Southeastern Leasing Corp. v. Stern Dragger Belogorsk Etc., Deep, Deep Ocean Products, Inc. v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

First Circuit

Southeastern Leasing Corp. v. Stern Dragger Belogorsk Etc., Deep, Deep Ocean Products, Inc. v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

493 F.2d 1223, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 9561, 1974 A.M.C. 300

CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit

DecidedMarch 20, 1974

Docket73-1318, 73-1319

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 493 F.2d 1223 (Southeastern Leasing Corp. v. Stern Dragger Belogorsk Etc., Deep, Deep Ocean Products, Inc. v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Southeastern Leasing Corp. v. Stern Dragger Belogorsk Etc., Deep, Deep Ocean Products, Inc. v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 493 F.2d 1223, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 9561, 1974 A.M.C. 300 (1st Cir. 1974).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The district court, acting upon a suggestion of immunity from the State Department filed by the Attorney General, dismissed the actions brought by appellants and ordered the release of the arrested vessel BELOGORSK. Appellants maintain that the vessel in question is neither owned nor controlled by the U.S.S.R. and that the suggestion of immunity was, therefore, improper. Faced with such allegations, the court erred, according to appellants, in accepting the executive suggestion of immunity without conducting an independent judicial inquiry. We could accept this argument only by deviating from oft-affirmed unequivocal doctrine:

“The certification and the request that the vessel be declared immune must be accepted by the courts as a conclusive determination by the political arm of the Government that the continued retention of the vessel interferes with the proper conduct of our foreign relations. Upon the submission of this certification to the district court, it became the court’s duty, in conformity to established principles, to release the vessel and to proceed no further in the cause.” Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589, 63 S.Ct. 793, 800, 87 L.Ed. 1014 (1943).

See Compania Espanola de Navegacion Maritima, S. A. v. The Navemar, 303 U. S. 68, 74, 58 S.Ct. 432, 82 L.Ed. 667 (1938); Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir. 1971); Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S. A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961). We decline to depart from these authorities. In a recent case the fifth circuit also refused to countenance judicial review of the State Department’s determination of immunity despite a claim that the executive had acted arbitrarily. Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974).

We find no merit in appellants’ alternative contention that the U.S.S.R. waived sovereign immunity by agreeing in a treaty that Soviet vessels would enter United States ports “subject to the applicable laws and regulations of the United States.”

Affirmed.

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PER CURIAM.

The district court, acting upon a suggestion of immunity from the State Department filed by the Attorney General, dismissed the actions brought by appellants and ordered the release of the arrested vessel BELOGORSK. Appellants maintain that the vessel in question is neither owned nor controlled by the U.S.S.R. and that the suggestion of immunity was, therefore, improper. Faced with such allegations, the court erred, according to appellants, in accepting the executive suggestion of immunity without conducting an independent judicial inquiry. We could accept this argument only by deviating from oft-affirmed unequivocal doctrine:

“The certification and the request that the vessel be declared immune must be accepted by the courts as a conclusive determination by the political arm of the Government that the continued retention of the vessel interferes with the proper conduct of our foreign relations. Upon the submission of this certification to the district court, it became the court’s duty, in conformity to established principles, to release the vessel and to proceed no further in the cause.” Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589, 63 S.Ct. 793, 800, 87 L.Ed. 1014 (1943).

See Compania Espanola de Navegacion Maritima, S. A. v. The Navemar, 303 U. S. 68, 74, 58 S.Ct. 432, 82 L.Ed. 667 (1938); Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir. 1971); Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S. A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961). We decline to depart from these authorities. In a recent case the fifth circuit also refused to countenance judicial review of the State Department’s determination of immunity despite a claim that the executive had acted arbitrarily. Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974).

We find no merit in appellants’ alternative contention that the U.S.S.R. waived sovereign immunity by agreeing in a treaty that Soviet vessels would enter United States ports “subject to the applicable laws and regulations of the United States.”

Affirmed.

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493 F.2d 1223, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 9561, 1974 A.M.C. 300, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/southeastern-leasing-corp-v-stern-dragger-belogorsk-etc-deep-deep-ca1-1974.

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