Southern Railway Co. v. Berry

1 S.E.2d 261, 172 Va. 266, 1939 Va. LEXIS 235
CourtSupreme Court of Virginia
DecidedFebruary 20, 1939
DocketRecord No. 2030
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 1 S.E.2d 261 (Southern Railway Co. v. Berry) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Southern Railway Co. v. Berry, 1 S.E.2d 261, 172 Va. 266, 1939 Va. LEXIS 235 (Va. 1939).

Opinion

Holt, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

Under review is a crossing accident in which plaintiff’s decedent was killed. Her contention is that the defendant was negligent in that it failed to give the statutory crossing signals of approach, and that this failure was a proximate [269]*269cause of her husband’s death. She has recovered a verdict and judgment.

The conditions at this crossing are shown by a survey and blueprint. The railroad runs substantially north and south, with a two-degree curve to the right going north. The highway runs east and west and is an ordinary county dirt road.

This crossing, known in the record as the Mission Crossing, was about a half mile north of Chase City. The whistle post to the south is 1,818 feet away and the box factory about 600 feet. Robert Roberts’ house is 634 feet distant and to the south; it is 218 feet west of the railroad track.

The defendant’s passenger train was going north. F. D. Berry, the decedent, in an automobile was driving east. Of course the defendant was familiar with conditions at this crossing and Berry was also; for many years he had been a rural free delivery mail carrier.

From a point 1,800 feet south of the crossing to a point about 100 feet from it, the railroad is on an upgrade. From this last named point, it runs through two cuts. To the west of the railroad and to the south of the highway, the elevation of the ground increases, and in the angle made with the county road is an area of about an acre, on which are 58 trees. None of them are on the right of way, but their limbs hang low, and there is also underbrush which obstructs the view of the railroad as one approaches it from the west. There are no obstructions within fifty feet of the crossing. Forty feet from the crossing, as one approaches from the west, an approaching train could be seen for 1,200 feet. This view is somewhat cut off by the curve. At the crossing itself, a train could be seen for 600 feet.

The accident occurred in the morning of May 23, 1937. The train was on schedule and was running from twenty-five to thirty-five miles an hour. When about two-thirds' of a mile from the crossing, it appears that the automobile was traveling at a rate of from twenty-five to thirty miles an hour and, at the moment of impact, its speed was about that of the train. The only eyewitness to the accident was the fireman, who saw the automobile when it was 150 or 160 [270]*270feet away. He said that when the car got within about forty feet of the railway track, he saw its driver bend over. The car appeared to increase its speed, was squarely struck in the collision which followed, and was carried some distance down the track before the train was brought to a standstill. The engineer’s view was cut off by the boiler of the locomotive. When Berry was seen to bend forward and increase the speed of his car, the fireman called out to the engineer, but it was, of course, then too late.

An engineer who sees an automobile approaching a crossing has the right to assume that it will stop in time to avoid an accident, and he may act upon this assumption unless there is some superadded circumstance sufficient to charge an ordinarily prudent man with a sense of danger. Director General v. Blue, 134 Va. 366, 109 S. E. 482, 114 S. E. 557; Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Jacobs, 166 Va. 11, 183 S. E. 221. Unless the situation is one of imminent peril, ordinary care is all that is required of a railroad. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Mace, 151 Va. 458, 145 S. E. 362.

Trains have the right of way; otherwise no adequate schedule could be maintained, particularly in thickly settled communities where automobiles are almost always in sight.

One who sees a train approaching, when there is yet time for him to stop, and is injured in attempting to cross the track ahead of it can not recover for there would be no causal connection between the accident and the failure of the locomotive driver to sound his whistle. Southern Ry. Co. v. Giles, 169 Va. 218, 192 S. E. 772.

Causal connection between the failure to give the statutory signals and the injury must be shown and will not be presumed. Proof of failure to give these signals and proof of injury and nothing more are not enough. Simons’ Adm’r v. Southern Ry. Co., 96 Va. 152, 31 S. E. 7; Virginian Railway Co. v. Haley, 156 Va. 350, 157 S. E. 776. If the failure to give the statutory signal in any way contributes to the accident, the plaintiff is entitled to recover, however gross may have been his negligence; that negligence may mitigate the quantum of his recovery but can not prevent it. [271]*271Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Hardy, 152 Va. 783, 148 S. E. 839; Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. White, 158 Va. 243, 163 S. E. 530.

The substance of it all is this: The plaintiff must prove his case as other plaintiffs must. He must show that the signals were not given, that he was injured and that there is some causal relation between these two facts. When he has done this, he is entitled to recover, and this no negligence of his can prevent, although, if shown, it may and should reduce the amount of that recovery to which he otherwise might have been entitled.

Before the plaintiff can recover, it must be made to appear that the whistle was not sounded at least twice at a distance not less than 300 yards nor more than 600 yards from the Mission Crossing; if it was, there can be no recovery. It is not contended that there was any failure to ring the bell. Code, section 3958.

These requirements are statutory and mandatory; there can be no substitute, although that substituted may be equally good. Gregory v. Seaboard Air Line Railway Co., 142 Va. 750, 128 S. E. 272.

In its nature, evidence that a certain thing did not happen is often negative in form, although it may be positive in substance. Evidence of a witness who, in attention, stood by a locomotive at a certain time and place and who said that it did not then whistle, has all the weight that such a statement could have, independent of the phraseology used, while the evidence of a witness who for any reason was so placed that the waves of sound could not reach him is without value. Between these poles an indefinite number of situations may arise. Distance, the topography of the country, the wind, if any, its velocity and direction, the attention or inattention of the witness, the character of his occupation at the moment, his alertness to casual impressions, are among considerations which should be remembered. There is no yardstick by which to measure their value. When we have the verdict of a jury approved by a trial court, we can not override the positive evidence of one witness who has not been impeached which supports the [272]*272verdict unless it is inherently improbable, although he be contradicted by a number of others. That is not true when we come to weigh negative testimony which does not of itself rise to the dignity of a positive statement and this because of the considerations named. In the one instance he might afterwards be convicted of perjury; in the other he could not be, for always he might say “that was what I thought,” or even “that is what I believed,” for no one could contradict him.

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1 S.E.2d 261, 172 Va. 266, 1939 Va. LEXIS 235, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/southern-railway-co-v-berry-va-1939.