STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
17-473
SOUTHERN COIL TUBING, INC.
VERSUS
ORACLE GAS, LLC, ET AL.
**********
APPEAL FROM THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. C-20154852 HONORABLE EDWARD D. RUBIN, DISTRICT JUDGE
MARC T. AMY JUDGE
Court composed of Marc T. Amy, Shannon J. Gremillion, and Phyllis M. Keaty, Judges.
REVERSED IN PART.
Daniel C. Hughes 126 Heymann Boulevard Lafayette, LA 70503 (337) 237-6566 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS: Delphi Oil, Inc. Robert E. Brooks
L. Lane Roy Brown Sims, PC 600 Jefferson Street, Suite 800 Lafayette, LA 70501 (337) 484-1240 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE: Southern Coil Tubing, Inc. AMY, Judge.
This appeal arises out of a claim brought by the plaintiff for a sum allegedly
due on an open account and for which the plaintiff also asserted a claim under the
Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act. The trial court rendered judgment in favor
of the plaintiff for $51,000.00 plus legal interest against all three defendants. Two
of the defendants appeal. For the following reasons, we reverse in part.
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff, Southern Coil Tubing, Inc., is a company located in Lafayette,
Louisiana. The plaintiff’s brief to this court described the type of service work
performed by the company as “involv[ing] the use of expensive and highly
specialized equipment being brought to existing producing [oil] wells for the
purposes of taking certain measures . . . to cause the well to become unclogged and
produce additional minerals from the existing well.” As owner of all stock in
Southern Coil Tubing, Inc., Mr. Carl Guidroz testified before the trial court on
behalf of the plaintiff company regarding the events surrounding this dispute.
Mr. Guidroz explained that in the summer of 2014, he received a phone call
from Robert Brooks, who “was soliciting some service work” on an oil well in
Laurel, Mississippi, and told him “[t]hat the well was for Burke’s [ 1 ] Energy”
(hereinafter “Burke’s”). Mr. Guidroz indicated that the coil tubing unit owned by
the plaintiff company “was designated and designed strictly for offshore. It can be
done for land, it’s just a little cumbersome. Takes a little more transportation and
trucks to get there.” Therefore, Mr. Guidroz testified that he suggested that Mr.
Brooks use a local company in Mississippi, because doing so would be quicker,
1 The variations “Burks” and “Burkes” appear in the record and in the briefs to this court. We will use the spelling “Burke’s” as it is consistent with the transcript. more convenient, and less expensive. Mr. Guidroz explained that, in response,
“[Mr. Brooks] said he would provide the trucks and also the crane to complete the
service. He would provide all the transportation and the cost of the crane to take
the unit from Lafayette to location and return.” Testifying on behalf of the
defense, Mr. Brooks recalled that, in their initial discussions, Mr. Guidroz
estimated that the cost would be “between eleven thousand and fifteen thousand
five hundred per day” and that the job “would take about a day.” The record
includes no indication that these discussions were reduced to writing.
Mr. Brooks said that, because he would be traveling via airplane and
unreachable by telephone on the day that the job was to be completed, he had
signed a check in advance and “instructed the drilling supervisor on the rig that
when Mr. Guidroz’s hands presented a bill, they were to write the check for the
amount[,] which [he] was anticipating to be thirty thousand plus or minus maybe a
little more.” Mr. Guidroz testified that, upon completing the job, the plaintiff
received an Oracle Gas, LLC check2 for the invoice total of $51,000.00 with “R.E.
Brooks” as the signature and dated August 6, 2014, explaining: “[The check] was
provided . . . by the supervisor on location . . . and was given to [the plaintiff’s]
supervisor for payment of the services rendered.” However, Mr. Guidroz said that
“after depositing the check,” he received notice from the bank “that those funds
were refused and there was a stop payment on that particular check.” In response,
Mr. Brooks explained that he was responsible for issuing the stop payment order
upon learning that the check had been written in the amount of $51,000.00. He
2 The plaintiff’s brief states that Mr. “Guidroz did not understand why an Oracle Gas check was being used[.]” Mr. Guidroz testified on behalf of the plaintiff that he “[does not] know where Oracle comes into play. The only place [he] saw [Oracle] was on the check.”
