Southern Building & Loan Ass'n v. Anniston Loan & Trust Co.

101 Ala. 582
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama
DecidedNovember 15, 1893
StatusPublished
Cited by21 cases

This text of 101 Ala. 582 (Southern Building & Loan Ass'n v. Anniston Loan & Trust Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Southern Building & Loan Ass'n v. Anniston Loan & Trust Co., 101 Ala. 582 (Ala. 1893).

Opinion

HARALSON, J.

The main question in this case, as stated by the appellant, is the right and power of the* Southern Building and Loan Association to declare forfeited the shares of a borrowing member. Or, as. stated by counsel for appellees, “The cause was submitted in the court below upon an agreed state of facts, and the single point of dispute turns upon the question of the right of the Southern Building and Loan Association to forfeit the shares of stock held by it as collateral, and the refusal of said association to credit its mortgage with the value of the stock, or the aggregate amount of the payments made by Isaac Linsky on account of said stock, or on account of said loan. There is no dispute as to what payments were made, but the Southern Building and Loan Association plants itself upon the proposition, that it is entitled to recover the full amount of the original loan with interest, without any abatement for the value of the stock, or the aggregate amount of payments made by Isaac Linsky during the life of the loan.. The learned court below held that this construction was inequitable and not within the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was made, and that the junior mortgagee and the assignee for the benefit of creditors were entitled to redeem upon paying the amount of the mortgage loan, after deducting the value of the stock, or the aggregate amount of the payments made by said Isaac Linsky prior to making default.” We thus have the issue plainly and sharply defined, and the parties treat the value of the stock, as merely the aggregate of all the payments which have been made upon it, thus following the rule which is laid down in the books for the ascertainment of its value — Endlich on Building Asso., §§ 455, 457, and authorities there cited.

This question has given rise to some confusion in the [587]*587decisions of courts. In North Carolina, the transaction has been treated upon the basis of an actual loan of money, and the aggregate amount of payments upon stock as partial payments on the loan by the borrower. Overby v. The Fayetteville B. & L. Asso., 81 N. C. 56; Hoskins v. Mich. B. & L. Asso., 84 N. C. 838. And the earlier Pennsylvania cases, previously to that of the North Am. Building Asso. v. Sutton, 35 Pa. St. 463, maintain the same view of the question. Commenting upon these decisions, Mr. Endlich says that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Sutton’s case, supra, for the first time approached an understanding of the nature and dealings between the building association and its members ; that under the rulings in the former cases in that court, upon the theory of partial payments, it followed that each stock payment made by the borrowing member was a pro tanto reduction of his mortgage debt, to be deducted with interest from the date of payment; and he adds: “The fallacy of this doctrine is obvious from the fact that the borrower’s standing as a member is not merged in his superadded character of debtor, and that, as a member, he is not entitled to an account of profits made by the society upon his contributions, before the period of its termination (or that of the series to which his stock belongs), whilst the settlement of his liabilities as a borrower is also referred to the winding up of the mutual scheme. It has therefore, become a well recognized doctrine that payments of dues upon stock are not payments to the mortgage debt, and do not, ipso facto, work an extinguishment of so much of the mortgage. The fact that the borrower has assigned his shares to the society as collateral security for his debt makes ho difference ; for this is a recognition of the distinct standing of the member as a member and as a debtor.” — Endlich on Building Associations, § 452. And it is a correct principle, as has been held, that there is no connection established between the stock held by the stockholder and the bond held by the company, such as that payments made on stock are to be treated as payments on the bond, so that one is steadily offset against the other, or the one merges in the other,— a fallacy sometimes indulged, arising from a failure to observe the separate existence of the stock on the one hand and the bond on the other, — the separate [588]*588relation borne to the company, on the one side, by its stockholder, and, on the other, by its borrower. The payment on the one is not necessarily a payment on the othhr. — State Washington Bldg. & Loan Asso. v. Liornbacker, 42 N. J. L. (535; Endlich Building Asso., § 452. Mr. Freeman, in an extended note to Robertson v. Homestead Association, 69 Am. Dec. 163, gives approval to the same principle, citing a long list of cases in support thereof; and the learned annotator adds, as a conclusion from the very many authorities he cites, as to the amount that the borrower ought justly to pay when he wishes to withdraw, or is in default, and his mortgage is sought to be enforced, that, “It must be remembered, that when a member obtains a loan or advance, he anticipates the amount he is to receive upon the termination of the association, or of the series to which it belongs. His obligation does not look to a repayment before that time. If he desires to withdraw, or it becomes necessary to onforce his mortgage against him before that period arrives, the question is, what amount ought he equitably to pay? In ascertaining this amount, the only difference between the two cases seem to be, that when he voluntarily withdraws he is entitled to receive the bonus or share of profits allowed him under the laws of the associations, and when he is in default, no such allowance is to be made him.” The justness of this conclusion is vindicated on the ground that the defaulting member’s action is an injury to the association, arising out of a breach of his obligations, for if he continue from time to time, for purposes of his own convenience, to withhold his contributions to the common fund, when they become payable, it is clear he is thereby depriving the association of just that much money, which ought to be invested for the common good; and if this be allowed till the end, it is also plain he will have derived, from his own violation of duty, an unjust advantage, in sharing with the other members, notwithstanding his defaults, an equal participation in the profits.

In principle there can be no difference in the rule as to the prompt payment of premiums on a policy in a life insurance company, and the premiums and other dues on a building and loan contract, and this court, speaking of the former, said : “It is too late, at this [589]*589day, to raise any question as to the legal validity of such a contract. To one who understands anything of the principles upon which the business of life insurance is conducted, it is obvious that the punctual payment of premiums is of the very essence of the contract. The calculations of insurance actuaries, fixing the rates of insurance, are based on the theory of prompt payment, so as to afford opportunity for such re-investment as to reap the fruits of compound interest upon the company’s moneyed capital. Laxity in the enforcement of punctual payments might, and no doubt would, frequently lead to ultimate, if not speedy, financial ruin. Stipulations, therefore, incorporated in insurance policies, making such payments conditions precedent to the continued liability of the insurer, are generally maintained as valid by the courts.” — Ala. Gold Life Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 74 Ala. 582.

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Bluebook (online)
101 Ala. 582, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/southern-building-loan-assn-v-anniston-loan-trust-co-ala-1893.