Affirmed.