2 clarified that he issued the order because he had anticipated that the invoice total
would be between $30,000.00 and $35,000.00, not $51,000.00.
Mr. Guidroz set forth the plaintiff’s reasons for the alleged discrepancy
between the invoice price and what Mr. Brooks believed to be the quoted price.
First, Mr. Guidroz testified that Mr. Brooks ultimately supplied only “[o]ne of
three” trucks required for transporting the equipment and that “[t]he truck that
showed up on lot to pick up the equipment was a [Delphi] [D]rilling truck.” Mr.
Guidroz explained that, when he notified Mr. Brooks that more trucks were
needed, “[Mr. Brooks] asked [the plaintiff] to provide the transportation and [Mr.
Brooks] would pay for it no problem[.]” Thereafter, Mr. Guidroz said that the
plaintiff hired and paid a third-party to supply the remaining two trucks.
Additionally, after the equipment made it to the job site and the project
began, Mr. Guidroz stated that nitrogen services were required to perform the job.
Mr. Guidroz testified that, when he explained this to Mr. Brooks, “[Mr. Brooks]
asked [Mr. Guidroz] to provide [nitrogen services] and out of Louisiana[,]” despite
Mr. Guidroz’s recommendation to use a local Laurel company instead. As with the
transportation company, the plaintiff paid the third-party nitrogen company. With
regard to both the third-party transportation and nitrogen services, the record
contains no indication that these conversations were reduced to writing.
Further, Mr. Guidroz explained that, even though he and Mr. Brooks had
discussed the approximate cost and length of time for the job in their initial
conversations, “[n]one of the perimeters were provided . . . If some of the
perimeters for the log in data would have been provided, [he] could have made a
better estimate. But, just a cold call . . . It’s speculation.” Mr. Guidroz testified
that he explained to Mr. Brooks that “[the job] could be one to two days” and that
3 the plaintiff’s employees “don’t know, not until [they] actually get on location and
see what the conditions are.”
After the stop payment order, Mr. Guidroz and Mr. Brooks attempted to
settle the dispute, but an agreement was never reached. Mr. Guidroz testified that
he subsequently determined that Mr. Brooks had connections with both Oracle
Gas, LLC (“Oracle”) and Delphi Oil, Inc. (“Delphi”).3 Ultimately, the plaintiff
brought a suit on open account against Mr. Brooks, Oracle, and Delphi. Burke’s
was not included as a defendant. The plaintiff also filed an amended and
supplemental petition to add an additional cause of action under the Louisiana
Unfair Trade Practices Act.4
Following a hearing at which Mr. Guidroz and Mr. Brooks testified, the trial
court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, finding Mr. Brooks, Oracle, and Delphi liable
jointly, severally, and in solido for the full sum of the invoice ($51,000.00) as well
3 The plaintiff provided an August 2014 business listing from the Louisiana Secretary of State’s website, which lists Robert Brooks as the registered agent and Robert E. Brooks as an officer of Oracle. Additionally, the plaintiff submitted an August 2014 business listing from the Louisiana Secretary of State’s website, which lists Robert Brooks as the registered agent for Delphi.
At trial, Mr. Brooks testified that he is the sole managing member of Oracle and that Oracle was engaged by Burke’s to be the contract operator for the oil well. He explained that Delphi is wholly owned by Gulf Coast Royalty of which he has an approximately 97% ownership interest.
Based on the record and Mr. Guidroz’s testimony, the plaintiff appears not to have known about the abovementioned connections until sometime after the stop payment order was issued on the check. 4 The Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act is described, in part, in La.R.S. 51:1405(A), which provides: “Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful.” Additionally, La.R.S. 51:1409(A) explains, in pertinent part, that: “Any person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or movable property, corporeal or incorporeal, as a result of the use or employment by another person of an unfair or deceptive method, act or practice declared unlawful by R.S. 51:1405, may bring an action . . . to recover actual damages.” See also Quality Envtl. Processes, Inc. v. I.P. Petroleum Co., 13-1582 (La. 5/7/14), 144 So.3d 1011.
