Spann-El v. MCF

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Indiana
DecidedAugust 3, 2022
Docket3:22-cv-00604
StatusUnknown

This text of Spann-El v. MCF (Spann-El v. MCF) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Spann-El v. MCF, (N.D. Ind. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA SOUTH BEND DIVISION

RICHARD A. SPANN-EL,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:22-CV-604-JD-MGG

MIAMI CORRECTIONAL FACILITY WARDEN, INDIANA STATE OF,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER Richard A. Spann-El, a prisoner without a lawyer, began this case by filing a motion asking for a preliminary and permanent injunction. (ECF 1.) He did not use the court’s approved complaint form for prisoner actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is available in his prison’s law library. See N.D. IND. L.R. 7-6 (providing that the court can require litigants representing themselves to use clerk-supplied complaint forms). Mr. Spann-El is a frequent litigator in this court and has used the complaint form many times. In this instance, the court will overlook this procedural deficiency and treat his filing as a complaint, but he is reminded that he is expected to comply with applicable procedural rules even though he is proceeding without counsel. Collins v. Illinois, 554 F.3d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 2009) (“As we have repeatedly held, even pro se litigants must follow procedural rules[.]”). Mr. Spann-El also did not pay the filing fee or move for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), he is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury because he has filed three or more cases that were dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim.1

See Abdul-Wadood v. Nathan, 91 F.3d 1023, 1025 (7th Cir. 1996). In order to meet the imminent danger standard, the threat complained of must be “real and proximate.” Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). “Allegations of past harm do not suffice; the harm must be imminent or occurring at the time the complaint is filed.” Id. In plain terms, only “genuine emergencies” qualify as a basis for circumventing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Lewis v. Sullivan, 279 F.3d 526, 531 (7th Cir. 2002).

Additionally, “[c]ourts don’t accept allegations of danger uncritically.” Sanders v. Melvin, 873 F.3d 957, 960 (7th Cir. 2017); see also Taylor v. Watkins, 623 F.3d 483, 485 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[I]t has never been the rule that courts must blindly accept a prisoner’s allegations of imminent danger.”). Courts “routinely” deny leave to proceed where imminent-danger allegations “are conclusory or ridiculous, or where they concern only

past injuries.” Taylor, 623 F.3d at 485 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, “[o]bservations about the general dangers of prison life” do not establish imminent danger under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Sanders, 873 F.3d at 960. Were it otherwise, “the statute would not serve to curtail litigation by those who have demonstrated a propensity to make baseless or malicious claims.” Id.

1 Court records reflect that Mr. Spann-El incurred strikes in the following cases: (1) Spann-El v. State of Indiana, et al., 3:20-CV-785-DRL-MGG (N.D. Ind. closed Sept. 22, 2020); (2) Spann-El v. State of Indiana, et al., 3:20-CV-741-DRL-MGG (N.D. Ind. closed Sept. 3, 2020); and (3) Spann-El v. State of Indiana, et al., 3:20-CV-595-DRL-MGG (N.D. Ind. closed Sept. 3, 2020). Mr. Spann-El has a lengthy litigation history in this District. In September 2020, he was informed by the court that he had incurred three or more strikes for filing

lawsuits that were dismissed as frivolous or for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See Spann-El v. State of Indiana, et al., 3:20-CV-806-JD-MGG (N.D. Ind. closed Nov. 5, 2020), ECF 3. Since told that he is three-struck, he has filed a spate of lawsuits in which he sought to circumvent the three-strikes provision. See Spann-El v. State of Indiana, et al., 3:20-CV-1011-DRL-MGG (N.D. ind. closed Feb. 16, 2021); Spann-El v. State of Indiana, et al., 3:22-CV-114-DRL-MGG (N.D. Ind. closed Mar. 15, 2022); Spann-El v.

Hall, 3:22-CV-115-RLM-MGG (N.D. Ind. closed Mar. 16, 2022); Spann-El v. State of Indiana, et al., 3:22-CV-116-RLM-MGG (N.D. Ind. closed Mar. 16, 2022); Spann-El v. State of Indiana, et al., 3:22-CV-117-DRL-MGG (N.D. Ind. closed Mar. 17, 2022); Spann-El v. State of Indiana, et al., 3:22-CV-450-JD-MGG (N.D. Ind. filed June 10, 2022); Spann-El v. State of Indiana, et al., 3:22-CV-541-JD-MGG (N.D. Ind. filed July 13, 2022).

In five of these cases, the court concluded that he was not in imminent danger. In the #1101 case, he claimed that he was upset after seeing another inmate get stabbed and “need[ed] someone to talk to.” Spann-El, 3:20-CV-1011-DRL-MGG, ECF 3. He was reminded that he was subject to the three-strikes provision and given an opportunity to amend his complaint if he felt he could allege that he was in imminent danger of serious

physical injury. Id. He did not file an amended complaint, but responded by filing several motions arguing that he met the imminent danger exception. Id., ECF 7. He claimed that he had helped the other inmate who was stabbed and in the process got some of the inmate’s blood on his hands; he was concerned that he might have contracted hepatitis, although he did not outline any symptoms he was experiencing to suggest he had a medical need that was not being adequately treated. Id. The court

concluded that he did not satisfy the imminent danger exception. Id. In early 2022, he filed four more cases asserting that he was in imminent danger. In the #114 case, he claimed he was improperly sprayed with pepper spray and denied a “detox” shower afterward. Spann-El, 3:22-CV-114-DRL-MGG, ECF 3. He was told that this allegation did not implicate a genuine emergency or otherwise suggest he was in imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time the case was filed. Id. In that

case, as in past cases, he attempted to pay the filing fee with a handwritten “negotiable instrument surety bond.” Id., ECF 2. Mr. Spann-El appears to believe he can issue these bonds because he is a “sovereign citizen” entitled to special privileges who is not subject to laws of general applicability. He has been told more than once that such claims are patently frivolous, and that these “bonds” are not a viable means of paying

the filing fee. See Spann-El v. State of Indiana, et al., No. 3:20-CV-785-DRL-MGG (N.D. Ind. closed Sept. 22, 2020). In the #115 case, he claimed that some of his legal materials were taken and he was not being given adequate pens and paper. Spann-El, 3:22-CV-115-RLM-MGG, ECF 3. He was again told that this type of allegation did not implicate an imminent danger

of serious physical injury. Id. In the #116 case, he complained that prison officials housed him with a transgender inmate, which was against his “moral beliefs,” and that officers used excessive force against him when he tried to avoid being housed with this inmate.

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Bluebook (online)
Spann-El v. MCF, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/spann-el-v-mcf-innd-2022.