Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority v. Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation Board of Review

506 A.2d 974, 96 Pa. Commw. 38, 1986 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 2030
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedMarch 19, 1986
DocketAppeal, No. 567 CD. 1984
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 506 A.2d 974 (Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority v. Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation Board of Review) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority v. Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 506 A.2d 974, 96 Pa. Commw. 38, 1986 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 2030 (Pa. Ct. App. 1986).

Opinion

Opinion by

Senior Judge Barbieri,

Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) appeals from a decision and order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) reversing the referee and granting unemployment compensation to Claimant Bobbie Lee McMiller under Section 3 of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law)1 [40]*40(declaration of public policy that benefits will be granted only to persons unemployed through no fault of their own). We affirm.

Claimant was employed by SEPTA as a bus operator until March 8, 1983. On Márch 9, Claimant was involved in a domestic altercation during which he allegedly shot two other people and then himself. The referee and the Board so found. From March 9 onward, Claimant was in the hospital recuperating from a bullet wound to his chest. He was eventually given permission by his physician to return to work on June 17, 1983. SEPTA would not permit Claimant to return to work, however, until Claimant obtained a work-release from SEPTAs physician. Because SEPTA had given Claimant a deadline for returning to work, and because his appointment had been postponed several timés, Claimant went to the workplace to try and pinpoint the exact date of his appointment with the SEPTA physician. Upon leaving the employer’s premises, Claimant was hit by a bus and, as a result, hospitalized. Claimant was, therefore, unable to return to work by July 4, 1983, the deadline set by SEPTA. By letter dated July 6, 1983, Claimant was advised that SEPTA considered Claimant to have voluntarily terminated his employment effective that date.

When Claimant applied for unemployment compensation the employer advised the Office of Employment Security (OES) that Claimant was separated from his employment when he foiled to return to work upon the expiration of his accrued sick leave. The OES found that Claimant did not return. to work as scheduled, that Claimant requested a leave of absence which the employer denied, and that Claimant foiled to submit any medical certification to his employer stating that he was unable to work. The Notice of Determination issued' by the OES advised Claimant that his application for [41]*41benefits was disapproved pursuant to Section 402(b) of the Law2 (voluntary quit).

Nevertheless, at the hearing scheduled before the unemployment compensation referee upon Claimants appeal from the OES’ determination, the employer’s representative advised the referee that it wished to proceed under Section 3 of the Law as Claimant had been separated from his employment, not for failure to return to work upon the expiration of his accrued sick leave as the employer had previously asserted, but because of the non-work-related domestic altercation.3 The Claimant agreed, and the referee issued his decision concluding that the facts presented regarding the domestic altercation warranted a denial of benefits under Section 3. The Board on appeal stated that the employer had not produced evidence to show that Claimant’s conduct, which led to his arrest, directly affected his ability to perform his assigned duties. Because the employer failed to produce such evidence, the Board concluded that the Claimant could riot be dis[42]*42qualified from receiving benefits under Section 3 of the Law. The Board reversed the referee and granted benefits.

SEPTA argues before this Court that Claimant was not discharged merely because of the shooting incident, as SEPTAs representative at the hearing asserted, but because, as a result of the shooting, Claimant overextended his accrued sick leave. Therein lies the fault, argues SEPTA, which disqualifies Claimant for benefits under Section 3.

SEPTA’s argument illustrates a common misperception regarding Sections 3 and 402(e)4 of the Law. Section 3 provides a basis for disqualification that is independent of those enumerated in Section 402 of the Law. Corbacio v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 78 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 70, 466 A.2d 1117 (1983). Section 402(e) is used to disqualify claimant for work-related misconduct. Section 3 is used to disqualify claimants for non-work-related misconduct which is inconsistent with acceptable standards of behavior and which directly affects the claimant’s ability to perform his assigned duties. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. Derk, 24 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 54, 57, 353 A.2d 915, 917 (1976). SEPTA may not, as it attempts to do, link Claimant’s failure to return to work upon the. expiration of his sick leave, work-related misconduct, with the domestic altercation to establish the fault, or non-work-related misconduct, necessary to disqualify Claimant under Section 3.

The task before this Court is to review the Board’s determination that SEPTA foiled to produce evidence of [43]*43conduct on the part of Claimant which directly reflected upon Claimants ability to perform his assigned duties, a burden imposed by Derk.

Since Derk, however, this Court has decided two cases refining the two-prong burden of proof set forth in Derk requiring the employer to show that (1) Claimant’s conduct was contrary to acceptable standards of behavior, and (2) the conduct in question directly reflects upon Claimant’s ability to perform his assigned duties. In Sheaffer v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 92 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 431, 499 A.2d 1121 (1985), after noting that evidence of the conduct leading to the arrest will satisfy the first part of the Derk test, we analyzed the second half of the Derk test and stated that a number of factors should be considered in determining whether a claimant’s conduct directly reflects upon his ability to do his job: (a) the specific nature of the offense committed by Claimant; (b) the nature of Claimant’s assigned duties; (c) whether Claimant’s job requires any special degree of trust on the part of the employer; and (d) any other circumstances which may particularly affect Claimant’s ability to do his job, including whether the crime occurred on or off Employer’s premises, and whether or not it involved any of Employer’s other workers or clients.

In Snelson v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 93 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 539, 502 A.2d 734 (1985), we noted the Sheaffer decision and then stated:

. . . [N]o single factor is necessarily dispositive of the issue of whether a claimant’s conduct reflects adversely on his fitness to do his job. Rather, if an examination of all relevant circumstances, including especially the nature of the conduct in question, leads to the conclusion that a claimant’s conduct is incompatible with his job [44]*44responsibilities, then the second prong of the Derk test is satisfied.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

J. Marth v. UCBR
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 2020
Cnty. of Allegheny/Fifth Judicial Dist. of Pa. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review
210 A.3d 1140 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 2019)
Lower Paxton Twp. v. UCBR
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 2017
Palladino v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review
81 A.3d 1096 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 2013)
Turner v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review
899 A.2d 381 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 2006)
Webb v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review
670 A.2d 1212 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 1996)
Gillins v. UNEMP. COMP. BD. OF REVIEW
633 A.2d 1150 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1993)
Phoebus v. UNEMP. COMP. BD. OF REVIEW
573 A.2d 649 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 1990)
Kawa v. UNEMP. COMP. BD. OF REVIEW
573 A.2d 252 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 1990)
Frank v. UN. COMP. BD. OF REV.
556 A.2d 15 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 1989)
Robinson v. UN. COMP. BD. OF REV.
546 A.2d 750 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 1988)
Horsefield v. Commonwealth
531 A.2d 829 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 1987)
Septa v. Un. Comp. Bd. of Rev.
506 A.2d 974 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 1986)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
506 A.2d 974, 96 Pa. Commw. 38, 1986 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 2030, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/southeastern-pennsylvania-transportation-authority-v-commonwealth-pacommwct-1986.