4 as legal interest from the date of the original demand. In oral reasons for
judgment, the trial court explained:
“[I]n looking at the totality of the circumstances, [defendant] or his wife are either members, agents, or officers of all three [sic] corporations, and given the irregular behavior and seemingly some fraudulent conduct or actions of defendant, the Court will pierce the corporate veil and find the defendants, Robert Brooks and Oracle Gas, liable in solido for the full sum of fifty-one thousand dollars ($51,000.00).
The trial court continued: “Delphi as well . . . In solido, all three of them.”
Thereafter, the defendants requested reasons for judgment. In response, the
court provided the following minute entry:
The Plaintiff has carried its burden of proving its’ [sic] case by a preponderance of the evidence. It clear [sic] from the evidence that Plaintiff, Southern Coil[,] rendered certain oil [sic] tubing services as requested by Defendants, Oracle and Delphi. It is clear that Defendant, Brooks[,] was an agent for [Burke’s] Energy, Delphi, and Oracle and acting with authority from those corporations, acted in a manner which assured Southern Coil that it would receive payment for services rendered.
The evidence shows that Mr. Brooks testified on the stand that he was acting as agent for defendants. Evidence showed that at no time did Mr. Brooks mention to Southern Coil that he was representing other companies. Southern Coil was not aware that Brooks was acting in the capacity of agent for defendant corporations. Testimony revealed that the Plaintiff, Southern Coil[,] believed that Brooks was acting on his own behalf or as an individual.
Further evidence shows that Brooks was the person who wrote the $51,000.00 check to Southern Coil on August 16 [sic], 2014; then he subsequently issued a stop payment on the same.
Mr. Brooks and Delphi appeal, asserting that the trial court erred concerning
the following issues:
1. The finding that Robert E. Brooks was personally liable, piercing the corporate veil of an unknown entity not identified by the District Court [].
2. The finding that Oracle Gas, LLC was liable for the alleged debt [].
5 3. The finding that Delphi Oil, Inc. was liable in solido [].
4. The District Court failed to rule on defendant’s, Mr. Brooks, Exceptions of No Right and No Cause of Action [].
(Record page citations omitted.)
Discussion
Standard of Review
The trial court’s liability determinations in this case entailed the resolution
of factual questions. An appellate court reviews the trial court’s factual findings
under the manifest error standard of review. Provosty v. Arc Constr., LLC, 15-
1219 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/2/16), 204 So.3d 623, writ denied, 17-0028 (La. 2/10/17),
216 So.3d 49. The supreme court has provided a two-part test for the reversal of a
trial court’s factual determinations under the manifest error standard of review.
Stobart v. State through Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993). First,
the appellate court must determine that there is no reasonable factual basis for the
trial court’s finding in the record. Id. Further, the record must reflect that the
finding is clearly wrong. Id. With the abovementioned legal standard in mind, we
turn to consideration of the trial court’s findings in light of the defendant’s
assignments of error.
Liability of Robert Brooks
In written reasons for judgment, the trial court concluded:
Evidence showed that at no time did Mr. Brooks mention to Southern Coil that he was representing other companies. Southern Coil was not aware that Brooks was acting in the capacity of agent for defendant corporations. Testimony revealed that the Plaintiff, Southern Coil[,] believed that Brooks was acting on his own behalf or as an individual.
However, review of the record in its entirety reveals no reasonable factual basis for
this finding. See Stobart, 617 So.2d 880. Specifically, the defense asked Mr.
6 Guidroz whether his “testimony was that Mr. Brooks told [him] that he was
representing Burke’s Energy, LLC[,]” and Mr. Guidroz answered, “That’s
correct.” This was confirmed when the defense asked whether “during all of this
time . . . dealing with Mr. Brooks . . . [Mr. Brooks] told [Mr. Guidroz] that he was
a representative of Burke’s Energy, LLC[,]” and Mr. Guidroz answered, “[H]e was
a consultant, representative, yes.” On this point, Mr. Brooks testified that he
explained to Mr. Guidroz that he was a consultant for Burke’s and that he
“absolutely” did not tell Mr. Guidroz that he was working in an individual
capacity.
