Sparre v. Dept. of Transp.

2012 Ohio 3679
CourtOhio Court of Claims
DecidedMarch 29, 2012
Docket2010-02286
StatusPublished

This text of 2012 Ohio 3679 (Sparre v. Dept. of Transp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sparre v. Dept. of Transp., 2012 Ohio 3679 (Ohio Super. Ct. 2012).

Opinion

[Cite as Sparre v. Dept. of Transp., 2012-Ohio-3679.]

Court of Claims of Ohio The Ohio Judicial Center 65 South Front Street, Third Floor Columbus, OH 43215 614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263 www.cco.state.oh.us

MATTHEW SPARRE, etc., et al.

Plaintiffs

v.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Defendant

Case No. 2010-02286

Judge Joseph T. Clark

DECISION

{¶ 1} Plaintiffs brought this action against the Ohio Department of Transportation (ODOT) alleging claims of negligence, wrongful death, and loss of consortium on behalf of themselves and the heirs of decedent, Kimberly Sparre.1 The issues of liability and damages were bifurcated and the case proceeded to trial on the issue of liability. {¶ 2} This case arises out of a motorcycle accident that occurred on Friday, June 20, 2008, on State Route (SR) 536 in Monroe County, Ohio.2 On Thursday, June 19, Sparre, Richard Avery, and David Kramer, who were all members of the Christian Motorcycle Association, traveled from Michigan to Marietta, Ohio, for a weekend excursion of riding motorcycles in southeastern Ohio. They drove to Marietta and towed their motorcycles in a trailer. Sparre had approximately 50 years of experience riding motorcycles at the time but Kramer was a novice rider. On June 20, the group began the ride in a staggered formation with Avery in the lead position riding close to the

