SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY v. Hook

135 S.E.2d 562, 261 N.C. 517, 1964 N.C. LEXIS 526
CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina
DecidedApril 8, 1964
Docket164
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 135 S.E.2d 562 (SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY v. Hook) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY v. Hook, 135 S.E.2d 562, 261 N.C. 517, 1964 N.C. LEXIS 526 (N.C. 1964).

Opinion

Moore, J.

This is a proceeding for the extension of the corporate limits of Bessemer City, N. C., pursuant to General Statutes, Chapter 160, Subchapter VI, Article 36, Part 2 (G.S. 160-453.1 to G.S. 160-453.12). Bessemer City has a population of less than 5000.

On 10 December 1962 the governing board adopted a resolution stating the intent of the municipality to extend its limits to include an area of 63.29 acres which adjoins its eastern boundary. A report of plans *518 for extension of city services to the area proposed for annexation was adopted and filed. Notice of a public hearing on the proposed annexation was given, and the hearing was held, pursuant to the notice, on 14 January 1963. On 4 February 1963 an annexation ordinance was adopted.

The area proposed for annexation includes a segment of the right of way of the Southern Railway Company, about two-fifths of a mile long. In apt time the Railway Company petitioned for review, pursuant to G.S. 160-453.6. It alleges, among other things, that the area sought to be annexed is not subject to annexation in that it is not developed for urban purposes within the meaning of G.S. 160-453.4 (c), which provides as follows:

“The area to be annexed must be developed for urban purposes. An area developed for urban purposes is defined as any area which is so developed that at least sixty per cent (60%) of the total number of lots and tracts in the area at the time of annexation are used for residential, commercial, industrial, institutional or governmental purposes, and is subdivided into lots and tracts such that at least sixty per cent (60%) of the total acreage, not counting the acreage used at the time of annexation for commercial, industrial, governmental or institutional purposes, consists of lots and tracts five acres or less in size.”

The annexation ordinance declares: The number of lots and tracts in the area is 34, of which 12 are vacant, and 22 are in use — residential 14, commercial 3, industrial 5. Thus 65% of the lots and tracts are in use. The total residential and undeveloped acreage is 36. Of this, the acreage in lots and tracts of five acres and less in size is 24, or 66%.

On the other hand, the Railway Company’s petition alleges: The number of lots and tracts in the area is 186, of which 81 are vacant. Only 56.5% of the lots and tracts are in use. The total residential and undeveloped acreage is 50.23. Of this, the acreage in lots and tracts of five acres and less is 24.73, or 49% only.

The petitioner and the municipality each offered evidence which, they contend, tends to support their respective analyses of the makeup of the area. It is not necessary to consider and discuss the wide discrepancy in the evidence as to the number of lots and tracts in the area. The crucial question on this appeal involves the proper classification of a tract of land owned by Ideal Industries, Inc., and situate on the north side of Highway 274. It contains 13.747 acres, of which about one-tenth (1.4 acres) is used for parking. There are no buildings or structures of any kind on the tract. The plant and buildings of *519 Ideal Industries are in the area proposed for annexation, but are on tracts and lots which do not adjoin this 13.747 acre tract. It is conceded that if, as petitioner contends, the part of the tract not used for parking (more than 12 acres) is vacant unused land, the area sought to be annexed to the City clearly does not meet the requirements of G.S. 160-453.4 (c).

The evidence concerning the 13.747 acre tract is as follows:

(1). Charles H. Davis, Jr., registered engineer, testified for petitioner: “. . . (T)he property shown (on map) labeled ‘Ideal Industries, Inc.’, of 13.747 acres is vacant property; the front of it is used for parking. . . . The area I have shown (on map) and denominated ‘Parking’ is used for nothing but the parking of automobiles. This is delineated by a bumper strip or barrier at the back of it.” (Cross Examination) “I testified that there was 25.503 acres of undeveloped land over five acres in size. That involves two tracts, one of J. A. Bess (Best) estate which is on the West end of the area, and the other is the Ideal Industries tract on the East end of the area. . . . I also designate the 13.747 acres lying on the North side of Highway 274 as belonging to Ideal Industries. About 90% of the property North of the highway I designate as being undeveloped, and I designate a small portion of it as parking. ... I did not talk to anyone from Ideal Industries about the property I designated as to why it was undeveloped.”

(2). C. Jack Costner, Secretary of Ideal Industries, Inc., testified for respondents: “The tract of land owned by Ideal Industries on the North side of 274 at this time has been graded.” In January 1963 it was used for a “cow pasture.” Before the first of the year “we had plans to, actually, at that time to move our entire operation across the road and the plans — that is, at some future time — not at this, you know, we didn’t have any particular date set when we would move, but that road is a line on a water shed. ... In regard to our plans prior to the first of the year to use this for industrial purposes, we had graded about 30 to 35 thousand yards of dirt and practically levelled about 14 acres of it. . . . Our plans are to move as fast as business requires us to expand because we have no further room where we have to expand. That was the purpose of buying the property in the first place.” (cross Examination). “. . . (T)he land we acquired was half of Miss Martha Torrence’s farm, and at that time it was a cow pasture . . ., and the only pasturing done was of animals that some fellow who lives on Dr. Eroneberger’s place was using . . ., I believe it was a cow pasture. . . . Right at this time there is some discussion (of *520 plans) but no concrete plans of any sort.” On February 4, 1963, there was no use whatever being made of this land by Ideal.

(3). Clyde Robinson, expert engineer and surveyor, testified for respondents: “I consulted with Mr. Costner and other officials at Ideal, we asked them how they considered that there was a question in our mind as to whether it was vacant or should be considered as being held for future expansion and so forth; and they told us they considered it industrial. ... As a result of our consultation with the owners we placed this land in the category of industrial.” (Cross Examination). “The land was vacant except for the parking lot at the time I examined it. I didn’t see any cows. . . . My interpretation as to its then use was based upon what Mr. Costner told me he considered the use of the land, and I in my own mind considered the use was predicated upon what they had purchased it for at that time. . . . (T)here wasn’t any use being made of the land at that time.”

The municipality classified the entire 13.747 acre tract of Ideal Industries, Inc., as property in use for industrial purposes. The court below found that this classification was proper. This is error. G.S. 160-453 (c) employs the expression “. . . are used for . . . industrial purposes . . .” The verb “use” means “to put into . . . service.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary — Unabridged (1961). The proceeding employed by the municipality in this instance is summary in nature, and material statutory requirements must be complied with.

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Bluebook (online)
135 S.E.2d 562, 261 N.C. 517, 1964 N.C. LEXIS 526, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/southern-railway-company-v-hook-nc-1964.