South San Joaquin Irrigation District v. Neumiller

42 P.2d 64, 2 Cal. 2d 485, 1935 Cal. LEXIS 352
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 25, 1935
DocketS. F. 15202
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 42 P.2d 64 (South San Joaquin Irrigation District v. Neumiller) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
South San Joaquin Irrigation District v. Neumiller, 42 P.2d 64, 2 Cal. 2d 485, 1935 Cal. LEXIS 352 (Cal. 1935).

Opinion

SHENK, J.

This is an application for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent, as Tax Collector of the County of San Joaquin, to give notice of the making of certain agreements between the board of supervisors of said county and the board of directors of South San Joaquin Irrigation District pursuant- to section 3897d of the Political Code, enacted in 1933. (Stats. 1933, p. 2580.)

In pertinent respects the foregoing section provides that whenever any property has been deeded for delinquent taxes or assessments to the state and the same property has also been deeded for delinquent taxes or assessments to an irrigation district, the board of directors of the district may *487 enter into an agreement with the board of supervisors of the county in which the property is situated, subject to the approval of the state controller, for the purchase of, or for an option to purchase, the property so held by the state; that any such agreement may provide for the price for which and the terms on which the property shall be sold; that when the agreement has been approved by the state controller, he shall by written authorization direct the tax collector of the county to cause notice of the making of the agreement to be given by publication or posting, which notice shall describe the property and shall state the names of the person or persons to whom the property was assessed for the year or years of delinquent payment of taxes; that said notice shall also state that an agreement for the sale of the property has been made by the board of supervisors of the county with the public agency named in the agreement; that the tax collector shall mail a copy of the notice to the persons to whom the property was last assessed next before the making of the agreement; that the agreement shall not become effective until twenty-one days after the first publication of the notice; that if within said twenty-one day period the property is redeemed as elsewhere provided for in the Political Code, or if the property is so redeemed before the purchaser shall have complied with the terms of purchase, the agreement shall be null and void, but if the property is not so redeemed then, whenever the purchaser shall have complied with the terms of purchase, the tax collector of the county shall execute and deliver to the purchaser a deed to the property in the form provided; that upon the execution of the deed all rights to redeem the property shall be terminated, and the deed shall, except for fraud, be conclusive evidence of the performance of all of the requirements of the section and shall otherwise have the same effect as evidence and as a deed issued in accordance with section 3898 of the same code.

It appears from the petition that within the boundaries of the irrigation district there are located the three parcels of real property particularly described and generally called parcels 1, 2 and 3; that prior to December 1, 1933, each of these parcels had been deeded to the district by its tax collector for assessments levied in 1927, which assessments remained delinquent, unpaid and unredeemed, more than three years *488 prior to the deed to the district; that said real property is also located within the county of San Joaquin and subsequent to 1925 had been levied upon by the authorities of that county for county taxes; that these taxes had become delinquent and the land had been sold to the state; that prior to the first day of December, 1933, and after the expiration of more than five years subsequent to the sale to the state the land had been deeded to the state and that no redemption had been made; that on December 18, 1933, three separate agreements, each affecting one of said parcels, were entered into wherein the board of supervisors of said county, as first party, agreed to sell and the irrigation district, as second party, agreed to buy, the described land for a cash consideration of $3.90 per acre, payable $1.93 per acre upon approval of the sale and thirty-nine cents per acre annually thereafter until the full purchase price is paid. Upon completion of the payments the first party agreed to execute to second party a deed as provided in section 3897d of the Political Code. In default of payment and thirty days’ notice thereof the second party agreed to quitclaim its interest in the land to the first party. These agreements were approved by the state controller, whereupon by written authorization he directed the tax collector to cause the notice of the making of the agreements to be given as required by the statute. The tax collector refused to comply with the direction. Hence this proceeding.

In support of his general demurrer to the petition the respondent contends that said section 3897d is unconstitutional and void for the reason that it would deprive persons entitled to redeem the lands affected of their rights to redeem, without due process of law, and would deny to them the equal protection of the law. It should first be noted that no question is here presented concerning the power or lack of power of the legislature to shorten the five-year period after the sale to the state within which redemption may be made, as provided in section 3780 of the Political Code, which section permits redemption ‘- by the owner, or any party in interest, within five years from the date of the sale to the state, or at any time prior to the entry or sale of said land by the state, in the manner provided by section three thousand eight hundred and seventeen”.

*489 Nor is there any question here as to whether the legislature may, after the deed to the state, so amend the law as to add new burdens or more onerous conditions to the right to redeem than existed when the sale was made. (See Teralta Land etc. Co. v. Shaffer, 116 Cal. 518 [48 Pac. 613, 68 Am. St. Rep. 194]; Johnson v. Taylor, 150 Cal. 201 [88 Pac. 903, 119 Am. St. Rep. 181, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 818].) This is so for the reason that no such burdens or conditions were added or imposed by the enactment of section 3897d. The person having the right to redeem now has the same redemption right within the same time, on at least the same notice, and for the same amount, as he had before the section was enacted. The new section not only preserves to him those rights, but in reality extends the time for redemption until the purchasing district has complied with the terms of its contract. The question is therefore narrowed to this: Does the person possessing a right to redeem also have a vested or such a substantial right in the method or conditions adopted by the state for the disposition by it of its tax deeded lands as would deprive the state of the power to change the method and terms of sale thereof, after it had received title to the lands? In other words, and as applied to the present situation, has the person having the privilege of redemption, whose rights in that behalf are not made more burdensome or onerous by the subsequent legislation, the constitutional right to compel the state to dispose of its title to tax deeded lands at public auction for cash as provided by section 3817 of the Political Code as the same was in effect at the time of the sale to the state? The answer must be in the negative. In the absence of constitutional limitations, and there is none here, the legislature is free to dispose of the state’s tax deeded lands in any way deemed by it from time to time to be for the public interest.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
42 P.2d 64, 2 Cal. 2d 485, 1935 Cal. LEXIS 352, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/south-san-joaquin-irrigation-district-v-neumiller-cal-1935.