Sparks Manufacturing Co. v. Town of Newton

41 A. 385, 57 N.J. Eq. 367, 12 Dickinson 367, 1898 N.J. Ch. LEXIS 12
CourtNew Jersey Court of Chancery
DecidedOctober 21, 1898
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 41 A. 385 (Sparks Manufacturing Co. v. Town of Newton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Court of Chancery primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sparks Manufacturing Co. v. Town of Newton, 41 A. 385, 57 N.J. Eq. 367, 12 Dickinson 367, 1898 N.J. Ch. LEXIS 12 (N.J. Ct. App. 1898).

Opinion

Pitney, V. C.

The defendant, by its answers, sets up and claims the right to divert all the water which its works as actually constructed are capable of diverting. That amount was, during the hearing, at first agreed upon as one million two hundred and fifty thousand gallons in twenty-four hours. But that estimate was based upon the flow due to a head produced by an open pipe at the level of the court-house in Newton; and when it was pointed out that such use of the pipe would leave a large portion— nearly, if not quite, one-half of the town which is situate on ground higher than the court-house — unsupplied with water, the defendant applied for and obtained leave to limit itself to a diversion of eight hundred thousand gallons a day, which, subject to some further remarks upon the question of quantity, I shall, for present purposes, consider the amount to be diverted.

And it is to be remarked, in the first place, that that amount is carried entirely out of the valley of the Wallkill river, which runs from a point three or four miles east of Newton, in a nearly direct line, northeasterly, to and through the county of Orange, in the State of New York, and reaches the Hudson river at or near Kingston; while the town of Newton is situate on the headwaters of the Paulins Kill, which flows to the Delaware, and all its drainage finds its way into that stream and none of it into the Wallkill. So that the diversion is total, and the case is not involved with the very nice question which might arise [371]*371if the drainage of the town were in the valley of the Wallkill, since it is a notorious fact that, under ordinary circumstances, a large portion, and, where a town or city has a system of sewerage, nearly the whole of the water consumed finds its way back into a running stream. t

Upon this state of the case there can be no doubt of the duty and power of this court to intervene to prevent such a diversion of water until just compensation shall be made, unless the particular defence or defences set up by the defendant are sufficient to answer the complainants’ equity in that respect.

In the case of Higgins v. Flemington Water Co., 9 Stew. Eq. 538, the total amount proposed to be diverted, or which by the pumping machinery in use for that purpose could be diverted, from the Raritan river, was clearly shown to be six thousand one hundred and fifty cubic feet, or forty-six thousand one hundred and eighty-five gallons in one day of ten hours, and the proposition was to pump for three days in a week during the dry season; and the Raritan river, at the point of diversion, was a much greater stream than the Wallkill at Hamburg. The amount so proposed to be diverted in that case was one-sixteenth of the amount here proposed to be diverted, or, if taken only three days in a week, then only one thirty-second of the amount, and it was shown that if all that was proposed to be taken for a whole season were collected together and used in a body on complainant’s wheel it would grind less than twenty bushels of corn, the head and fall of the complainant’s power in that case being not more than five or six feet, or one-quarter of the fall here. (I take these figures from the printed book in that case.) Yet the chief-justice, in the face of these facts (at p. 541), uses this language: “ The facts which must be taken as established are these: The complainants’ property is situated on the south branch of the Raritan river, which is a stream of considerable volume except in times of drought; the defendant is a corporate body, constituted for the purpose of supplying the village of Flemington with water, and to that end, finding its supply of water from other sources insufficient, contracted with the owners of a mill on the stream in question to pump from such stream, [372]*372at a point above the premises of the complainants, and to force through pipes into its reservoir, such a quantity of water as would form the complement of its resources. This supplementary supply was necessary only in times of scarcity of water, and at such times the natural stream, if left undiminished, was insufficient for the purposes of the complainants; and the quantum which would be thus abstracted by the defendant, though not very great, would be of such, magnitude as to work a sensible and essential detriment to the complaina/nts, and would therefore be of a character that its abstraction cannot be disregarded by force of the maxim de minimis,” &c.

There was, in that case, in addition to the comparative smallness of the diversion, the additional element that the town was situate on the banks of a small stream known as Bushkill brook, which -emptied into the river above the complainants’ mills, and the drainage from the town found its way into that brook and so to the complainants’ mill-pond, so that the actual diversion was very small. No proof, however, was given by any expert of the proportion of the amount consumed by the inhabitants which found its way by natural causes into the river, and that element of the case, though pressed in the argument, was undoubtedly left for consideration by the court of chancery in settling the terms and extent of the injunction, as stated at the end of the opinion (at p. 547).

With this precedent before me, together with many others cited by counsel for the complainants, not necessary here to be mentioned, it is impossible for me to escape the duty of granting relief to the complainants unless the defence set up has strength and virtue.

In order to do full justice to the ingenious and elaborate defence set up and pressed at much length and with great earnestness and power, it is necessary to state the facts and discuss the law involved with some considerable prolixity.

The Wallkill river proper is formed at the northerly and down-stream end of .the village of Sparta, in the county of Sussex, by the union of two or three other streams, the more westerly of which is called the Wallkill, and rises in what is known [373]*373as the-Brogden meadows, and is sufficient of itself, with a large head and fall, to drive, for most of the time, a small gristmill, known as Hurd’s mill, in the southern part of the village. Then below Hurd’s mill there comes in another stream from the southeast, known as the Lennington brook, and then a stream from a natural lake, known as Morris lake, situate on ground two or three hundred feet higher than Sparta and to the east of it. To the outpour from this lake is added a small brook called Pine Swamp brook, with a drainage area of two and fifty-five hundredths square miles. The result of these flows added to the .two first mentioned forms the 'Walikill proper.

Morris lake was originally a natural lake of considerable depth, covering about one hundred and thirty acres of land, fed mainly, as alleged by the answers and proven in the case, by springs, and having a drainage area of one and twenty-five hundredths square miles, including the surface of the lake itself. But the proof satisfies me that the natural flow from the lake in a drought is much greater than is due to such drainage area. Nearly a century ago a dam several feet high was thrown across its outlet by the owners of mills in the village of Sparta to increase its depth and form a storage reservoir from which they drew the water in dry times to supply the mills.

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Bluebook (online)
41 A. 385, 57 N.J. Eq. 367, 12 Dickinson 367, 1898 N.J. Ch. LEXIS 12, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sparks-manufacturing-co-v-town-of-newton-njch-1898.