Sorensen v. USAA

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 21, 2024
• Docket: 24CA0035
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA0035 Sorensen v USAA 11-21-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0035 El Paso County District Court No. 22CV32106 Honorable Thomas K. Kane, Judge

Nathan Sorensen and Amanda Sorensen, a/k/a Amanda Armstrong,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

USAA Casualty Insurance Company,

Defendant-Appellee.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division II Opinion by JUDGE FOX Johnson, J., concurs Schock, J., concurs in part and dissents in part

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced November 21, 2024

Robert J. Anderson, P.C., Robert J. Anderson, Timothy G. Buxton, Scott F. Anderson, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellants

Rider Kafer, P.C., Kelly L. Kafer, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee ¶1 Plaintiffs, Nathan and Amanda Sorensen, a/k/a Amanda

Armstrong (collectively, the Sorensens), appeal the district court’s

grant of summary judgment in favor of USAA Casualty Insurance

Company (USAA). We reverse and remand the case to the district

court for further proceedings.

I. Background

¶2 This appeal concerns an insurance dispute following an April

11, 2021, car accident in Colorado Springs involving the Sorensens

and another driver, which the Sorensens allege caused them

serious injuries. After the accident, the Sorensens made a claim for

compensation through a USAA uninsured/underinsured motorist

(UM/UIM) insurance policy (the policy) issued to Nathan’s mother,

Susan Sorensen.1

1 The Toyota 4Runner driven by the Sorensens during the crash

was not identified in the USAA policy. According to the Sorensens’ complaint, the other driver’s insurance policy was limited to $25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident, and the Sorensens’ 4Runner was also insured by Geico for $25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident. The Geico policy paid out the full limit of its coverage.

1 ¶3 Susan was listed as the “named insured” on the policy’s

declarations page, but Nathan, his sister Shannon Sorensen,2 and

Susan were also listed as “operators.” The policy defines a “covered

person,” i.e., a person who may be entitled to insurance coverage,

as the individual listed as the named insured and her “family

members.” The policy then defines family members as “a person

related to [the named insured] by blood, marriage or adoption who

resides primarily in [the named insured’s] household.”

¶4 Susan owns two properties in Colorado Springs, the “Garden

Place” property and the “Bates Drive” property, about ten minutes

apart by car. At the time of the accident, Nathan and Amanda were

living at the Bates Drive property while Susan lived at the Garden

Place property. While they did not have a formal lease agreement,

Nathan testified that he paid Susan rent each month. Susan’s and

Nathan’s deposition testimony indicated that there was some degree

of shared habitation between the two properties with each going

“back and forth” between the properties.

2 For clarity we will respectfully refer to Susan, Nathan, Shannon,

and Amanda Sorensen by their first names.

2 ¶5 Susan’s address on the policy was the Garden Place property

and Nathan lived at the Bates Drive property, so USAA rejected the

Sorensens’ UM/UIM claim as Nathan did not meet the definition of

a family member and thus was not deemed a covered person. The

Sorensens later sued, arguing that (1) the USAA policy did not

differentiate between an operator and a named insured on the

declarations page; (2) Susan was charged a premium for Nathan to

be on the policy; and (3) Susan and Nathan reasonably believed

that he was insured. As relevant here, the Sorensens contended

Nathan was entitled to UM/UIM benefits.3

¶6 USAA and the Sorensens filed competing motions for summary

judgment pursuant to C.R.C.P. 56. The district court granted

summary judgment in favor of USAA, finding that (1) the term

“covered persons” was unambiguous and (2) the Sorensens were not

covered persons under the policy because they were not named

insureds nor did they reside in Susan’s household and thus were

not qualifying family members.

3 The Sorensens also raised a claim for unreasonable denial or

delay of insurance benefits under sections 10-3-1115(1)(a) and -1116(1), C.R.S. 2024, and requested damages.

3 ¶7 This appeal followed. The Sorensens argue that the USAA

policy’s term “operator” is ambiguous and there is effectively no

difference between a named insured and an operator. They

contended this was particularly true as USAA was charging a

premium to include Nathan on the policy, thus, under the

“reasonable expectations” doctrine, Nathan would have reasonably

understood that he was covered by the policy and was entitled to

coverage. Alternatively, they assert that, given the “fluid”

households Nathan and Susan shared, Nathan and Amanda met

the criteria of a covered family member under the USAA policy.

