Southside Welfare Rights Organization v. Stangler

156 F.R.D. 187, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20342, 1993 WL 719601
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Missouri
DecidedNovember 3, 1993
DocketNo. 90-4271-CV-C-66BA
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 156 F.R.D. 187 (Southside Welfare Rights Organization v. Stangler) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Southside Welfare Rights Organization v. Stangler, 156 F.R.D. 187, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20342, 1993 WL 719601 (W.D. Mo. 1993).

Opinion

ORDER

KNOX, United States Magistrate Judge.

On August 25, 1993, plaintiffs filed their motion for attorney fees and costs in the above-styled class action suit. Defendants have responded in opposition to part of plaintiffs’ motion and plaintiffs have replied.

The court notes plaintiffs prevailed on certain issues in this case and a preliminary injunction has been issued. The injunction will be made permanent with this order.

“The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable [188]*188hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). To determine what are “reasonably expended hours” and what is a “reasonable rate,” twelve factors should be considered. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714, 716-17 (5th Cir.1974); Hardman v. Board of Educ., 714 F.2d 823, 825 (8th Cir.1983). These are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the ease; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the undesirability of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.

The appropriate application of these factors differs from case to case and should be explained, because it is important “for the district court to provide a concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 438, 103 S.Ct. at 1942. An award of attorney fees is, thus, within the sound discretion of the district court. Id.

Plaintiffs seek an award, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, of fees and costs totaling $633,616.58. Defendants assert this amount is excessive and includes some impermissible items or amounts. Defendants suggest an amount of $211,850.90.

After review of the parties’ pleadings and application of the relevant factors, the court finds an amount of $334,570.15 to be appropriate.

Application of the Factors

Clearly, this class action suit dealing with the processing of food stamp applications across the state took considerable time and labor. The case was originally filed in July, 1990, and continues through the present. Voluminous file studies were made of applications; regulations and procedures were reviewed; and statistics were compiled and analyzed in anticipation of the trial. The issues were briefed and boxes of documents were produced and prepared as exhibits. Nevertheless, the court finds certain of the hours billed and the rates charged by plaintiffs are excessive, and adjustments will be made accordingly.

Counsel for plaintiffs in this ease are employed by Legal Services of Eastern Missouri, Inc. Legal Services provides legal assistance to low income persons without charge or with minimal charge, and serves the community by handling litigation affecting large numbers of low income and indigent persons as well as certain cases for individuals. Thus, while this case may have precluded counsel from handling some additional cases, this is the type of case counsel was hired to litigate and counsel was not prevented from taking more lucrative eases with greater income potential. Counsel should be reimbursed, however, based on a reasonable rate for comparable work in the private sector. Oldham v. Ehrlich, 617 F.2d 163 (8th Cir.1980).

Counsel billed hourly rates for Joel Ferber at $175, Molly Ryan at $130, Ann Lever at $175, and Dianne Taylor at $150. Defendants have not objected to the rates charged, but the court finds these rates to be excessive for this area of the country. Reasonable hourly rates for attorneys in similar cases and with comparable abilities, experience and reputations in Missouri range from $90 to $125. The affidavits from a few St. Louis attorneys suggesting higher rates are appropriate for plaintiffs’ counsel are not persuasive. The affidavits setting forth rates and hours based on experience in the Wash- • ington, D.C., area must be adjusted downward for Missouri. Thus, reductions will be made in the hourly rates.

The parties have submitted no information indicating whether fee arrangements were made with plaintiffs, and the court has no reason to believe such arrangements were made.

Certain time limitations were imposed by the nature of the case insofar as plaintiffs are indigent individuals seeking expedited food stamps. Thus, plaintiffs pursued the case [189]*189with zeal and kept the ease moving toward resolution. Although a ease of this size might have been slow in the discovery phase, this case proceeded to trial on a schedule comparable to other cases filed in this court.

Similar claims have been brought in other states and the law is relatively clear on the issues. A careful analysis of the facts and statistics, however, was required by the parties, and the court will not say this was simple litigation. Certainly, voluminous documents were produced, analyzed, summarized and used at trial requiring a special knowledge of the food stamp system.

Likewise, complete understanding of the state procedures and federal law was required to present this ease and defense, and counsel were required to present this information in a condensed, manageable form for the court.

Counsel for plaintiffs were extremely well prepared and contested in detail even minor issues. This court’s oversight of the case suggests that excessive time was devoted to the case, on even the most insignificant of issues. Counsel were, perhaps, overly meticulous with regard to details, and appear to have spent an excessive amount of time preparing this case for trial in an effort to be complete. Counsel is commended for their thoroughness, but defendants should not be penalized for plaintiffs’ over-exuberance on behalf of their clients.

After review of the itemizations presented by plaintiffs, the court finds the following to be reasonable rates for plaintiffs’ counsel, based on the skill of the attorneys and the hours billed:

Attorneys Hours Rate/Hour Subtotal Total
Joel D. Ferber 2046.2 $125 $255,775.00
Molly A. Ryan 1319.9 90 118,791.00
Ann B. Lever 339.3 125 42,412.50
F. Dianne Taylor 123.8 100 12,380.00
Total 3829.2 $429,358.50
(Less one-fourth 107,339.62)
Attorney Total $322,018.88

This total was reduced by $107,339.62, or one-fourth, to reflect excessive or unnecessary efforts by counsel.

The court notes law clerks performed some clerical work (copying) in this case, and the court will adjust law clerk hours to exclude work which is implicitly included in attorney fees.

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Bluebook (online)
156 F.R.D. 187, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20342, 1993 WL 719601, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/southside-welfare-rights-organization-v-stangler-mowd-1993.