Southard's Estate

16 Pa. D. & C. 751, 1932 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 68
CourtPennsylvania Orphans' Court, Philadelphia County
DecidedMay 11, 1932
DocketNo. 2428 of 1931
StatusPublished

This text of 16 Pa. D. & C. 751 (Southard's Estate) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Orphans' Court, Philadelphia County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Southard's Estate, 16 Pa. D. & C. 751, 1932 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 68 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1932).

Opinion

Stearne, J.,

— This is an appeal by the mother and sole heir of a deceased World War veteran from the assessment and appraisement of direct inheritance tax upon a-fund derived solely from United States com-, pensation award to the soldier, occasioned by his permanent and total disability through war injuries. The disability was physical and mental. Because of the impaired mental condition a guardian of the soldier’s estate was appointed by the common pleas court. The United States periodically paid compensation to the guardian for a period of years, and it was applied by the guardian for the support, maintenance and comfort of the soldier. A considerable sum of money accumulated in the hands of the guardian in excess of the amounts necessarily expended as stated above. The Commonwealth claims’ that this accumulated fund is taxable under the transfer inheritance tax laws of this Commonwealth.

A United States soldier in the World War automatically became entitled to the benefits and provisions of the Acts of Congress- of September 2, 1914, August 11, 1916, March 3, 1917, June 12, 1917, October 6, 1917, and July 11, 1918, all referring to the Bureau of War Risk Insurance of the Treasury Department. These Acts of Congress were generally repealed and codified by the World War Veterans’ Act of June 7, 1924, Chap. 320, 43 Stat. at L. 607. This act has been further amended and modified in more or less unimportant items which need not be considered in the present inquiry.

The declared intent of the congressional enactment was to provide a system for the relief of disabled soldiers and for the dependents of those who died as a result of disability. Under title two elaborate provisions are enacted defining precisely who is entitled to participate and in what amounts and under what circumstances. Title three relates to the privilege accorded a soldier in securing United States Government life insurance for not less than $1000 or more than $10,000, with detailed provisions as to the method of payment of premiums, naming of beneficiaries, payment of policies, conversions, etc.

The present decedent entered the military service of the United States- on January 1, 1918, and applied for and was granted insurance in the sum of $10,000, and deductions were thereafter regularly made from his service pay until his disability occurred. Decedent was permanently and totally disabled from September 15, 1919, to the time of his death on November 11, 1930. At the time of his disability, under the act, he was entitled to receive $57.50 per month. His injuries were physical and mental, and he became a patient at the United States Veterans’ Hospital at Philadelphia. Due to his mental incapacity, a guardian was appointed for his estate in the common pleas court. [752]*752During the soldier’s lifetime the guardian collected the compensation, cared for the soldier, hut the expenditures proved to be less than the compensation received. In consequence whereof a balance accumulated in the hands of the guardian, part of which was invested in mortgages. It became necessary to foreclose certain of the mortgages, and the guardian held the real estate, herein considered as personalty, as a result thereof.

An examination of the account of the administrator reveals a total receipt of funds from the guardian and the United States Government of

$10,316.26

In assessing tax the Commonwealth excluded from the above the following items appearing in the administra-

tor’s account:

Interest on deposits...................... $.46

Phila. County Commissioners on account of burial................................ 75.00

U. S. Veterans’Bureau on account of burial. 135.00,

Adjusted service compensation............ 1,565.00

- 1,775.46

Gross personal estate........................ $8,540.80

Deductions were allowed for items of expense and administration as set forth in the administrator’s account, including the difference in funeral bill and the sums contributed by U. S. Government and of this Commonwealth, totaling.................................... 1,232.04

Net personal estate.......................... $7,308.76

to which add the appraised value of the real estate, which said real estate as above was secured by foreclosures of mortgages thereon.............................. 5,430.09

Total estate................................. $12,738.85

which was assessed for taxation at the rate of two per cent., or $254.77, together with interest thereon at the rate earned, four per cent., since November 11, 1931, one year after the date of the soldier’s death.

The Commonwealth, however, properly excluded the item of interest on deposit as such item manifestly accrued after the death; it likewise excluded the payments by the government and state on account of funeral expenses, because the soldier was not seized of this fund in his lifetime. And finally, Smith’s Estate, 8 D. & C. 639, is authority for the exclusion of the item of $1565, the amount of the adjusted service compensation, which was received after the death of the soldier and formed no part of his estate at the time of his decease.

This brings squarely in issue the status of this fund as to its taxability by the Commonwealth for transfer inheritance tax.

Section twenty-two of the Act of Congress of June 7, 1924, 43 Stat. at L. 607, provides “that the compensation, insurance and maintenance and support allowance . . . shall not be assignable; shall not be subject to the claims of creditors . . . and shall be exempt from all taxation.”

At first I was disposed to regard the fund in question as exempt from tax because of the provisions of the above act. It seemed repugnant to me to tax such a fund, particularly in the circumstances of this case. I have sought every avenue to escape the conclusion that it is so taxable. However, upon [753]*753subsequent reflection and after considerable research of the authorities in this and other jurisdictions, I have changed my original view and am now clear that the tax was properly assessed.

As I view the Act of Congress and the cases, it seems very clear that as respects compensation and insurance Congress had two principal objects in view:

1. To compensate the soldier in his lifetime for accident or injury while in the service.

2. To care for the soldier’s designated beneficiaries after his death (where the soldier voluntarily acquired such an insurance policy).

This particular soldier possessed such an insurance policy. Upon the occurrence of his disability he was entitled to his compensation during his own life. Upon his death, his mother, his designated insurance beneficiary, was entitled to the benefits of his war risk insurance for the duration of her life. After the death of the mother, and through the soldier’s estate, the unpaid portions of such insurance will be paid to the soldier’s next of kin.

The taxable situation concerning the war risk insurance undoubtedly has confused the situation with respect to compensation. However, a study of the situation clarifies the subject. There can be no question since Wanzel’s Estate, 295 Pa. 419, Fisher’s Estate, 302 Pa. 516, and Neuburger’s Estate, 16 D. & C.

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Related

Wanzel's Estate
145 A. 512 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1929)
Fisher's Estate
153 A. 736 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1930)
Elwyn's Appeal
67 Pa. 367 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1871)
Rozelle v. Rhodes
9 A. 160 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1887)
Commonwealth v. Baum
95 A. 662 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1915)
Aubrey v. McIntosh
10 Pa. Super. 275 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1899)
Pentz v. First National Bank
75 Pa. Super. 1 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1920)
State ex rel. Smith v. Board of County Commissioners
294 P. 915 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1931)

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16 Pa. D. & C. 751, 1932 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 68, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/southards-estate-paorphctphilad-1932.