These contentions were preserved. See Gebert v. Sears, Roebuck &

Co., 2023 COA 107, ¶ 25.

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

¶8 “An insurance policy is a contract, the interpretation of which

is a matter of law that we review de novo.” Farmers Ins. Exch. v.

Kretzer, 2023 COA 94, ¶ 11. If an insurance contract is

unambiguous, we interpret it in a manner that effectuates the

intent of the parties. We give words and phrases in an insurance

policy their plain, everyday meaning and may not force strained

4 constructions. Id. at ¶¶ 11-12. But when a contract is within a

trade or technical field, like insurance, and unless a different intent

is manifested, “technical terms and words of art are given their

technical meaning when used in a transaction within their technical

field.” People ex rel. Rein v. Jacobs, 2020 CO 50, ¶ 43 (quoting

Bledsoe Land Co. v. Forest Oil Corp., 277 P.3d 838, 843 (Colo. App.

2011)). “The language of an insurance contract is determinative of

the parties’ intent.” Kretzer, ¶ 11.

¶9 “Whether an insurance policy is ambiguous is a question of

law.” Id. at ¶ 12. “A policy is ambiguous if it is susceptible on its

face to more than one reasonable interpretation.” USAA Cas. Ins.

Co. v. Anglum, 119 P.3d 1058, 1059-60 (Colo. 2005). “An ambiguity

must appear in the four corners of the document before extrinsic

evidence can be considered. In other words, extrinsic evidence

cannot create ambiguity; it is an aid to ascertaining the intent of

the parties once an ambiguity is found.” Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v.

Hansen, 2016 CO 46, ¶ 4 (citation omitted). “Undefined terms do

not create ambiguity if the provision can be understood by

considering its context.” Usick v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 131 P.3d

1195, 1200 (Colo. App. 2006).

5 ¶ 10 “When ‘an insurer seeks to restrict coverage, the limitation

must be clearly expressed.’ If the limitation is ‘ambiguous, then the

contract must be construed in favor of coverage and against’ the

limitation.” Kretzer, ¶ 13 (citation omitted).

¶ 11 Finally, “we review de novo orders granting summary

judgment.” Essentia Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 2024 CO 17, ¶ 20.

Summary judgment is a high bar, and only appropriate when

undisputed material facts in the parties’ pleadings and supporting

documentation prove that, as a matter of law, the moving party is

entitled to judgment in its favor. See id. “When considering a

motion for summary judgment, ‘a court must grant the nonmoving

party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may reasonably be

drawn from the undisputed facts, and it must resolve all doubts

against the moving party.’” Id. (citation omitted).

B. The USAA Agreement is Ambiguous

¶ 12 We start with whether the policy is ambiguous — i.e., whether,

solely based on the language of the contract itself, it is susceptible

to more than one reasonable interpretation. See Hansen, ¶ 4;

Anglum, 119 P.3d at 1059-60.

6 ¶ 13 It is true that the policy unambiguously defines who meets the

criteria of a covered person. In its UM/UIM coverage section, the

policy defines covered persons as (1) the named insured on the

policy’s declarations page and their spouse if they reside in the

same household; (2) the named insured’s family members; (3)

anyone “occupying or using” a “covered auto”; or (4) anyone who is

entitled to recover damages covered by the policy because of bodily

injury or property damage “sustained by” the named insured, their

family, or anyone occupying or using a covered auto. But simply

because the policy unambiguously defines covered persons does not

resolve the issue at hand. The question remains, what is an

operator? And does this create ambiguity for who is considered a

named insured?

7 ¶ 14 The term operator is not defined anywhere in the policy.4 And

while Susan is the only person listed in the named insured box on

the declarations page, Susan, Nathan, and Shannon are all listed as

operators right next to this box. The result is that the meaning and

significance of being classified as an operator is unclear — and

makes the policy ambiguous because the terms of the policy allow

at least three reasonable interpretations of operator. See Hansen,

¶ 4.

