NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 3 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RIGOBERTO SORIANO-GARCIA, No. 24-7179 Agency No. Petitioner, A208-080-788 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 27, 2026** Richland, Washington
Before: SUNG, MENDOZA, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.
Rigoberto Soriano-Garcia, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review
of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision affirming an immigration
judge’s denial of his applications for cancellation of removal, asylum, withholding
of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Soriano-
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Garcia seeks cancellation of removal based on hardship to his wife and children if
he were removed. He seeks asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection
because his relative in Mexico was allegedly kidnapped and held hostage for several
days in 2015, and he fears the worsening conditions in Mexico.
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review legal questions de
novo, Gonzalez-Caraveo v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 885, 893 (9th Cir. 2018), and factual
determinations and “fact-intensive mixed questions” for substantial evidence, Ruiz
v. Bondi, 163 F.4th 586, 599 (9th Cir. 2025) (citation modified). We grant the
petition in part and deny the petition in part.
1. The agency did not err by denying Soriano-Garcia’s cancellation of
removal application. Soriano-Garcia challenges the agency’s “failure to weigh
critical positive factors,” such as his family’s hardship, his rehabilitation, and his
effort to amend prior erroneous tax filings. But the BIA acknowledged each of these
factors in its decision, either expressly or by “incorporat[ing] parts of the IJ’s
reasoning.” See, e.g., Szonyi v. Barr, 942 F.3d 874, 897 (9th Cir. 2013). To the
extent Soriano-Garcia challenges how the agency weighed the individual factors, we
lack jurisdiction to review the claim. Id. at 896.
2. We have jurisdiction to review Soriano-Garcia’s challenge to the denial
of his asylum application as untimely. The parties agree that Soriano-Garcia did not
file his asylum application within one year of his arrival to the United States. 8
2 24-7179 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). But Soriano-Garcia sought an exception to the one-year
deadline based on “changed circumstances” under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D). We
have previously held that the changed circumstances determination is not subject to
either of the relevant statutory jurisdictional bars. Ramadan v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d
646, 650, 655–56 (9th Cir. 2007). First, the jurisdictional bar under 8
U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3) does not apply when the petitioner raises a “question[] of law.”
Id. at 650 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D)). And second, the jurisdictional bar
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) does not apply because the changed circumstances
decision is not discretionary. Id. at 655–56; see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (“[N]o
court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . any other decision or action . . . the
authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the
Attorney General.”). We recently clarified that, although intervening Supreme Court
case law is clearly irreconcilable with some of Ramadan’s reasoning, its core
holding is undisturbed: the “extraordinary” or “changed circumstances”
determinations are reviewable when they present mixed questions of law and fact.1
Ruiz, 163 F.4th at 597–98; see Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024).
Here, Soriano-Garcia challenges the agency’s conclusion that he failed to
1 Ruiz addressed only the “extraordinary circumstances” exception, but its reasoning applies with equal force to the “changed circumstances” exception. The exceptions are in the same sentence, and prior case law has treated them as “parallel” and “analogous.” See Husyev v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 1172, 1178, 1180 (9th Cir. 2008).
3 24-7179 demonstrate changed circumstances in Mexico, and also its alternative conclusion
that his delay after the changed circumstances was unreasonable. Both issues present
mixed questions of law and fact because “the historical facts are admitted or
established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy
the statutory standard.” Husyev v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2008)
(citation modified); Ramadan, 479 F.3d at 650. We thus have jurisdiction to review
the claims.
On the merits, substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that
Soriano-Garcia failed to demonstrate changed circumstances. Soriano-Garcia points
to general country conditions reports and news stories, but these documents do not
compel the conclusion that he has shown “[c]hanges in conditions in [his] country
of nationality” that “materially affect[] [his] eligibility for asylum.” 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.4(a)(4)(i). Moreover, even if Soriano-Garcia’s relative’s kidnapping
constituted a changed circumstance, substantial evidence supports the agency’s
conclusion that Soriano-Garcia failed to file his application within a “reasonable
period” after the change. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4)(ii). Soriano-Garcia waited at least
nine months to file his asylum application after the kidnapping, and his only
justification for the delay is that he “did not know about the deadline.” See Husyev,
528 F.3d at 1182 (accepting that “six months . . . is not an unreasonable presumptive
deadline” and holding that a one-year delay “is not a reasonable period . . . in the
4 24-7179 absence of any established explanation for” a petitioner’s failure to file earlier).
3. The BIA erred when it held that Soriano-Garcia forfeited his challenge
to the denial of his withholding of removal claim. The immigration judge denied
Soriano-Garcia’s claim based on (1) lack of nexus to a protected ground, (2) lack of
a cognizable particular social group, and (3) failure to show a clear probability of
future persecution. Before the BIA, Soriano-Garcia challenged all of these bases.
The BIA thus erred by concluding Soriano-Garcia failed to challenge the denial.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 3 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RIGOBERTO SORIANO-GARCIA, No. 24-7179 Agency No. Petitioner, A208-080-788 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 27, 2026** Richland, Washington
Before: SUNG, MENDOZA, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.
Rigoberto Soriano-Garcia, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review
of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision affirming an immigration
judge’s denial of his applications for cancellation of removal, asylum, withholding
of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Soriano-
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Garcia seeks cancellation of removal based on hardship to his wife and children if
he were removed. He seeks asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection
because his relative in Mexico was allegedly kidnapped and held hostage for several
days in 2015, and he fears the worsening conditions in Mexico.
