Southwestern Public Service Co. v. Goodwine

228 S.W.2d 925, 1949 Tex. App. LEXIS 1937
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedDecember 19, 1949
DocketNo. 6017
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 228 S.W.2d 925 (Southwestern Public Service Co. v. Goodwine) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Southwestern Public Service Co. v. Goodwine, 228 S.W.2d 925, 1949 Tex. App. LEXIS 1937 (Tex. Ct. App. 1949).

Opinion

STOKES, Justice.

This litigation, in the nature of a condemnation proceeding, was instituted by the appellant, Southwestern Public Service [927]*927Company, a public utility corporation having the right of eminent domain, against the appellee, Clyde V. Goodwine, for the purpose of condemning an easement for an electrical transmission line over and across the lands of the appellee. The petition was filed with the county judge of Parmer County, in which the land is situated, commissioners were duly appointed and appellee was given proper notice. The matter was heard and evidence presented before the commissioners on March 29, 1949. After hearing the evidence and contentions of the parties, the commissioners awarded damages to the appel-lee in the total amount of $1865. The award consisted of $561.25 for the easement which occupied a strip 30 feet in width, extending across the southeast portion of three quarter-sections of appellee’s land, aggregating 4.49 acres, and $1303.75 damages to the remainder of his land. In due time appellee filed objections to the award and the case was properly placed upon the docket of the county court where it was tried before a jury on July 19, 1949. The case was submitted upon special issues, in answer to which the jury found that the land included in the strip covered by the transmission line was of the value of $493.-90; that immediately before the condemnation of the strip, the remainder of appel-lee’s land was of the value of $87,176.10; and that immediately after it was condemned, the remainder was of the value of $82,421.04. Based upon the findings of the jury, the court entered judgment for the appellee in the sum of $5,248.96, being the $493.90, value of the strip taken, and the difference in value of the remaining land before and after the 30 foot strip was condemned and appropriated by the appellant.

Appellant duly perfected its appeal and presents the case here upon nine assignments or points of error. The principal contention urged by the assignments is that the court erred in permitting testimony, submitting special issues to the jury, and entering judgment in favor of appellee for incidental damages to the entire tract of 800 acres because 320 acres, consisting of the north half of section No. 7 was not included in any of the pleadings and there was no evidence that the 320 acre tract was in a cómmon enclosure with that described in the pleadings as being the tracts upon which the condemned 30 foot strip was located.

The record shows that appellee’s farm consists of 800 acres and that practically all of it is in cultivation. He had been living upon the land since 1909, a period of 40 years, during all of which time he had operated it, and was still operating it, as a farm unit. It consists of section No. 7 and the northwest quarter of section No. 8 lying immediately east of and adjoining section No. 7. The transmission line enters the northwest quarter of section No. 8 near the center of its east line and runs in a southwesterly direction through that quarter-section, entering the southeast quarter of section No. 7 near its northeast corner, passing through the latter quarter-section to a point a short distance north of its southwest corner. From there it proceeds through the extreme southeast corner of the southwest quarter of section 7 leaving a small triangular tract south of the transmission line in the southeast corner of that quarter-section. From this it will be seen that the north half of section No. 7 was not touched by the transmission line and none of it was included in the 30 foot strip that was condemned. Appellee filed no pleadings with the commissioners and appellant’s pleading did not include the north half of section No. 7. In making their award, the commissioners described the land as it was described in appellant’s pleading, hence the north half of section No. 7 was not included in it. When appel-lee removed the case to the county court he alleged that the award was wholly inadequate in the matter of damages and that the finding of the commissioners was contrary to law and the evidence. When the case was submitted to the jury the special’ issues referred to the appellee’s tract of land and did not confine the jury’s consideration to the three quarter-sections described in the award of the commissioners nor was the 800 acres specifically described. Appellant urges that it was error for the court to permit the jury to consider the entire tract of land because there were no [928]*928pleadings of either party, either before the commissioners or in the trial in the county court, that warranted the inclusion of the north half of section No. 7.

It has been held in a number of cases that formal pleading of a land owner, setting out his damages and particularizing the injuries done to his land by condemnation proceedings such as this, it not necessary because the law designates the damages to which he is entitled. The statutes provide that the damages shall consist of the value of the land taken and the injury, if any, to the remaining portion caused by the condemnation and taking of the property. Article 3264 et seq., Vernon’s Annotated Civil Statutes. Recovery of these items is secured to the owner of such lands and there are no other issues of fact to be determined. There is, therefore, no reason for requiring the owner of property sought to be condemned to allege the damages sustained by him nor to specify the elements of damage produced by the condemnation proceeding. The land is there, open to the view of the condemnor, and he is as well informed of the consequences of the condemnation as he could be by any sort of allegations and pleading. Concho, S. S. & L. V. Ry. Co. v. Sanders, Tex.Civ.App., 144 S.W. 693; Wichita Falls & W. R. Co. of Texas v. Wyrick, Tex.Civ.App., 158 S.W. 570; Lower Colorado River Authority v. Hughes, Tex.Civ.App., 122 S.W.2d 222; Kennedy v. City of Dallas, Tex.Civ.App., 201 S.W.2d 840, and the many other cases therein cited.

Appellant contends further that, since the north half of section No. 7 was not shown to be within the same enclosure as the tracts over which the 30 foot strip was condemned, it should not have been taken into consideration in estimating ap-pellee’s incidental damages. The statute, Art. 3265 R.C.S., provides that when only a portion of a tract or parcel of a person’s real estate is condemned, the commissioners shall estimate the injuries sustained and the benefits received thereby by the owner; whether the remaining portion is increased or diminished in value by reason of such condemnation; and the extent of such increase or diminution, and shall assess the damages accordingly. There is no provision of the statute which confines the incidental damage to any particular tract as laid out in official maps or plats, nor to that which is contained in a single enclosure. It is referred to in the statute as the remaining portion of the tract or parcel of a person’s real estate. Of course, conditions could be presented, and have been, in which it would not be in keeping with the purpose and intention of the law to include isolated tracts, having no connection with that involved in the condemnation. It is often difficult to determine what is a distinct and independent tract when only a part of a tract or parcel of land is taken. Exceptional circumstances will sometimes throw out of gear the most carefully guarded rule.

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Bluebook (online)
228 S.W.2d 925, 1949 Tex. App. LEXIS 1937, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/southwestern-public-service-co-v-goodwine-texapp-1949.