¶ 15 One possible interpretation is that the term has no significant

meaning, and operator is merely synonymous with “driver” in a

broader sense. Indeed, this seems to be how the policy uses the

term elsewhere in the contract. In the UM/UIM section of the policy

when defining “uninsured motor vehicle,” the policy explains that

4 The plain, everyday meaning of operator does little to illuminate

the intent of the parties here, unfortunately. Merriam-Webster, in the most pertinent definition, defines an operator as “one that operates,” giving as an example “one that operates a machine or device.” Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://perma.cc/7JYV- XV38. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “operate” in the most pertinent sense as “[t]o direct, put into action, or maintain the functioning of, esp. by direct personal effort; to engage, use, and control (a machine, computer, equipment, etc.).” Black’s Law Dictionary 1312 (12th ed. 2024). The everyday meaning of operator is clear, but this tells us little about the Sorensens’ or USAA’s intent for those classified as operators.

8 one possible definition is a “hit-and-run motor vehicle,” meaning a

vehicle whose “owner or operator” cannot be identified. Another

example comes from the policy’s UM/UIM section explaining when

it will pay compensatory damages, where it provides that damages

must arise out of an “owner’s or operator’s” liability for the

ownership, use, or maintenance of an uninsured vehicle.

¶ 16 But using the term operator as a synonym for the word

“driver” creates its own ambiguity. While the insurance code does

not define “operator,” §§ 10-4-601 to -643, C.R.S. 2024, section 10-

4-640(1), C.R.S. 2024, authorizes insurers to underwrite an

“operator’s policy of liability insurance,” which an insured may

purchase in lieu of an owner’s policy of insurance. But such

policies have certain limitations and requirements that differ from

an owner’s policy of insurance. See § 10-4-640. We normally

would give effect to the term of art definition in a technical field, but

an “operator” and “driver” are not synonymous in the insurance

code. See Jacobs, ¶ 43.

¶ 17 And the policy also seems to attach some significance to the

term operator beyond simply using it as a synonym for driver. The

best example is that the declarations page itself carves out a special

9 section for operators it identifies by name, including Susan, which

contradicts a broader use of the term.

¶ 18 A second possible interpretation is that “operator” only relates

to the individuals USAA takes into account for purposes of charging

a premium. The best support for this interpretation is that in the

policy’s general provisions section, it provides that changes in

premiums can be the result of any changes to the number of

operators driving a covered vehicle or any changes to an operator’s

age, marital status, driver’s license information, or driving record.

¶ 19 Yet the policy’s general provisions section tells a reader

nothing about whether an operator might be entitled to coverage.

To the contrary, nothing in the policy explicitly demands that an

operator meet the definition of covered person or family member for

coverage, and yet an insured may be charged a premium for

including operators. Thus, if an operator is not inherently entitled

to any coverage — and USAA in some situations would not have to

compensate an operator in the event of an accident — without some

explanation of what constitutes an operator, a reader may wonder

whether USAA charges the insured for the operators or takes into

consideration the operators for setting the premium. Thus, an

10 ordinary reader may interpret the term to mean that an operator is

entitled to some form of insurance coverage if a premium is paid to

include them. See Grippin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2016

COA 127, ¶¶ 31-33 (finding that an “other household driver”

provision in an insurance policy did not support the persons listed

to be insureds because the express language of the policy indicated

that those individuals were only considered for purposes of

determining the amount of the premium).

¶ 20 A final example of a possible interpretation of operators is that

the policy uses operators as a list of all the named insureds in a

policy. After all, Susan, the named insured, is certainly entitled to

coverage and she is listed as an operator alongside Nathan and

Shannon, potentially giving an ordinary reader the impression that

all operators are entitled to some form of coverage as they are

“named” on the declarations page. Though the declarations page

has a specific box for the “named insured” and only Susan’s name

appears there, it is not unusual for there to be multiple insureds

covered under one policy and USAA put multiple names in the

“operator” box — including Susan’s.

11 ¶ 21 Each of these possibilities are reasonable ways an ordinary

reader might interpret the policy and the term operator. For this

reason, and because it is unclear from the policy alone what the

parties intended the term to mean — the policy is ambiguous. We

thus turn to extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the

parties. See Hansen, ¶ 4.

C. Extrinsic Intent and Understanding Evidence

¶ 22 Most of the extrinsic evidence available to us in the record to

discern USAA’s and Susan’s intent when entering into the policy

comes from Susan’s and Jose Segura’s depositions. Segura is an

“underwriting business and controls advisor for USAA” who served

as a corporate representative for USAA.

