South Village Comm. LLC

CourtVermont Superior Court
DecidedJuly 6, 2006
Docket74-04-05 Vtec
StatusPublished

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Bluebook
South Village Comm. LLC, (Vt. Ct. App. 2006).

Opinion

STATE OF VERMONT ENVIRONMENTAL COURT

} South Village Communities, LLC } Docket No. 74-4-05 Vtec (Appeal of Vallee) } (Master Plan Appeal) }

Decision on Pending Motions Skip and Denise Vallee appealed from a decision of the City of South Burlington (City) Development Review Board (DRB) dated March 10, 20051 granting final approval to South Village Communities, LLC‟s Master Plan Application (#MP-04-01) for a planned unit development in the City‟s Southeast Quadrant Zoning District. Appellants are represented by Jon T. Anderson, Esq.; Appellee-Applicant South Village Communities, LLC is represented by Mark G. Hall, Esq.; the City appears as an Interested Person and is represented by Amanda Lafferty, Esq.; Interested Person Daniel M. Wetzel represents himself. Appellants have filed a motion for partial summary judgment, which South Village opposes. Appellee-Applicant filed a motion to dismiss. The pending motions focus our attention on the applicability of a mixed rate housing density bonus for development in the Southeast Quadrant Zoning District.

Appellee-Applicant’s Motion to Dismiss Appellee-Applicant moves to dismiss this appeal based on Appellants‟ failure to file the Statement of Questions within twenty days after filing the notice of appeal, as required by V.R.E.C.P. 5(f).2 If we do not grant the motion to dismiss, Appellee-Applicant seeks, in the alternative, a ruling limiting the issues in this appeal to the sole issue presented in Appellants‟

1 On April 13, 2005, Appellee-Applicant filed an unopposed motion to remand to allow the DRB to reconsider its March 10, 2005 DRB decision. This Court granted the remand, with leave to reopen, on April 14, 2005. The DRB issued a reconsidered decision on July 19, 2005, in which it came to the same conclusion as it had on March 10. On August 3, 2005, Appellants filed a “notice of continued appeal.” It thus appears that the decision being appealed here is the March 10, 2005 DRB decision. However, any distinctions between the March 10 and July 19 DRB decisions are not material to our decision on the pending motions. 2 V.R.E.C.P. 5(f) states in its entirety: Within 20 days after the filing of the notice of appeal, the appellant shall file with the clerk of the Environmental Court a statement of the questions that the appellant desires to have determined. The statement shall be served in accordance with Rule 5 of the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure. No response to the statement of questions shall be filed. The appellant may not raise any question on the appeal not presented in the statement as filed, unless otherwise ordered by the court in a pretrial order entered pursuant to subdivision (d) of Rule 2. The statement is subject to a motion to clarify or dismiss some or all of the questions.

1 motion for partial summary judgment. The operative notice of appeal in the somewhat convoluted procedural history of this case is the Notice of Continued Appeal filed by Appellants on August 3, 2005. At that time, the parties expected that an Act 250 application would be filed in connection with the project at issue in this appeal. On August 18, 2005, this Court ordered that the current appeal, Docket No. 74-4-05 Vtec, “be placed on inactive status in this Court until any Act 250 application filed for this project is decided and appealed to this Court, or until further Order of the Court.” Scheduling Order in Docket Nos. 163-9-04 Vtec and 74-4-05 Vtec, dated August 18, 2005, at 2. On September 20, 2005, Appellee-Applicant acknowledged that the Court‟s August 18, 2005 Order tolled the time period for initial filings, in a letter requesting that “the appeal [Docket No. 74-4-05 Vtec] be removed from inactive status so that the initial procedures for filing the statement of questions and issues related to the parties can go forward. . . . none of the initial time periods for narrowing issues and participation are running.” Appellee-Applicant‟s letter dated Sept. 20, 2005. This appeal, Docket No. 74-4-05 Vtec, was not removed from inactive status until January 3, 2006. Between August 18, 2005, and January 3, 2006, during which time this appeal was on inactive status, the time limits for initial filings were tolled, and Appellants‟ failure to file a Statement of Questions during that period is of no legal effect, especially since Appellants were assured by Court staff on October 24, 2005 that the Statement of Questions was not yet due. Despite the inactive status of this appeal, the parties proceeded to file the pending motions: Appellants‟ motion for partial summary judgment was filed on October 31, 2005, and Appellee- Applicant‟s motion to dismiss and reply memorandum was filed on November 29, 2005. This resulted in an unusual situation where the pre-trial motions preceded the filing of Appellants‟ Statement of Questions. Perhaps motivated by Appellee-Applicant‟s motion to dismiss, Appellants filed a Statement of Questions for this appeal on December 21, 2005. Given the circumstances, Appellants‟ filing of their Statement of Questions is wholly sufficient to satisfy the requirements of V.R.E.C.P. 5(f). We therefore conclude that Appellee-Applicant‟s motion to dismiss should be denied. Nor will we grant its alternative request to limit the issues on appeal to the issue raised in Appellants‟ motion for partial summary judgment. The placing of this appeal on inactive status tolled the twenty-day period for filing the Statement of Questions. Therefore,

2 Appellants‟ Statement of Questions, which was filed while this appeal was still on inactive status, was timely.

Appellants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Appellants seek partial summary judgment on the sole issue of whether open space and natural area protection can be reduced in the Southeast Quadrant Zoning District to allow a housing density of more than 1.2 housing units per acre. This is a question of pure law, which we must resolve by applying the language of the relevant sections of the City of South Burlington Land Development Regulations (SBLDR). Section 9.01 of the SBLDR states the purpose of the SEQ: A Southeast Quadrant Zoning District (SEQ) is hereby formed in order to encourage open space preservation, scenic view and natural resource protection, wildlife habitat preservation, continued agricultural use, and well planned residential use in the largely undeveloped area of the City known as the Southeast Quadrant. The open character and scenic views offered in this area have long been recognized as very special and unique resources in the City and worthy of protection. The location and clustering of buildings and lots in a manner that in the judgment of the Development Review Board will best preserve the open space character of this area shall be encouraged. Any uses not expressly permitted are prohibited except those which are allowed as conditional uses.

Development in the SEQ is subject to restrictions designed to further the purposes outlined in SBLDR § 9.01. Our reading of the SEQ protections, together with the PUD allowances for the other zoning districts, leads us to conclude that planned unit developments in the SEQ district do not qualify for the same housing density bonuses that apply in the other zoning districts. In the Residential 2 District, where, pursuant to SBLDR Table C-2, the maximum residential density is two units per acre, SBLDR § 4.02(F) provides that “[f]or lots within the Residential 2 District that are five (5) acres in size or more, a Planned Unit Development may be permitted at a maximum of four (4) units per acre,” or twice the otherwise applicable maximum density.

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