Sparks v. State

48 A.D.2d 236, 368 N.Y.S.2d 614, 1975 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9581
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedMay 30, 1975
DocketClaim No. 44929
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 48 A.D.2d 236 (Sparks v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sparks v. State, 48 A.D.2d 236, 368 N.Y.S.2d 614, 1975 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9581 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1975).

Opinion

Moule, J.

The State of New York appeals and claimants cross-appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims, which awarded claimants $47,620, with interest, constituting a total sum of $73,218.40, as direct damages for the appropriation of their farm property in Cattaraugus County. This case was before us on a previous occasion at which time we decided the [238]*238questions of law involved but remitted for a new trial because the Court of Claims’ decision was neither within the range of expert testimony nor supported by the evidence (Sparks v State of New York, 39 AD2d 822).

Claimants owned 114.111 acres of land situated entirely within Allegany State Park. Several years before the appropriation of any of claimants’ land, it became apparent that at least one half of their land would be appropriated in connection with a Federally-funded program to build the Kinzua Dam and to create a reservoir and perimeter road.

At a time well after the Federal project began, but shortly before the appropriation of claimants’ property, the State decided to acquire the remainder of claimants’ land for general park purposes. As a result, on December 10, 1964 two simultaneous appropriations were made. The first, made by the State Department of Public Works, appropriated 57.287 acres of claimants’ property for use in the Federal project. The second, made by the Allegany State Park Commission pursuant to section 676-a of the Conservation Law, appropriated the remaining 56.824-acres. This latter parcel was identified as Parcel 80.

Claimants filed a claim in February, 1965 and at a trial in May, 1970 asserted that they were entitled to an enhanced value for their property in Parcel 80 due to its proximity to the reservoir and perimeter road. The State asserted that there was no enhancement and, therefore, presented no evidence as to any enhanced value of the land. The enhanced value which claimants sought included an increase in the value of the property because of certain sand and gravel borrow deposits located upon 12.89 acres of Parcel 80. The increased value attributed to these deposits was predicated upon its proximity to the Federal project.

The Court of Claims awarded $20,500 damages in connection with the property appropriated for the Federal project and awarded $47,620 for Parcel 80, taking into account its enhanced value. However, no increased value for the borrow deposits was allowed because the claimants’ appraiser used an unacceptable valuation technique.

Upon appeals by both parties, we affirmed the award of $20,500 for the property appropriated for the Federal project. In a memorandum decision (Sparks v State of New York, 39 AD2d 822, supra), we concluded that claimants were entitled to an enhanced valuation for Parcel 80 and that this included [239]*239an increased value attributed to the borrow deposits. Concerning the borrow deposits, however, it was determined that this value must be established by introducing comparable sales of land that contained borrow. Since the State appraiser had not considered enhanced value, his appraisal was found to be inadmissible. This left the court with only the claimants’ appraiser’s testimony to determine the value of Parcel 80. We found that this did not contain comparable sales which included independent evidence supporting the court’s award. We, therefore, remitted the case for a new trial on damages suffered as a result of the appropriation of Parcel 80.

Upon the retrial, claimants’ appraiser subdivided Parcel 80 into four distinct topographical categories; commercial or residential front land, 4.13 acres; open seasonal residential-recreational area, 12.89 acres; east and west wooded seasonal residential-recreational areas, 31.304 acres, and west woods steep area, 8.5 acres. He added only two comparable sales to his prior comparables to determine the enhanced value of these areas excluding the increased value attributable to the borrow deposits. He also introduced six new comparables in order to establish the increased value of the subject because of the borrow deposits which were located entirely upon the 12.89 acres of open seasonal residential-recreational property. His total value for Parcel 80 was $70,900.

The State appraiser did include enhanced value in his appraisal because of proximity to the perimeter road; however, he gave no credit for the borrow deposits, timber on the property, commercial value or for its access to the reservoir and did not subdivide the parcel as claimants’ expert did. His total value for the parcel was $4,200.

The Court of Claims made the identical award which it had made on the previous trial; $8,260 for the 4.13-acre area; $14,180 for the 12.89-acre area; $23,480 for the 31.304-acre areas and $1,700 for the 8.5-acre area, resulting in a total of $47,620. However, it did not grant any award for the borrow deposits, on the ground that the State was not obligated to pay for any increase in value which it created by sponsoring the project requiring condemnation (see 4 Nichols, Eminent Domain [3d ed], § 12.21).

The questions of whether the claimants were entitled to an enhanced value for Parcel 80 because of its proximity to the Federally-funded project and whether this enhanced value should have included an increased award due to the presence [240]*240of the borrow deposits were determined in claimants’ favor upon the prior appeal (Sparks v State of New York, 39 AD2d 822, supra), and no argument has been made herein which causes us to reconsider our position. Therefore, the only remaining question is whether the trial court improperly predicated its award for damages on claimants’ evidence which was essentially identical to that presented upon the previous trial.

Turning to the valuations of the property reached by the Court of Claims, the standard which applies on this appeal is different from that which applied on the first appeal. In the first case, since the State’s expert’s appraisal was inadmissible because it utilized an erroneous theory of valuation, there was only one appraisal upon which the court could have relied and that appraisal did not, as pointed out in our memorandum, support the values reached by the court. However, now there are two admissible appraisals and, therefore, the standard that an award must be within the range of the expert testimony or supported by independent evidence is applicable (see Ridgeway Assoc. v State of New York, 32 AD2d 851).

In valuing the 4.13-acre commercial area claimants’ appraiser used comparable Sales 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 25 and 26. Of these, only comparables 3 and 26 were truly comparable because the others were either a great distance from the subject parcel, were grossly adjusted, or did not take into account substantial differences with the subject parcel. Comparable 3 was adjacent to the same reservoir and road as the subject and was purchased for commercial use, i.e., a restaurant. However, there was a 200% increase for sales-poor frontage, poor topography, and high development costs, made by claimants’ appraiser because the comparable had a gully at its road frontage which required a large amount of fill. Although an adjustment was justified, this evidence only supports an adjustment of 100%. Further, because of the three-year delay between the appropriation and the completion of the reservoir, an additional downward adjustment of 15% should also be made to reflect the fact that the property would not immediately benefit from its frontage upon and view of the reservoir.

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Bluebook (online)
48 A.D.2d 236, 368 N.Y.S.2d 614, 1975 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9581, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sparks-v-state-nyappdiv-1975.