¶ 23 Susan could not recall much of her substantive discussions

with USAA. Testifying in response to whether she could recall “any

conversations with USAA about the substance of your coverages,

who was covered under the policy,” she said, “No.” And when asked

if she could recall “any communications with USAA discussing

under what circumstances Nathan would or would not have

coverage,” she testified that “I don’t think there was ever a

conversation like that.” But Susan believed that Nathan was

12 insured by the policy. Most notably, USAA’s counsel asked: “Do

you recall having any discussions with Nathan about, you know,

that he would be covered under the USAA policy or anything like

that?” Susan responded, “No, obviously I thought he was insured.

Is he not insured?”

¶ 24 In response to USAA’s counsel’s question about whether there

was a “specific reason” Susan last reached out to USAA, she said

that she did so because Nathan “needed insurance.” USAA’s

counsel also asked, “Was there anything about the declaration page

you reviewed that was sent out in the mail that would make you

think Nate was not an insured person?” Susan responded, “No, it

looks like he’s an insured person.”

¶ 25 Susan further testified that she could not recall any

conversations with USAA where she was told Nathan was not

insured. And in the partial transcript of the phone call between

Susan and the USAA representative when Susan got the policy, the

USAA representative did not state whether Nathan and Shannon

would be included in the policy. The transcript details that Susan

stated that Nathan and Shannon were licensed drivers in her

household.

13 ¶ 26 Segura provided more information in his deposition about how

USAA creates its policies and what an operator is, but the

information he provided is somewhat contradictory. Segura

testified that USAA’s “policy administration system” was designed to

only allow “the eligible member that we’re writing the policy under

to be considered that named insured for purposes of declarations

page generation. . . . [T]here’s no way for someone to manually

intervene and change that name or add additional names to that

field.” Thus, even if someone wanted to purchase a policy that

explicitly included multiple people as named insureds, such as

family members, there would be no way for USAA to do that in a

single policy.

¶ 27 As to what operators are, Segura testified that “operators are

essentially someone that we are needing to account for within the

policy for purposes of risk and rate calculations.” The Sorensens’

counsel later asked, “is it fair for me to say that USAA is taking

account for operators to charge [a] different premium based on who

is listed as an operator?” Segura responded, “Yes. Trying to

account for the appropriate risk for the policy, yes.” Segura also

confirmed that the term operator is undefined in the policy but

14 noted that “when we are looking at trying to identify all applicable

operators for a policy besides the named insured, we’re trying to

identify individuals who are living within the household, who a[re]

licensed, and have a dependency relationship with the insured.”

¶ 28 The Sorensens’ counsel also asked, “Are there any benefits or

protections that a named insured receives that a named operator

does not?” And Segura responded, “No. No additional benefits.”

Following up on this, the Sorensens’ counsel then asked, “But does

USAA, in terms of coverage decisions and who is covered, treat

operators who are listed under that operator section differently than

the people named under the named insured section?” Segura again

responded, “No.”

¶ 29 Collectively, the deposition testimony gives us some insight

into the respective parties’ intents and understanding, though the

two parties’ conceptions of the policy conflict in part. Susan

seemingly intended to provide Nathan with insurance, and from her

reading of the declarations page, she believed that Nathan was

covered by the policy. Segura, however, seemed to indicate that, on

one hand, USAA only considered operators as potential drivers to

determine what premiums to charge the named insured. On the

15 other hand, Segura also said that the named insured receives no

additional benefits than an operator would and that USAA treats

operators and the named insured the same. Furthermore, even if

an insured wished to explicitly make one of their family members a

named insured on the policy to ensure they received coverage

(assuming this was negotiated with USAA), USAA’s software would

not allow this.

D. The Ambiguity in the Policy Must be Construed Against USAA and in Favor of Coverage

¶ 30 The Sorensens argue that Nathan should be treated as a

named insured because the policy does not distinguish between an

operator and a named insured, and an ordinary reader would

conclude that operators are insured under the policy.5 Such an

interpretation, the Sorensens argue, gives effect to Susan’s intent to

5 The Sorensens’ brief relies heavily on the reasonable expectations

doctrine as detailed in Bailey v. Lincoln General Insurance Co., 255 P.3d 1039, 1048-49 (Colo. 2011). The reasonable expectations doctrine is one of the ways that we subject insurance contracts to heightened scrutiny, but the doctrine focuses on questions of ambiguity surrounding the scope of insurance coverage after it is determined that a claimant is indeed an insured. See id.; see also Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hansen, 2016 CO 46, ¶ 30. Here, however, if we resolve the ambiguity in favor of extending coverage to operators, then we need not reach the reasonable expectations doctrine.

