Southeastern Human Development Corp. v. Schweiker

531 F. Supp. 440, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9300
CourtDistrict Court, D. South Dakota
DecidedJanuary 18, 1982
DocketCiv. No. 81-3072
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 531 F. Supp. 440 (Southeastern Human Development Corp. v. Schweiker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. South Dakota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Southeastern Human Development Corp. v. Schweiker, 531 F. Supp. 440, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9300 (D.S.D. 1982).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DONALD J. PORTER, District Judge.

CASE SUMMARY

Plaintiff brought this action seeking an injunction enjoining defendants from disbursing or expending the allotment available to the State of South Dakota under Subtitle B-Community Service Block Grant Program of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981. On December 23, 1981, following a hearing in which all parties appeared by counsel, this Court granted a temporary restraining order to preserve the status quo until a hearing on plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction could be held. The federal defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that plaintiff lacks the requisite standing. In addition, both the federal defendants and state defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court heard the motion for preliminary injunction on January 13, 1982.1 For the reasons which follow, plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction is denied.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (The Reconciliation Act) among other things, established seven block grant programs to be .administered by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services. The block grants replaced a large number of programs previously administered by the federal government, transferred primary responsibility for their administration to the states, and conferred substantial discretion on the state as to use of the block grant funds. The Reconciliation Act repealed most of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq., and abolished the Community Services Administration, (CSA), the federal agency which had been responsible for administering the anti-poverty, categorical grant programs authorized by the Economic Opportunity Act.

Prior to August 13, 1981, when the Reconciliation Act became law, Plaintiff was receiving funds from the CSA as an eligible grantee under the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. Because of its grantee status under the old law, plaintiff is an “eligible entity” under the Community Services Block Grant (CSBG) Program2 established by the Reconciliation Act.

Beginning in fiscal year 1983, CSBG funds will be available only through state block grant programs, with certain limited exceptions not relevant here. For fiscal year 1982 only, transition provisions of the Reconciliation Act permit a state to elect to administer the CSBG program, or to request that the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) administer the block grant.3 If a state chooses not to administer the block grant program, the state’s allotment for fiscal year 1982 is administered by the Secretary in accordance with the relevant repealed provisions of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964.4 If a state chooses to administer the block grant program, it must submit an application containing specified assurances and a plan describing how the state will [442]*442carry out the assurances.5 In addition, states are required to prepare a public report on the proposed use of block grant funds.6

On September 2, 1981, the Governor of South Dakota notified the Secretary of HHS, in writing, that South Dakota elected to administer the CSBG effective October 1, 1981, the beginning of the federal fiscal year for 1982. The State, however, did not submit its plan containing the requisite assurances until December 11, 1981.

On December 17, 1981, plaintiff filed a motion for temporary restraining order, seeking to enjoin the defendants from disbursing any CSBG funds to South Dakota for fiscal year 1982, alleging that the state defendants failed to timely file its plan containing the requisite assurances in violation of § 1743(a).7

DISCUSSION

I. TIME REQUIREMENT FOR SUBMISSION OF STATE PLAN

Plaintiff contends that once the State informed the Secretary of its intent to administer the CSBG, it was bound to follow the timetable set forth in § 1743(a),8 and further until the State complied with § 1743(a), the Secretary was bound to follow the terms of § 1743(b).9 Specifically, plaintiff contends that the State did not submit its plan and the requisite assurances in time to be eligible to receive CSBG funding for the first two quarters of fiscal year 1982. As a result, plaintiff contends that the Secretary must distribute the two quarters’ funding to those entities in the state, such as the plaintiff, that were receiving funds under the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964.

It is the position of both the federal and state defendants that although the provisions of Title XVII upon which the plaintiff relies are general provisions applicable to all block grant programs created by the Reconciliation Act, the more specific provisions of Title VI, under which the CSBG program is authorized, are controlling in the instant situation. In short, the defendants contend that once the State notified HHS of the state’s election to administer the CSBG the specific block grant provisions of Title VI and not the general transition provisions of Title XVII went into effect as to South Dakota for fiscal year 1982.

As stated in Dataphase Systems, Inc. v. C. L. Systems, Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981) whether a preliminary injunction should issue involves a consideration of (1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the balance between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict on other parties litigant; (3) the probability that the movant will succeed on the merits; and (4) the public interest. Because the case at bar essentially involves a legal question of statutory interpretation, the Court’s discussion will focus on the third factor above, i.e., the probability of plaintiff’s success on the merits.

Upon reviewing the legislative history of Titles VI and XVII, and applying the rules of statutory construction, the Court agrees with the statutory interpretation urged by the defendant. With respect to the transition provisions of Title XVII, the Conference Committee noted that, “[a]ny transition provision contained in a block grant program authorized by this Act shall supersede this [Title].” H.R.Rep.No. 97-208, 97th Cong., 1st Session 923 (1981), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp.-,-. The transition provisions for the CSBG Program are found in § 682. As discussed supra, § 682 permits a state to choose, for fiscal year 1982 only, to administer the block grant or to request the Secretary to [443]*443administer the block grant. Although the bulk of the provisions in § 682 pertain only to the instance, unlike the case at bar, in which a state elects not to administer the block grant, the specific provisions of Title VI, particularly § 675, are also applicable here and must prevail over the general transition provisions of § 1743. In reaching this interpretation, the Court is cognizant of the well-established rule of statutory construction that specific provisions prevail over general provisions in the same statute which might otherwise be controlling. See, e.g., Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Production Corp.,

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Related

Southeastern Human Development Corp. v. Heckler
560 F. Supp. 925 (D. South Dakota, 1983)

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Bluebook (online)
531 F. Supp. 440, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9300, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/southeastern-human-development-corp-v-schweiker-sdd-1982.