South Atlantic Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Shaw

92 So. 277, 83 Fla. 463, 1922 Fla. LEXIS 596
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
DecidedMarch 31, 1922
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 92 So. 277 (South Atlantic Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Shaw) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
South Atlantic Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Shaw, 92 So. 277, 83 Fla. 463, 1922 Fla. LEXIS 596 (Fla. 1922).

Opinion

Ellis, J.

The defendant in error, Henry R. Shaw, a man about thirty-two years of age was employed by the plaintiff in error, the South Atlantic Telephone and Telegraph Company, as cable splicer. His rate of wages was six dollars and fifty cents for a day of eight hours, he did some “overtime” work which ran his weekly wages to an average of about sixty-fivé dollars.

On September 29th, 1919 he was at work in a “manhole” at the corner of Avenue D and Morris Street in the city of Miami. He had been supplied by the company with a blowtorch commonly used in melting spider and metal. Mr. Shaw was making a change in the cable, opening an old splice in an old cable and the blow torch was being used in melting solder on the cable. The cable was a large one [465]*465incased in a lead pipe. He was endeavoring to remove the lead pipe, and had melted the joint, at one end and was engaged in melting the other end, to do so it became necear sary to turn the torch on its side to work underneath the cable. As he did this “something broke about the torch” a flame shot back into his face, he threw himself upon the floor of the manhole to protect himself from the flames but was severely burned. The plaintiff was supplied by the Company with a helper who came to plaintiff’s relief by throwing a tarpaulin over the manhole and smothering the fire.

The torch consists of a metallic reservior about five and one half inches high and about fourteen inches in circumference. This reservoir is designed to contain the fuel which supplies the flame. The fuel which the makers of the instrument intended should be used is kerosene, but the fuel actually used was gasoline. Upon the-side of the reservoir is a handle by which the instrument is to be held by the person who operates it. Upon the top of the reservoir is a small opening through which the reservoir is filled with fuel, this opening is closed by a metallic cap, there is also an air pump and the burner, the latter made exclusively of metal except the handle of the needle valve which controls the supply of fuel to the flame. The burner consists of a metal tube about three inches long and about an inch and a quarter in diameter to the rear end of which is attached the needle valve. The burner is attached to the reservoir by a small pipe through which the fuel is forced by air pressure into a conduit upon one side of the metal tube running from the rear to the forward end and back again through the needle valve into the metal tube which is heated by means of a small pan underneath into which is poured some of the fuel which is ignited just be[466]*466fore operating the torch. One arm of the valve is let into the conduit by means of a threaded end, the other arm is attached to a small iron bar by means of a screw, the other end of the bar is attached to the metallic tube thus making the valve rigid. This valve is operated by a long shanked screw at one end of which is a wooden handle.

The declaration contains four counts. It rests upon the doctrine that it is the duty of the master to furnish the servant with safe tools with which to work and that defend • ant in this case failed to do so. The first count alleged that the blowtorch which was furnished by the defendant to the plaintiff with which to work was unsafe in that it -had a latent tendency to allow ignited gasoline to escape. The second count alleged that the defendant furnished gasoline as a fuel for the torch which was unsafe, instead of kerosene which was the kind of fuel the instrument was intended to consume. The 'third count alleged that the blowtorch had a latent tendency to allow ignited gasoline to escape which the defendant knew or could have known by the exercise of reasonable diligence, but that the plaintiff did not know and by the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have known, and the defendant failed to warn.him; the fourth count alleged that the use of gasoline as fuel in the blowtorch was a latent and concealed danger in that the blowtorch was. designed and made for the use of kerosene and and not gasoline, all of which the defendant knew or could have known by reasonable diligence but that the plaintiff did not know and could not have known by the exercise of care and diligence.

There were six pleas. First not guilty; second, that the plaintiff’s negligent care and maintenance of the blowtorch prior to the accident was the proximate cause of his injury; Third, that his negligent care and maintenance of [467]*467the blowtorch at the time of the accident was the proximate cause of the injury; Fourth, that the plaintiff negligently used and operated the blowtorch which caused the injury; Fifth, that plea was a composite plea consisting in substance of the averments of both the second and third, and the sixth was a plea of satisfaction and discharge.

Issue was joined upon the pleas and the parties went to trial. There was a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars upon which judgment was entered and the defendant took writ of error. „

The assignments of error, thirty-six in number, all rest upon rulings which occured at the trial and involve the admission and rejection of evidence the giving and refusing of instructions to the jury and the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict.

The negligence of the defendant consisted according to the declaration in one of the several alleged omissions of duty as the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. These omissions of duty related to the blowtorch which was used by the plaintiff, and are as follows: The blowtorch was unsafe in that it had a latent tendecy to allow ignited gasoline to escape; second, gasoline, instead of kerosene, was furnished as a fuel; third, the defendant knew or could have known of the alleged latent defect and that the plaintiff did not know it and the defendant failed to warn him, and fourth, that the use of gasoline as a fuel In the torch was a latent and concealed danger which the defendant knew or could have known and which the plaintiff did not know and the defendant failed to warn him.

A plaintiff must recover, if at all, upon the case made by his declaration and not upon some other ease made by evidence. However meritorious a case may be as shown [468]*468by the evidence there can be no rcovery unless the declaration makes out that kind of a case. See Coons v. Pritchard, 69 Fla. 362, 68 South. Rep. 225; Dexter v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 55 Fla. 292, 45 South. Rep. 887; Florida Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Hart, 73 Fla. 970, 75 South. Rep. 528.

There is nothing- in the evidence to warrant the finding that the injury occurred to the plaintiff because of a structural defect in the blowtorch which caused a latent tendency to allow ignited gasoline to escape, nor that the use -of gasoline instead of kerosene as a fuel caused the injury. The testimony of the plaintiff was: “I had completed the melting of one joint on one end and was engaged in melting the other end and as I was working on the side joint it was. necessary to turn the torch on its side to work underneath the cable. As I did so something broke about the torch and there 'was an immense flame came up in my face and naturally I let go the torch and dropped it and crawled down on the floor in the corner of the manhole to escape the fire” etc.

The plaintiff’s testimony on this point was not, nor indeed could it be, reasonably disputed because he was the only witness to the incident. He was alone in the manhole, the helper was on the surface and put the tarpaulin over the manhole which smothered the flames.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
92 So. 277, 83 Fla. 463, 1922 Fla. LEXIS 596, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/south-atlantic-telephone-telegraph-co-v-shaw-fla-1922.