Space Shadow LLC v. Colliers Nevada LLC

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: December 15, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-02065
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3

4 SPACE SHADOW LLC, Case No.: 2:25-cv-02065-GMN 5 Plaintiff, 6 vs. ORDER

7 COLLIERS NEVADA LLC,

8 Defendant. 9 Pending before the Court is the Amended Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, (ECF No. 7), 10 filed by Appellant’s counsel David J. Winterton. Appellant Space Shadow LLC filed a 11 Response, (ECF No. 19), to which Winterton replied, (ECF No. 21). Further pending before 12 the Court is Appellee Colliers Nevada LLC’s Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 11). Appellant 13 filed a Response, (ECF No. 17), to which Appellee replied, (ECF No. 22). 14 Because the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal, the Court GRANTS the Motion 15 to Dismiss. Further, the Court DENIES as MOOT the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel. 16 I. BACKGROUND 17 This action arises out of Appellant’s voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the 18 Bankruptcy Code. On October 3, 2025, the bankruptcy court approved Appellee’s Fee 19 Application by entering the Order Approving the First and Final Application for Compensation 20 of Colliers Nevada LLC as Real Estate Broker, (“Fee App Order”). (Mot. Dismiss at 3, ECF 21 No. 11). On October 20, 2025, Appellee filed a notice of appeal from the Fee App Order. (Not. 22 Appeal, ECF No. 333 in Case No. 23-14412-hlb). The next day, this Court received a Notice 23 of Appeal from the bankruptcy court. (See Not. Appeal, ECF No. 1). 24 25 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 The Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over appeals from bankruptcy court orders 3 derives from 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), which provides, in relevant part, that district courts “shall 4 have jurisdiction to hear appeals [] from final judgments, orders, and decrees” of the 5 bankruptcy court. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1); see also Preblich v. Battley, 181 F.3d 1048, 1056 6 (9th Cir. 1999) (discussing jurisdiction). Unlike other types of cases, a bankruptcy case may 7 encompass “numerous individual controversies,” and bankruptcy courts often must “resolve 8 discrete controversies definitively while the umbrella bankruptcy case remains pending.” Ritzen 9 Grp., Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 589 U.S. 35, 38 (2020). Because delaying an appeal of a 10 discrete controversy until the end of an entire bankruptcy case could “long postpone appellate 11 review of fully adjudicated disputes,” and “require the bankruptcy court to unravel later 12 adjudications rendered in reliance on an earlier [defective] decision,” id. at 38–39, “Congress 13 made orders in bankruptcy cases immediately appealable if they finally dispose of discrete 14 disputes within the larger bankruptcy case,” id. at 39; see also id. (“In short, the usual judicial 15 unit for analyzing finality in ordinary civil litigation is the case, but in bankruptcy, it is often 16 the proceeding.” (citation modified)). 17 “Under the Ninth Circuit approach, a bankruptcy court’s order is final for purposes of 18 immediate appeal under [28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)] if: (1) it fully and finally determined the 19 discrete issue or issues it presented; and (2) the resolution of discrete issues seriously affected 20 substantive rights.” See In re Linton, 631 B.R. 882, 891 (9th Cir. BAP 2021), aff’d, No. 21- 21 60053, 2022 WL 17077498 (9th Cir. Nov. 18, 2022). Courts, however, only have jurisdiction 22 to consider timely appeals of final bankruptcy court orders, which refers to appeals that are 23 taken within 14 days. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a). This is because “[t]he 14-day time 24 deadline in Rule 8002(a) is a jurisdictional requirement that acts as an immutable constraint on

25 1 [a court’s] authority to consider and hear appeals.” In re Wilkins, 587 B.R. 97, 107 (9th Cir. 2 BAP 2018). 3 III. DISCUSSION 4 Appellee moves to dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that 5 the appeal is untimely. Appellee contends that the Fee App Order became final after its entry 6 on October 3, 2025. (Mot. Dismiss at 4). It argues that a notice of appeal had to be filed within 7 14 days after October 3 (by October 17), and Appellee’s notice of appeal, filed on October 21, 8 was therefore late. (Id.). Appellant responds that on October 3 the bankruptcy court approved 9 Appellee’s fee application but seems to argue that the Fee App Order did not become final until 10 Appellee filed a Notice of Entry of Order on October 20. (See Resp. at 2:2, ECF No. 17). 11 Appellant therefore argues its October 21 appeal was timely. (Id.). But Appellant does not cite 12 any case law or applicable rule to support its assertion that Appellee’s Notice starts the clock, 13 rather than the bankruptcy court’s Order.1 14 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a)(1) is clear: “[A] notice of appeal must be filed with the 15 bankruptcy clerk within 14 days after the judgment, order, or decree to be appealed is entered. 16 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a)(1). The bankruptcy court entered the Fee App Order on October 3, 17 2025. (Fee App Order, ECF No. 323 in Case No. 23-14412-hlb). As further evidence of the 18 order’s effective date, the Notice of Appeal filed by Appellant itself states that the Fee App 19 Order was entered on October 3. (Not. Appeal, ECF No. 333 in Case No. 23-14412-hlb). Thus, 20 Appellant’s appeal filed on October 21, 2025, is untimely. 21 In the alternative, Appellant argues a retroactive extension of time should be granted 22 pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002. (Resp. 3:5). Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(d) provides that “the 23

24 1 The only authority that Appellant’s Response cited in support of this point is Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(b). (See 25 Resp. at 2:26–3:4). That part of Bankruptcy Rule 8002 deals with the effect of certain post judgment motions on the time to appeal. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(b). Since no such motions were filed in this case, Rule 8002(b) is inapposite. 1 bankruptcy court may, on motion, extend the time to file a notice of appeal if the motion is filed 2 ||... within 21 days after that time expires if the party shows excusable neglect.” But 3 || Appellant’s alternative argument fails for three reasons. First, Appellant did not file a motion 4 || to extend time with the bankruptcy court. (See generally Case No. 23-14412-hlb). Second, 5 || under the applicable rule, Appellant was supposed to move for an extension by November 7, 6 2025.7 But Appellant requested an extension on December 5, 2025. And third, Appellant 7 ||summarily states that “there is excusable neglect in the inadvertent mis-calendaring of the 8 || deadline and the timing of the ultimate filing of the appeal.” (Resp. 3:14-15). Appellant fails to 9 || meet its burden of establishing excusable neglect with such a conclusory statement. Thus, 10 || Appellant’s request for an extension fails procedurally and on the merits. 11 In sum, the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the appeal is untimely. 12 || The Court therefore GRANTS Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss. 13 CONCLUSION 14 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 11), is 15 |}GRANTED. Appellant’s appeal is DISMISSED with prejudice. 16 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Withdraw, (ECF No. 7), is DENIED 17 |}as MOOT. 18 The Clerk of Court is kindly directed to close the case. 19 DATED this 15 day of December, 2025. 20 Up, Gloria M. Nay arro, District Judge UNITED SPATES DISTRICT COURT 23 24 25 Even under Appellant’s version of the timeline, the extension should have been requested by November 24,

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