Further, the defense asked Mr. Guidroz whether he “knew Burke’s Energy,
LLC was the operator of the well[,]” and Mr. Guidroz responded, “Yes.” The
defense subsequently asked Mr. Guidroz for whom the work was performed, and
Mr. Guidroz answered, “Burke’s.” Additionally, the record reveals that the “Bill
To” box reads “Burkes EnergyField [sic]” on the invoice provided by the plaintiff
after completion of the job. The record also contains copies of a “SERVICE
ORDER AND FIELD RECEIPT” in which the customer box is filled in with
“Burkes Energy.” Given this evidence, our review indicates that the trial court was
manifestly erroneous in its determination that the plaintiff believed Mr. Brooks
was acting as an individual. See Stobart, 617 So.2d 880.
We next turn to consideration of whether Mr. Brooks is personally liable
despite the plaintiff’s testimony that Mr. Brooks presented himself as a
representative of Burke’s to the plaintiff. However, as mentioned above, the
plaintiff did not name Burke’s as a defendant here. In turn, the record is silent on
the scope and nature of Mr. Brooks’ seeming representation of Burke’s.
7 The record reveals that Burke’s is a limited liability company. Concerning
the liability of agents of limited liability companies, La.R.S. 12:1320(B) provides,
in pertinent part, that: “Except as otherwise specifically set forth in this Chapter,
no member, manager, employee, or agent of a limited liability company is liable in
such capacity for a debt, obligation, or liability of the limited liability company.”
However, the statute is not a complete shield from personal liability, as subsection
(D) lists exceptions to the general rule:
Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed as being in derogation of any rights which any person may by law have against a member, manager, employee, or agent of a limited liability company because of any fraud practiced upon him, because of any breach of professional duty or other negligent or wrongful act by such person[.]
Given the above evidence as to Mr. Brooks’ status as an agent, at least as to
Burke’s, we turn to consideration of whether the situation at hand presents any of
the enumerated exceptions to the general rule of limited liability—fraud, breach of
professional duty, or any other negligent or wrongful conduct. See
La.R.S.12:1320(D).
First, we consider whether the plaintiff demonstrated that Mr. Brooks
committed fraud. In oral reasons for judgment, the trial court referenced
“seemingly some fraudulent conduct or actions of defendant[,]” and the plaintiff
urges the issue of fraud on appeal. Specifically, the plaintiff asserts that “[t]he
fraud here was Robert Brooks, acting for himself, presenting himself and
persuading Carl Guidroz to accept the agreement to perform services and to be
paid by Mr. Brooks, who has never paid.” Above we have found that the evidence
undermines a finding that the plaintiff felt that Mr. Brooks was acting on his own
behalf. Nonetheless, we consider the alleged presence of fraud as to Mr. Brooks’
8 purported agency of Burke’s, which is the only entity of which the plaintiff was
informed.
Louisiana Civil Code Article 1953 defines fraud as “a misrepresentation or a
suppression of the truth made with the intention either to obtain an unjust
advantage for one party or to cause a loss or inconvenience to the other. Fraud
may also result from silence or inaction.” The supreme court has said that “[t]here
are two elements necessary to prove legal fraud: an intent to defraud and a
resulting damage.” Lomont v. Bennett, 14-2483, p. 12 (La. 6/30/15), 172 So.3d
620, 629, cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 136 S.Ct. 1167 (2016). Concerning the intent
element, the fourth circuit has said that fraud “may be predicated on promises
made with the intention not to perform at the time the promise is made.” Sun
Drilling Prods. Corp. v. Rayborn, 00-1884, p. 15 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/3/01), 798
So.2d 1141, 1152, writ denied, 01-2939 (La. 1/25/02), 807 So.2d 840.
As mentioned above, Mr. Guidroz testified that Mr. Brooks revealed that the
oil well was for Burke’s and that he was informed that Mr. Brooks was a
consultant or representative of Burke’s. Additionally, the receipts and the invoice
submitted by the plaintiff were addressed only to Burke’s. When questioned about
the payment process and whether he knew of any other parties that might be
financially responsible, Mr. Guidroz answered, “they only would be Burke’s
Energy[.]” Considering the codal definition of fraud and the paucity of evidence
regarding the relationship between Mr. Brooks and Burke’s, we find no indication
that the plaintiff demonstrated that Mr. Brooks misrepresented or suppressed the
truth that the services were to be performed for Burke’s and that Burke’s, not Mr.
Brooks, would be the party responsible for payment as Mr. Brooks was
representing himself to be an agent of Burke’s.