16 insure herself, Nathan, and Shannon, and matches her

understanding of the policy and its declarations page.

¶ 31 As discussed above, such an interpretation is reasonable in

light of the policy’s ambiguity concerning the significance of the

term operator. The policy explains that a covered person is the

individual listed as the “named insured” on the declarations page,

and an ordinary reader might reasonably interpret this to mean

that all individuals listed by name on the declarations page are

covered persons, particularly as this list includes Susan. This is

especially reasonable considering Segura’s deposition testimony

that USAA treats operators and the named insured the same, and

this was also Susan’s understanding of the policy.

¶ 32 And while we have precedent to guide us concerning the

meaning of a named insured, it does little to negate the potential

reasonableness of this interpretation. As the Colorado Supreme

Court stated, “[t]he named insured is the party who contracts for

insurance and whose background and driving experience

determines the premium which must be paid for the policy.” Mid-

Century Ins. Co. v. Liljestrand, 620 P.2d 1064, 1066 (Colo. 1980).

“Because the identification of the named insured is of paramount

17 interest to the insurer, in interpreting insurance policies, courts

have held that the term ‘named insured’ has a restricted meaning

and does not apply to any persons other than those named in the

policy.” D.C. Concrete Mgmt., Inc. v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 39 P.3d

1205, 1207 (Colo. App. 2001).

¶ 33 Here, while Susan was the party contracting for the insurance,

Susan’s, Nathan’s, and Shannon’s driving records were all

considered in determining Susan’s premium as operators.6 See

Liljestrand, 620 P.2d at 1066. And while Susan was the only

individual listed in the specific named insured box on the

declarations page, technically speaking Nathan and Shannon are

also “named” on the declarations page. See D.C. Concrete Mgmt.,

Inc., 39 P.3d at 1207.

¶ 34 USAA, however, argues that nothing in the policy indicates

that an operator is equivalent to being a named insured or covered

person and that nothing in the policy suggests operators are

entitled to coverage. USAA argues further that because the policy’s

6 USAA notes in its brief that it did not charge Susan a premium for

including Nathan on the policy, but also contends that it would be “hardly inappropriate” for it to do so as it does take other drivers into account when deciding premiums.

18 provisions explaining who is a covered person are not ambiguous,

the fact that Susan is also listed as an operator in the policy does

not create any ambiguity. USAA thus contends that our analysis

should begin and end with the policy’s explanation of covered

persons. And indeed, the declarations page does have a specific

box for the “named insured” and it only included Susan. Such an

interpretation is also reasonable.

¶ 35 In the end, however, while the term covered persons is

unambiguous in its reference to named persons, it is the ambiguity

within the policy itself surrounding what an operator is — and the

explicit naming of individuals on the declarations page as operators

(including Susan) without defining what this means — that creates

ambiguity as to who the policy covers. Compare id. at 1207-08

(where named insured was listed as “Rafael Sanchez DC Concrete

Management,” it was unclear whether this was one or two named

insureds, and thus it was ambiguous and construed in favor of

coverage), with Hansen, ¶¶ 24-25 (there was no ambiguity

concerning the identity of the named insured when the declarations

page unambiguously listed “Davis William & Joyce” as the named

insureds and the plaintiff’s name was Hansen, regardless of

19 extrinsic evidence that suggested otherwise); and Grippin, ¶¶ 29-31

(“[T]he declarations pages of each policy state unambiguously that

the named insureds are Lora Grippin, Patty J. Hall, and James W.

Hall, respectively” and did not include Shane Grippin, so Shane was

not a named insured regardless of extrinsic evidence that may have

created ambiguity). And unlike in policies with arguably similar

provisions — such as policies that include references to “other

household drivers” used to calculate premiums — the policy here

never explicitly explained that being an operator limits any

insurance coverage. See Grippin, ¶¶ 32-33. Had USAA wanted to

remove any ambiguity concerning whether operators are entitled to

coverage, all it had to do was define the term somewhere in the

policy — yet it chose not to do so.

¶ 36 In the face of this ambiguity and two competing reasonable

interpretations asserted by the respective parties, we must construe

the ambiguity in the policy against its drafter and in favor of

coverage. See Kretzer, ¶ 13; see also Cary v. United of Omaha Life

Ins. Co., 108 P.3d 288, 291-92 (Colo. 2005) (between competing

reasonable interpretations advanced by the insured and insurer,

the ambiguity is resolved in favor of coverage).

