Sovereign Camp, W. O. W. v. Derrick

64 S.W.2d 982
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedOctober 6, 1933
DocketNo. 1158.
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 64 S.W.2d 982 (Sovereign Camp, W. O. W. v. Derrick) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sovereign Camp, W. O. W. v. Derrick, 64 S.W.2d 982 (Tex. Ct. App. 1933).

Opinions

Mrs. Alice E. Derrick instituted suit in the district court of Eastland county against the Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of the World, for recovery on two beneficiary certificates, one for $1,000 and one for $2,000, issued to her husband, James E. Derrick, on April 7, 1904, and April 14, 1919, respectively, and in each of which plaintiff was named beneficiary.

James E. Derrick died on November 5, 1931, as a result of "Metastatic Melano Sarcoma." All insurance premiums and assessments were regularly paid from the date of the respective certificates until May and June, 1931, when by reason of default the insurance was automatically forfeited as of date June 1, 1931, under the terms and provisions of the constitution, laws, and by-laws of the association. On July 28, 1931, Mr. Derrick paid all assessments in arrears, including that for July, and he thereupon became reinstated and his insurance became effective, subject to a warranty on the part of the assured that he was then and would remain for thirty days thereafter "in good health."

Only two assignments are urged on this appeal, one to the effect that there is no evidence of probative force in the record to sustain the judgment of the trial court in favor of appellee; and one, that such judgment is contrary to the great preponderance of the evidence and is manifestly wrong and unjust. The trial was before the court without the intervention of a jury, and there are no specific findings of fact or conclusions of law embraced in the record. It was admitted by counsel for each of the parties to this appeal in their oral argument upon submission that if James E. Derrick was shown by the evidence to be in fact "in good health" on July 28, 1931, and remained in such condition for thirty days thereafter, the trial court's judgment should be affirmed, otherwise, the same should not be permitted to stand.

It has been announced many times by the Supreme Court that in such attacks on the trial court's judgment it is not the province of the Court of Civil Appeals to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court, unless it might be said that the facts and circumstances are such that but one reasonable conclusion can be reached which would result in a different judgment, or expressed differently, only in the event there is no evidence of probative force to sustain the trial court's general findings of fact may it be said, as a matter of law, that the judgment should be set aside. Another well-recognized rule is that the facts and circumstances and all reasonable deductions therefrom must be considered most favorably in support of the trial court's judgment, but mere speculation and conjecture should not be indulged. With these fundamental rules as a guide, it at once becomes important to determine the condition of James E. Derrick's health on July 28, 1931, and for thirty days thereafter. In arriving at a correct conclusion as to the then health of Mr. Derrick, it becomes necessary to first determine what the expression "in good health" means as that term is used in the constitution, laws, and by-laws of the order.

In an approved definition of the term "sound health" by the Commission of Appeals, and which expression has been held to be synonymous with that of "good health," it is said not to mean perfect health, nor absolute perfection, but "is a state of health free from any disease or ailment that affects the general soundness and healthfulness of the system seriously, that is, that the insured be not afflicted with a disease or bodily infirmity of a substantial nature, which affects the insured's general health, or which materially increases the risk to be assumed by the insurer." Vann v. National Life Accident Insurance Co. (Tex.Com.App.) 24 S.W.2d 347, 349; Pickens v. Security Benefit Association, 117 Kan. 475, 231 P. 1016, 40 A.L.R. 654, and annotations.

We do not understand that a disease or ailment which affects the general soundness and healthfulness of the human system seriously to embrace an "affection even though curable only by medical or surgical treatment, but nevertheless readily remediable and so not necessarily tending to shorten life, before it has become so far developed as to have some bearing in præsenti, upon the general health." Cady v. Fidelity Casualty Co., 134 Wis. 322, 113 N.W. 967, 971, 17 L.R.A. (N. S.) 260. And such affection would not constitute a bodily infirmity of a substantial nature, nor materially or necessarily increase the risk of the insurer, nor could it be said such an affection constituted bad health. Hence the very time of the inception or the beginning of the ravages of the terrible disease with which James E. Derrick died, is all important in this case as there is no room for doubt but what he died as a direct result of metastases from a melano sarcoma.

The plaintiff and her two daughters who resided with the deceased during the year 1931, and who were in a better position to daily observe his physical condition than others, testified in effect: Mr. Derrick had just an ordinary and painless mole on his shoulder all his life. In June it bled some as a result of being rubbed with a towel, it being first noticed in July to be slightly enlarged, *Page 984 but still gave him no pain and was not inflamed. During the first part of August he went to see Dr. Blackwell who informed him that it was a bloody mole. A week or so later he went to see Dr. Kuykendall who also informed him it was a bloody mole, stating that he would burn it out and would then be through with it. On that occasion he cauterized or burned the tissue out with electric scissors. This was about the middle of August. Dr. Kuykendall described the place as a bleeding tumor about the size of a pea from which the assured suffered no pain. Later Mr. Derrick returned to the office of Dr. Kuykendall, who having found that the mole had recurred, excised it. The doctor fixed this date as of August 20th, when he dressed the wound and stated that he could not say that Mr. Derrick then had melano sarcoma, or that he had it at any time prior to that date. Dr. Kuykendall testified that the assured returned again on August 27th when Dr. Lauderdale was called in and that they were then of the opinion that Mr. Derrick had melano sarcoma, or a twin sister to a cancer. Dr. Lauderdale did not testify. Dr. Kuykendall testified that this was the last time he saw Mr. Derrick, but later upon being recalled stated that upon re-examining his records, this occasion was on October 20th instead of August 27th. Mrs. Howell testified that her father went to Dr. Kuykendall four times instead of three as first testified to by Dr. Kuykendall. She said the first time was when the mole was cauterized, the second, when it was excised, the third, when her father went to have the stitches removed from the wound, but which was not then done, and the fourth, on October 19th, instead of the 20th, as fixed by the doctor. It was on this last occasion when the doctor re-examined the affection on Mr. Derrick's shoulder, took out the stitches, and informed him the wound was then cancerous. So the trial court was justified in fixing that date rather than August 28th or a prior date as the time of the origin of melano sarcoma. But Dr. Kuykendall testified that he never definitely determined that Mr. Derrick had melano sarcoma until after the autopsy.

From Dr. Blackwell's testimony it appears in substance: Mr. Derrick and a lady went to his office two or three weeks before Mr. Derrick died on November 5th. He did not treat him professionally and made no record of the visit.

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Bluebook (online)
64 S.W.2d 982, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sovereign-camp-w-o-w-v-derrick-texapp-1933.