9 Moreover, the plaintiff has not proven the two elements of fraud. See
Lomont, 172 So.3d 620. Significantly, the record reveals that the plaintiff has not
proven that Mr. Brooks had the intent to defraud. Id. The plaintiff has not
provided sufficient evidence that Mr. Brooks’ promise of payment was “made with
the intention not to perform at the time the promise [was] made.” Sun Drilling
Prods. Corp., 798 So.2d at 1152. To the contrary, Mr. Brooks left a pre-signed
check at the job site for payment of the plaintiff’s services. He further explained
that the reason he stopped payment on the check was because the invoice total was
greater than the amount he anticipated. Finding insufficient record evidence of
intent, we find that the plaintiff did not establish the applicability of the fraud
exception under La.R.S. 12:1320(D).
Next, we turn to the “breach of professional duty” exception. See La.R.S.
12:1320(D). Having reviewed the record in its entirety, we conclude that the
plaintiff has introduced neither proof that Mr. Brooks was a member of a
legislatively-recognized profession nor evidence, such as licensing, which might
elevate Mr. Brooks to the status of a “professional” as contemplated by La.R.S.
12:1320(D). See Ogea v. Merritt, 13-1085 (La. 12/10/13), 130 So.3d 888.
Therefore, the “breach of professional duty” exception is inapplicable in this
matter. Id.
Last, we consider whether the situation falls under the “other negligent or
wrongful act” exception of La.R.S. 12:1320(D). The supreme court has said that
this exception contains two distinct concepts, as it encompasses acts that are either
“negligent” or “wrongful” and that this exception includes, but is not limited to,
tort liability. Ogea, 130 So.3d 888. Drawing from statutes and jurisprudence, the
10 supreme court has developed a four-factor test to determine whether the negligent
or wrongful act exception applies:
1) [W]hether a member’s conduct could be fairly characterized as a traditionally recognized tort; 2) whether a member’s conduct could be fairly characterized as a crime, for which a natural person, not a juridical person, could be held culpable; 3) whether the conduct at issue was required by, or was in furtherance of, a contract between the claimant and the LLC; and 4) whether the conduct at issue was done outside the member’s capacity as a member.
Id. at 900-01. We review each of these factors in turn.
The first factor requires us to examine whether Mr. Brooks’ conduct can be
considered a traditional tort. This factor refers to a tort duty, not a contractual one,
and asks whether the individual can be held personally liable for actions
undertaken pursuant to the LLC’s contract. Ogea, 130 So.3d 888. The supreme
court has reasoned that the individual’s tort duty must be something more than that
duty inherent in the LLC’s contract, because to hold otherwise would negate the
general rule of limited liability for agents of an LLC. Id. Turning to the record,
we find that the plaintiff did not establish that Mr. Brooks personally owed a
statutory, jurisprudential, or fault-based tort duty to the plaintiff. See id.
The second factor requires us to determine whether Mr. Brooks’ conduct
violates a criminal statute intended to protect the plaintiff from the type of harm
which ensued. See Ogea, 130 So.3d 888. The record does not contain evidence of
such conduct.
Next, we must determine whether the conduct was in furtherance of a
contract between the plaintiff and Burke’s. Discussing the third factor, the
supreme court has explained that “if the reason a member is engaged in the
conduct at issue is to satisfy a contractual obligation of the LLC, then the member
should be more likely to qualify for the protections of the general rule of limited
11 liability in La.R.S. 12:1320(B).” Ogea, 130 So.3d at 904. Here, the only evidence
presented indicates that Mr. Brooks’ interactions with the plaintiff company were
represented to be on behalf of Burke’s and seemingly in furtherance of the
relationship between Burke’s and the plaintiff. Therefore, this factor suggests that
Mr. Brooks qualifies for the protection of limited liability in La.R.S. 12:1320(B).
See Ogea, 130 So3d 888.