20 ¶ 37 As a result, we conclude the district court erred by granting

summary judgment in favor of USAA. See Hughes, ¶ 20. We also

therefore do not address the Sorensens’ alternative contention that

Nathan should have been considered a resident family member

under the policy.

III. Whether Amanda is a Resident of the Household is a Fact Question

¶ 38 The Sorensens contend on appeal that because Nathan must

be treated as a named insured under the policy, “then Amanda also

becomes insured as a resident relative to Nathan.” That we

conclude that the ambiguity in the policy must be construed in

favor of extending coverage to operators, however, does not resolve

the fact question of whether Amanda is a resident family member of

Susan’s or Nathan’s household as defined by the policy.

¶ 39 The record contains conflicting evidence about whether

Nathan is a member of Susan’s household at the Garden Place

property, the Bates Drive property, or both. See GEICO Cas. Co. v.

Collins, 2016 COA 30M, ¶ 19 (“Whether a person is a resident of a

household for purposes of insurance coverage is determined by the

facts and circumstances of each case.”); see also Scoular Co. v.

21 Denney, 151 P.3d 615, 620 (Colo. App. 2006) (matters of factual

dispute only become matters of law “if reasonable persons could

draw only one conclusion from the evidence”). Thus, whether

Amanda is entitled to coverage as a resident family member of

Nathan’s household under the policy is a question the fact finder

must resolve.

IV. Disposition

¶ 40 The district court’s judgment is reversed, and the case is

remanded for further proceedings on the Sorensens’ claims in

accordance with this opinion.

JUDGE JOHNSON concurs.

JUDGE SCHOCK concurs in part and dissents in part.

22 JUDGE SCHOCK, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

¶ 41 The insurance policy in this case provides that a “covered

person” includes the “named insured” shown on the Declarations.

The Declarations identify the “named insured” as Susan Sorensen.

Because I would conclude that this makes the policy unambiguous

that Susan — and only Susan — is the named insured, I

respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the policy is

ambiguous as to whether Nathan Sorensen is a named insured.

I. Covered Person

¶ 42 We interpret an insurance policy like any other contract.

Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Kretzer, 2023 COA 94, ¶ 11. That means that

when the policy language is “clear and unambiguous on its face,”

we must enforce the policy as written. Id. at ¶ 12. A contractual

provision is ambiguous only if it is “susceptible on its face to more

than one reasonable interpretation.” Id. (citation omitted).

¶ 43 As the majority correctly concludes, the insurance policy

unambiguously defines “covered person” to include, as relevant to

this case, (1) “You” or (2) “any family member.” It defines “You” to

mean “the ‘named insured’ shown on the Declarations and spouse if

a resident of the same household.” And it defines “family member”

23 as “a person related to [the named insured] by blood, marriage or

adoption who resides primarily in [the named insured’s]

household.” Thus, plaintiffs’ entitlement to coverage turns on

whether they qualify as either “the ‘named insured’ shown on the

Declarations,” or a “family member” of the named insured.

II. Named Insured

¶ 44 In my view, there is only one reasonable interpretation of “the

‘named insured’ shown on the Declarations.” The Declarations

page, which is attached to the insurance policy, includes a box

labeled “Named Insured and Address.” That box includes one

name: Susan Sorensen. I do not think we need go any further than

that to determine that the only named insured is Susan. See Am.

Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hansen, 2016 CO 46, ¶¶ 23-24 (holding that

insurance contract was unambiguous as to identity of the insureds

where the declarations page named the insureds); Grippin v. State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2016 COA 127, ¶ 31 (concluding that

policy was unambiguous as to identity of the insureds where the

named insureds on the declarations page did not include plaintiff).

¶ 45 The majority concludes that the policy is ambiguous on this

point because there is another box on the Declarations page that

24 lists “operators,” and Nathan is identified in that box. While I agree

that the term “operator” may be ambiguous, I do not think we need

to interpret that term because it is a separate and distinct category

from the “named insured,” and Nathan does not seek coverage as

an “operator.” See Grippin, ¶¶ 32-33 (concluding that listing

plaintiff as an “other household driver” did not make policy

ambiguous as to whether he was an insured). Nor does the policy’s

use of the phrase “named insured” otherwise refer to operators.

