Sorrell v. Ohio Department of Natural Resources
Opinion
This case presents two issues for our consideration. We are first asked to decide whether appellee Frank Sorrell was a “recreational user,” as defined in R.C. 1533.18(B), at the time of his accident. For the reasons which follow, we hold that he was. Second, in their cross-appeal, the Sorrells ask this court to overrule its decisions in McCord v. Division of Parks & Recreation, (1978), 54 Ohio St. 2d 72, 8 O.O. 3d 77, 375 N.E. 2d 50, and Moss v. Dept. of Natural Resources (1980), 62 Ohio St. 2d 138, 16 O.O. 3d 161, 404 N.E. 2d 742, paragraph one of the syllabus, wherein it was held that “* * * the definition of ‘premises’ in R.C. 1533.18(A) effectively encompassed state-owned lands.” We find no acceptable reason to deviate from that construction of the statute, and thus we reverse the decision of the court of appeals.1
[143]*143R.C. 1533.18 provides:
“As used in sections 1533.18 and 1533.181 of the Revised Code:
“(A) ‘Premises’ means all privately-owned lands, ways, waters, and any buildings and structures thereon, and all state-owned lands, ways, and waters leased to a private person, firm, organization, or corporation, including any buildings and structures thereon.
“(B) ‘Recreational user’ means a person to whom permission has been granted, without the payment of a fee or consideration to the owner, lessee, or occupant of premises, other than a fee or consideration paid to the state or any agency thereof, to enter upon premises to hunt, fish, trap, camp, hike, swim, or engage in other recreational pursuits.” (Emphasis added.)
R.C. 1533.181 provides:
“(A) No owner, lessee, or occupant of premises:
“(1) Owes any duty to a recreational user to keep the premises safe for entry or use;
“(2) Extends any assurance to a recreational user, through the act of giving permission, that the premises are safe for entry or use;
“(3) Assumes responsibility for or incurs liability for any injury to person or property caused by any act of a recreational user.” (Emphasis added.)
Appellee Sorrell does not contend that snowmobiling is not a “recreational pursuit” for purposes of R.C. 1533.18(B), and in fact admitted in his answers to ODNR’s interrogatories that he entered Buckeye Lake for recreational purposes. Instead, Sorrell argues that since he was operating his snowmobile between the prohibited hours of 11:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., in violation of ODNR rules,2 he was using the park without “permission” and was thus a trespasser — not a recrea[144]*144tional user. He further argues that, as he was an undiscovered trespasser, ODNR owed him a duty to refrain from willful or wanton conduct which might cause him injury, citing Elliott v. Nagy (1986), 22 Ohio St. 3d 58, 22 OBR 77, 488 N.E. 2d 853, and that R.C. 1533.181 does not provide immunity from a breach of such duty.
Sorrell’s argument correctly implies that the duty of landowners, both public and private, toward trespassers is narrow. “Ordinarily, a landowner owes no duty to undiscovered trespassers other than to refrain from injuring such trespassers by willful or wanton conduct. See Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5 Ed. 1984) 397, Section 58.” Elliott, supra, at 60, 22 OBR at 78, 488 N.E. 2d at 854-855. “In general, no one has any right to enter without his consent, and he is free to fix the terms on which that consent will be given. Intruders who come without his permission have no right to demand that he provide them with a safe place to trespass, or that he protect them in their wrongful use of his property. When they enter where they have no right or privilege, the responsibility is theirs, and they must assume the risk of what they may encounter * * * and are expected to look out for themselves.” (Footnote omitted.) Prosser & Keeton, supra, at 393. We find it unnecessary to consider the applicability of R.C. 1533.181 to trespassers, however, as we hold that appellee Sorrell was a “recreational user,” as defined in R.C. 1533.18(B), irrespective of any violation of ODNR’s snowmobile operational restrictions.
The recreational user statutes apply to premises owned by the state that are made available for recreational purposes. McCord, supra; Moss, supra. The immunity conferred by R.C. 1533.181 extends only to those persons who have (1) been given permission, (2) to gratuitously, (3) engage in a recreational pursuit. Buckeye Lake was dedicated for the use of the public as a public park in 1902 by operation of a predecessor of R.C. 1541.06. (R.S. 218-305.) R.C. 1541.07 mandates that Buckeye Lake and other lakes “shall at all times be open to the public as resorts for recreation and pleasure. * * *”* *3 (Emphasis added.) This is consistent with the general purposes of ODNR’s Division of Parks and Recreation, which is to “create, supervise, operate, protect, and maintain a system of state parks and promote the use thereof by the public.” R.C. 1541.01. Thus, by statutory mandate, Buckeye Lake is held open for gratuitous recreational use by the general public. Cf. Loyer v. Buchholz (1988), 38 Ohio St. 3d 65, 526 N.E. 2d 300.
Although the state may limit or control gratuitous recreational use by the promulgation of reasonable rules, see Ohio Adm. Code Chapter 1501, such rules do not limit the grant of permission by the General Assembly. The [145]*145immunity granted by R.C. 1533.181 to owners, lessees, or occupants of premises who hold such premises open for gratuitous recreational use by the general public can not be lost where a person violates state park rules and regulations while using a park for permitted, gratuitous recreational purposes. A contrary ruling would either discourage the state from holding its land open to the general public, or discourage it from promulgating reasonable safely rules and regulations for the protection of the public using its land. Such a result would hinder the common goal of both R.C. Chapter 1541 and the recreational user statutes, which is to encourage the state to open its land to public recreational use without fear of liability. See Marrek v. Cleveland Metroparks Bd. of Commrs. (1984), 9 Ohio St. 3d 194, 198, 9 OBR 508, 511, 459 N.E. 2d 873, 877; Moss, supra, at 142, 16 O.O. 3d at 164, 404 N.E. 2d at 745; Loyer, supra, at 66, 526 N.E. 2d at 302. Inasmuch as the court of appeals below erroneously held that Sorrell was not a recreational user in that the ODNR had not granted anyone “permission” to snowmobile on Buckeye Lake between the hours of 11:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., we must reverse that decision and reinstate the summary judgment against appellees, Sorrell being, as a matter of law, a recreational user at the time of his accident.
In their cross-appeal, the Sorrells argue that the immunity granted in R.C. 1533.181 applies solely to land which is privately owned, leased or occupied, and does not apply to land owned by the state. They charge that this court improperly engaged in “judicial legislation” in our decisions in McCord and Moss, rather than applying the “clear and unambiguous language” of the statute. We recently clarified our prior holdings on this issue in Johnson v. New London (1988), 36 Ohio St. 3d 60, 63, 521 N.E. 2d 793, 796-797, wherein we emphasized that the state’s immunity is not conferred directly by R.C.
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532 N.E.2d 722 (Sorrell v. Ohio Department of Natural Resources) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.