1 Plaintiff Matthew Sparre was appointed executor of his father Kimberly’s estate. Plaintiff Bonnie Sparre is Kimberly Sparre’s widow. 2 All dates in the months of May and June refer to the year 2008. center line, Sparre in the middle position riding on the right side of the travel lane near the white edge line, and Kramer in the rear position near the center line. The group proceeded southbound on SR 536, a two-lane, scenic roadway. At the time of the accident, the weather conditions were sunny and clear. {¶ 3} Avery testified that he was traveling approximately 30 miles per hour (mph) when he came upon a raised area in the asphalt of the southbound lane of SR 536 near mile marker 5.98. The speed limit in that area was 55 mph. Avery testified that the raised area caused him difficulty in controlling his motorcycle as he traversed it. After Avery encountered difficulty, he glanced in his rear-view mirror and saw Sparre come around the corner near the top of a hill, but as Sparre rode into a shaded area, Avery lost sight of him. Avery then stopped at the bottom of the hill, turned around and traveled in the opposite direction. Avery saw Sparre’s motorcycle lying in the southbound lane of SR 536 and found Sparre’s body lying under a guardrail. Kramer then came upon the accident scene. A passing motorist in a pick-up truck stopped to assist the group. They attempted to call for assistance but encountered difficulty with cell-phone service so they decided to place Sparre’s body in the back of the truck and drive to the hospital. After traveling approximately three miles, an ambulance with paramedics arrived. Sparre was pronounced dead by the paramedics. Toxicology tests showed that no alcohol or drugs were in Sparre’s system. {¶ 4} Plaintiffs assert that defendant was negligent in that it both failed to maintain SR 536 in a reasonably safe condition for the motoring public, and that the signage in place in the vicinity of mile markers 5.9 and 5.98 was inadequate to warn of the condition of the roadway. Plaintiffs assert that defendant knew that the area where the accident occurred was located on a “slip”, a condition where the terrain beneath the roadway on a hillside erodes and causes the asphalt to become unstable. Plaintiffs assert that defendant’s negligence was the proximate cause of Sparre’s death. Defendant contends that it did not have actual or constructive notice of the particular hazard in the roadway. Defendant further argues that it is not liable based upon the doctrine of discretionary immunity. {¶ 5} “To maintain a wrongful death action on a theory of negligence, a plaintiff must show (1) the existence of a duty owing to plaintiff's decedent, (2) a breach of that duty, and (3) proximate causation between the breach of duty and the death.” Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hosp. & Health Ctr., 39 Ohio St.3d 86, 92 (1988), citing Bennison v. Stillpass Transit Co., 5 Ohio St.2d 122 (1966). {¶ 6} Defendant has a general duty to maintain its highways in a reasonably safe condition for the traveling public. Knickel v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 49 Ohio App.2d 335 (10th Dist.1976). However, defendant is not an insurer of the safety of its highways. See Rhodus v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 67 Ohio App.3d 723 (10th Dist.1990). It is well- settled that ODOT may be subject to liability for its failure to exercise reasonable care in maintaining state highways. White v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 56 Ohio St.3d 39, 42 (1990). However, ODOT is not liable for damages caused by dangerous conditions on state highways unless it has actual or constructive notice of the precise condition alleged to have caused the injuries in question. Manning v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 10th Dist. Nos. 96API07-931, 96API07-932, 96API07-937 (April 24, 1997), citing McClellan v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 34 Ohio App.3d 247, 249 (10th Dist.1986). The distinction between actual and constructive notice is in the manner in which notice is obtained rather than in the amount of information obtained. Whenever the trier of fact is entitled to find from competent evidence that information was personally communicated to or received by the party, the notice is actual. Constructive notice is that notice which the law regards as sufficient to give notice and is regarded as a substitute for actual notice. In re Estate of Fahle, 90 Ohio App. 195, 197 (1950). “In order for there to be constructive notice of a nuisance or defect in the highway, it must have existed for such length of time as to impute knowledge or notice.” McClellan, supra, at 250. {¶ 7} On the day of the accident, Ohio State Highway Patrol (OSHP) Trooper Ralph Hendershot and Sergeant Donald Britton arrived at the location where the ambulance and pick-up truck had stopped. They initiated an investigation which included interviewing witnesses and taking photographs. Trooper Roger Clark also answered an emergency call and went directly to the accident scene on SR 536 and began his investigation by taking both photographs and measurements. Kramer and Avery also returned to the accident scene at approximately 4:00 p.m. the same day to take photographs of the condition of the roadway. {¶ 8} Sgt. Britton and Troopers Hendershot and Clark testified that they each drafted different portions of the traffic crash report (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 27). Trooper Hendershot and Sgt. Britton took measurements of the slip in the roadway, which Trooper Hendershot described as a dip approaching a downhill grade. Trooper Hendershot noted that a southbound motorist would have encountered a 4.5-inch dip spanning the entire southbound lane which he characterized as a hazard to motorists. Trooper Hendershot and Sgt. Britton stated that the photographs do not depict the severity of the defect in the roadway and noted that the slip went into a left curve downhill. In Trooper Hendershot’s opinion, Sparre was involved in a low-speed crash caused by the condition of the roadway. Trooper Clark concluded that Sparre had ridden across that section of the roadway at a lawful speed, that he lost control of his motorcycle, and that his body came into contact with the guardrail. Trooper Clark stated that the condition of the roadway presented a hazard for a motorcycle but that a car probably would have been able to traverse the area without losing control. {¶ 9} Plaintiffs’ expert, Frederick Lickert, testified that he was a full-time accident reconstructionist and that he has ridden motorcycles for 40 years.

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Related

Knickel v. Department of Transportation
361 N.E.2d 486 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1976)
Slavick v. State, Department of Transportation
540 N.E.2d 748 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1988)
McClellan v. Ohio Department of Transportation
517 N.E.2d 1388 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1986)
Pierce v. Ohio Department of Transportation
491 N.E.2d 729 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1985)
Rhodus v. Ohio Department of Transportation
588 N.E.2d 864 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1990)
In Re Estate of Fahle
105 N.E.2d 429 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1950)
Bennison v. Stillpass Transit Co.
214 N.E.2d 213 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1966)
Reynolds v. State
471 N.E.2d 776 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1984)
Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hospital & Health Center
529 N.E.2d 449 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1988)
White v. Ohio Department of Transportation
564 N.E.2d 462 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1990)
Bowen v. Kil-Kare, Inc.
585 N.E.2d 384 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1992)

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Bluebook (online)
2012 Ohio 3679, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sparre-v-dept-of-transp-ohioctcl-2012.