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review legal questions de
novo, Gonzalez-Caraveo v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 885, 893 (9th Cir. 2018), and factual
determinations and “fact-intensive mixed questions” for substantial evidence, Ruiz
v. Bondi, 163 F.4th 586, 599 (9th Cir. 2025) (citation modified). We grant the
petition in part and deny the petition in part.
1. The agency did not err by denying Soriano-Garcia’s cancellation of
removal application. Soriano-Garcia challenges the agency’s “failure to weigh
critical positive factors,” such as his family’s hardship, his rehabilitation, and his
effort to amend prior erroneous tax filings. But the BIA acknowledged each of these
factors in its decision, either expressly or by “incorporat[ing] parts of the IJ’s
reasoning.” See, e.g., Szonyi v. Barr, 942 F.3d 874, 897 (9th Cir. 2013). To the
extent Soriano-Garcia challenges how the agency weighed the individual factors, we
lack jurisdiction to review the claim. Id. at 896.
2. We have jurisdiction to review Soriano-Garcia’s challenge to the denial
of his asylum application as untimely. The parties agree that Soriano-Garcia did not
file his asylum application within one year of his arrival to the United States. 8
2 24-7179 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). But Soriano-Garcia sought an exception to the one-year
deadline based on “changed circumstances” under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D). We
have previously held that the changed circumstances determination is not subject to
either of the relevant statutory jurisdictional bars. Ramadan v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d
646, 650, 655–56 (9th Cir. 2007). First, the jurisdictional bar under 8
U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3) does not apply when the petitioner raises a “question[] of law.”
Id. at 650 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D)). And second, the jurisdictional bar
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) does not apply because the changed circumstances
decision is not discretionary. Id. at 655–56; see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (“[N]o
court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . any other decision or action . . . the
authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the
Attorney General.”). We recently clarified that, although intervening Supreme Court
case law is clearly irreconcilable with some of Ramadan’s reasoning, its core
holding is undisturbed: the “extraordinary” or “changed circumstances”
determinations are reviewable when they present mixed questions of law and fact.1
Ruiz, 163 F.4th at 597–98; see Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024).
Here, Soriano-Garcia challenges the agency’s conclusion that he failed to
1 Ruiz addressed only the “extraordinary circumstances” exception, but its reasoning applies with equal force to the “changed circumstances” exception. The exceptions are in the same sentence, and prior case law has treated them as “parallel” and “analogous.” See Husyev v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 1172, 1178, 1180 (9th Cir. 2008).
3 24-7179 demonstrate changed circumstances in Mexico, and also its alternative conclusion
that his delay after the changed circumstances was unreasonable. Both issues present
mixed questions of law and fact because “the historical facts are admitted or
established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy
the statutory standard.” Husyev v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2008)
(citation modified); Ramadan, 479 F.3d at 650. We thus have jurisdiction to review
the claims.
On the merits, substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that
Soriano-Garcia failed to demonstrate changed circumstances. Soriano-Garcia points
to general country conditions reports and news stories, but these documents do not
compel the conclusion that he has shown “[c]hanges in conditions in [his] country
of nationality” that “materially affect[] [his] eligibility for asylum.” 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.4(a)(4)(i). Moreover, even if Soriano-Garcia’s relative’s kidnapping
constituted a changed circumstance, substantial evidence supports the agency’s
conclusion that Soriano-Garcia failed to file his application within a “reasonable
period” after the change. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4)(ii). Soriano-Garcia waited at least
nine months to file his asylum application after the kidnapping, and his only
justification for the delay is that he “did not know about the deadline.” See Husyev,
528 F.3d at 1182 (accepting that “six months . . . is not an unreasonable presumptive
deadline” and holding that a one-year delay “is not a reasonable period . . . in the
4 24-7179 absence of any established explanation for” a petitioner’s failure to file earlier).
3. The BIA erred when it held that Soriano-Garcia forfeited his challenge
to the denial of his withholding of removal claim. The immigration judge denied
Soriano-Garcia’s claim based on (1) lack of nexus to a protected ground, (2) lack of
a cognizable particular social group, and (3) failure to show a clear probability of
future persecution. Before the BIA, Soriano-Garcia challenged all of these bases.
The BIA thus erred by concluding Soriano-Garcia failed to challenge the denial. See
Bare v. Barr, 975 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 2020). The government acknowledges the
BIA’s error but asks us to deny the withholding of removal claim by evaluating the
merits. We “cannot affirm the BIA on a ground upon which it did not rely,”
Arredondo v. Holder, 623 F.3d 1317, 1320 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation modified), and
when the BIA’s decision “cannot be sustained upon its reasoning, [the] case must be
remanded.” See Kalulu v. Bondi, 128 F.4th 1009, 1024 (9th Cir. 2024) (citation
modified). We thus grant the petition with respect to the withholding of removal
claim and remand to the agency to evaluate the claim on the merits.
4. Substantial evidence supports the denial of Soriano-Garcia’s CAT
claim. Soriano-Garcia presents only generalized country conditions reports in
support of his claim that the Mexican government would acquiesce in his torture.
Such evidence does not compel the conclusion that he would face torture with the
acquiescence of the government if he were removed. See Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch,
5 24-7179 828 F.3d 829, 836–37 (9th Cir. 2016).
Petition GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; REMANDED.
6 24-7179