¶ 46 In other words, whatever it means for Nathan to be an

“operator,” he is not the named insured. And whatever it means for

Susan to also be an “operator,” she is the named insured. Simply

put, the “named insured” is the person named in the box that says

“named insured” — regardless of who or what an operator is.

¶ 47 Moreover, although I do not think it is necessary to consider

why the Declarations page might have identified “operators,” I note

that the policy covers any person using any vehicle identified on the

Declarations. Correspondingly, the premium for the policy may

take into account the number, identities, and driving records of the

operators. Thus, it makes sense that the policy would identify

operators of the covered vehicles, in addition to the named insured.

25 ¶ 48 In any event, I disagree with the majority that the term

“operators” can reasonably be read as a “list of all the named

insureds” when there is a separate box for the named insured. See

Copper Mountain, Inc. v. Indus. Sys., Inc., 208 P.3d 692, 700 (Colo.

2009) (“We choose a construction of the contract that harmonizes

provisions instead of rendering them superfluous.”). To the

contrary, “[t]he use of different terms in the policy signals that those

terms should be afforded different meanings.” Weitz Co. v. Mid-

Century Ins. Co., 181 P.3d 309, 313 (Colo. App. 2007).

¶ 49 Because I would conclude that the policy is unambiguous that

Nathan is not a named insured, I would not consider extrinsic

evidence of the parties’ intent. See Hansen, ¶ 28. Nor would I

consider Nathan’s arguments as to his reasonable expectations.

See id. at ¶ 30 (noting that doctrine of reasonable expectations

applies “only after it is determined that the claimant is an insured”).

III. Family Member

¶ 50 Having concluded that Nathan is not entitled to coverage as a

named insured, I turn to whether he and Amanda Sorensen are

entitled to coverage as “family members” of Susan. As noted above,

under the terms of the policy, this turns on whether Nathan and

26 Amanda reside in Susan’s household. See Grippin, ¶ 26 (holding

that provision requiring a relative to reside “primarily” with named

insured violates public policy and is void). On this question, I agree

with the majority that there are genuine issues of material fact that

preclude summary judgment.

¶ 51 The Sorensens presented evidence that Susan owned two

homes that were “interchangeable” in the sense that she and her

children, including Nathan, all had keys to both homes and “come

and go as they want.” Although the Sorensens primarily stay in one

home and Susan in another, they go back and forth between the

two. Susan pays for property taxes, insurance, and other expenses

at both properties, and both she and Nathan keep belongings at

both homes. And when Susan purchased the insurance policy in

this case, she described Nathan as a member of her household.

¶ 52 Whether a person is a resident of an insured’s household

depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, including the

person’s subjective or declared intent, the formality or informality of

the relationship, the existence of another place of lodging, and the

relative permanence or transience of the person’s residence in the

household. GEICO Cas. Co. v. Collins, 2016 COA 30M, ¶ 19. For

27 purposes of this analysis, a person may “reside” in more than one

place. Grippin, ¶¶ 18-19. It is therefore not determinative, as the

district court’s summary judgment order suggested, that the person

also has another residence, so long as “all relevant circumstances

. . . reveal ‘some intended presence in the insured’s home.’” Id. at

¶ 19 (citation omitted). The overarching consideration is “whether

the parties to the insurance contract intended that coverage would

extend to the alleged insured.” Id. at ¶ 15 (citation omitted).

¶ 53 To be entitled to summary judgment, the moving party must

show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at ¶ 8; see also C.R.C.P.

56(c). Given the fact-intensive nature of the inquiry and allowing

the Sorensens the benefit of all reasonable favorable inferences, see

Westin Operator, LLC v. Groh, 2015 CO 25, ¶ 20, reasonable people

could draw conflicting inferences as to whether the Sorensens

reside in Susan’s household. See Fin. Assocs., Ltd. v. G.E. Johnson

Constr. Co., 723 P.2d 135, 138 (Colo. 1986) (“An issue of fact may

arise from the existence of conflicting permissible inferences from

evidence accepted as true.”). I would therefore conclude that the

district court erred by granting summary judgment on this issue.

28 IV. Conclusion

¶ 54 Thus, based on the plain language of the policy, I would

conclude that the district court correctly determined that Nathan

was not a named insured under the policy. I would reverse the

district court’s summary judgment order to the extent it ruled that

the Sorensens were not entitled to coverage as “family members,”

and I would remand for resolution of that factual question.