Last, the fourth factor questions whether the individual acted outside of his
representative status. The supreme court has explained that this factor is met if the
individual acts “outside” of his capacity as an agent of the LLC or if the individual
does not act “inside” the structure of the LLC when contracting. Ogea, 130 So.3d
888. Again, the record lacks evidence regarding the structure of Burke’s and the
scope of any agency relationship between Burke’s and Mr. Brooks. The record
indicates only that Mr. Brooks said that he is the single managing member of
Oracle, which was hired by Burke’s as a contract operator for this oil well. At
trial, Mr. Guidroz testified that he was notified that the well was owned by Burke’s
and that Mr. Brooks was a consultant or representative of Burke’s. Thus, there is
no issue of an undisclosed mandatary5 relationship for which Mr. Brooks could be
held personally liable. See Ogea, 130 So.3d 888. The plaintiff has neither
demonstrated that Mr. Brooks acted “outside” of his purported agency capacity nor
that Mr. Brooks failed to act “inside” the structure of Burke’s. Id.
Having determined that there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate fraud,
breach of professional duty, or any other negligent or wrongful conduct, we
5 Louisiana Civil Code Article 3017 provides that an undisclosed mandatary is “[a] mandatary who contracts in his own name without disclosing his status as a mandatary” and thus “binds himself personally for the performance of the contract.”
12 conclude that the plaintiff failed to carry its burden at trial to rebut the presumption
that Mr. Brooks is protected by a limitation of liability and is not personally liable.
Liability of Oracle Gas, LLC and Delphi Oil, Inc.
The next assignments of error question the trial court’s holdings regarding
the liability of Oracle and Delphi. However, we note that the petition for appeal
was brought by Mr. Brooks and Delphi, not Oracle, and the corresponding order
for appeal was granted only to Mr. Brooks and Delphi. Accordingly, the
assignment of error regarding Oracle’s liability is not properly before the court, as
that party has not appealed.
Turning to Delphi, the trial court concluded that “[t]he evidence shows that
Mr. Brooks testified on the stand that he was acting as agent for defendants” and
“that [the] Plaintiff . . . rendered certain oil [sic] tubing services as requested by . . .
Delphi.” We note that Delphi’s involvement in this matter is not clearly explained
in the record;6 thus, there is no reasonable factual basis for this finding, and the
finding is clearly wrong. See Stobart, 617 So.2d 888. Having reviewed the record
in its entirety, we conclude that Mr. Brooks did not testify that he was acting as an
agent for Delphi. Moreover, nothing in the record indicates that Delphi requested
the plaintiff’s coil tubing services.
Instead, the only evidence in the record on this point indicates that Mr.
Brooks represented himself as a consultant of Burke’s only and that Burke’s was
the entity requesting the plaintiff’s coil tubing services. Mr. Guidroz testified that,
6 The record reveals that “Delphi Drilling, LLC” and “Delphi Oil, Inc.” are two different entities, but only “Delphi Oil, Inc.” was named as a defendant in this suit. When asked “[w]hat contact or information did [he] have with regard to Delphi Oil to sue them in this case[,]” Mr. Guidroz testified that “[t]he truck that showed up on lot to pick up the equipment was a [Delphi] [D]rilling truck.” (Emphasis added.) Mr. Guidroz further answered that he determined that Mr. Brooks is “an agent for Delphi Oil in the State of Louisiana.”
13 in their first telephone conversation, Mr. Brooks told him “[t]hat the well was for
Burke’s Energy.” Additionally, Mr. Guidroz testified that Mr. Brooks never
referred him to anyone else, such as Delphi, for payment or credit information.
Concerning Delphi’s role leading up to this dispute, Mr. Guidroz testified that he
and the plaintiff company had “[n]o contacts” and “[n]o business relations” with
Delphi. Rather, Mr. Guidroz testified that he subsequently determined that Mr.
Brooks had a connection with Delphi7 after the stop payment order was issued on
the check. Therefore, we find no basis for the trial court’s inclusion of Delphi in
the finding of liability.
DECREE For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, in part,
insofar as it finds the defendants/appellants, Robert Brooks and Delphi Oil, Inc.,
liable. We leave the judgment of the trial court with respect to Oracle Gas, LLC
undisturbed insofar as that party has not appealed. Costs of this proceeding are
assessed to the plaintiff/appellee, Southern Coil Tubing, Inc.
7 The plaintiff submitted a 2014 business listing from the Louisiana Secretary of State’s website, which lists Robert Brooks as the registered agent for Delphi Oil, Inc.