NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3277-24
SORA LEAH OCHS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ARI OCHS,
Defendant-Respondent. ________________________
Submitted April 23, 2026 – Decided May 29, 2026
Before Judges Marczyk and Puglisi.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Passaic County, Docket No. FM-16-0735-06.
Sora Leah Ochs, self-represented appellant.
Treuhaft & Zakarin LLP, attorneys for respondent (Ira Treuhaft, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Sora Leah Ochs appeals from the Family Part's May 2, 2025 order
granting in part and denying in part her cross-motion to enforce provisions of the parties' marital settlement agreement (MSA). Because disputed issues of
fact exist essential to full and fair consideration of the legal questions posed
regarding defendant Ari Ochs's laches defense, we reverse and remand for a
plenary hearing.
I.
The parties were married in July 1995 and had two daughters born in 1999
and 2001. The marriage ended by judgment of divorce in December 2005, which
incorporated the parties' September 2005 MSA. Pursuant to Articles IV and VI
of the MSA, the parties agreed defendant would pay $792 1 per month in child
support and an additional $792 per month in non-deductible spousal support 2
directly to the bank to pay off the mortgage on the marital residence, with the
intent the combined payments would equal the total mortgage payment due each
month. Additionally, pursuant to Article IV(B)(1)(a), the parties agreed
defendant would pay for the children's school tuition and related expenses
through high school.
1 The $792 monthly child support payment was subject to a dollar-for-dollar adjustment for any increase in real estate taxes or homeowner's insurance costs. 2 The MSA provided the spousal support payments would terminate upon plaintiff's remarriage. Plaintiff remarried in August 2007. A-3277-24 2 The parties agreed plaintiff would have exclusive possession of the
marital residence for her and the children until the occurrence of an "[o]perating
[e]vent." The MSA defined such an event as "the earliest of: (a) both [c]hildren
. . . no longer living in the [m]arital [r]esidence (excluding the circumstances of
the [c]hildren dorming at a residential college); (b) [the d]ecision of [plaintiff]
to live elsewhere; (c) [m]utual agreement; or (d) July 1, 2025."
Article V(D) provided plaintiff "the right to elect to purchase [defendant]'s
share of the [m]arital [r]esidence" at any time prior to an operating event, and
gave defendant the right to exercise his buy-out option if plaintiff did not choose
to exercise hers. Article V(E) stated: "If neither party chooses to exercise their
buy-out option, the parties shall place the [m]arital [r]esidence on the market for
sale. Both parties shall cooperate and use efforts reasonably calculated to
produce the best sales price available on the market."
Additionally, pursuant to Article VIII(C), the parties agreed the stock
options defendant had earned from a previous employer were marital assets. All
proceeds from those options would "first be used to pay off the parties' credit
card debt" and any "remaining proceeds . . . earned prior to July 2003" would
"be shared equally between" them.
A-3277-24 3 As outlined in Article XIII, the parties also agreed, in the event either
defaulted in their performance of any obligations under the MSA, the aggrieved
party would send written notice to the defaulting party and allow them ten days
to cure the default before instituting legal action for relief. Article XIX(3)
provided no provision of the MSA "shall be changed or modified, nor . . .
discharged or terminated[,] . . . except by an instrument in writing signed by the
party against whom the change, modification, discharge[,] or termination is
claimed."
In November 2023, following the younger daughter's marriage, defendant
advised plaintiff he wanted to place the marital residence on the market for sale,
as an operating event had occurred pursuant to the MSA, given neither child was
still living in the marital residence. In January 2024, after not receiving a
response from plaintiff, defendant sent her a second letter, again requesting a
response regarding the sale of the home and notifying plaintiff she was in
default. Plaintiff responded in mid-January, informing defendant she needed six
months to obtain a mortgage to buy defendant out of the home. Thereafter, the
parties continued exchanging emails regarding the property's sale but were
ultimately unable to reach an agreement. In February 2024, plaintiff unilaterally
paid off the outstanding mortgage balance, which totaled $75,892.69.
A-3277-24 4 In February 2024, defendant moved to enforce the MSA, seeking, in part,
to require plaintiff to list the marital residence for sale within five days of the
court's order and for fifty percent of the net proceeds of the sale. Plaintiff cross-
moved, in part, requesting the court: deny defendant's motion in its entirety and
permit plaintiff to buy out defendant's interest in the marital home; reduce
defendant's share of the marital home by $77,500, to reflect half of her paydown
of the mortgage; find defendant violated Article IV(E)(1) of the MSA by failing
to pay child support in the amount of $45,751.32 and to be credited that amount
against his share of the home; find defendant violated Article IV(B)(1)(a) of the
MSA by failing to pay his share of the children's tuition and for the $79,689
owed to be credited against his share of the marital home; and find defendant in
violation Article VIII of the MSA for failing to provide her with the value of her
share of his stock options and for the $37,029 owed to be credited against his
share of the home. 3
Defendant's opposition to the cross-motion argued plaintiff's requests for
credits were untimely, unsupported, and barred by laches. He also certified he
had made all required payments under the MSA.
3 Plaintiff's subsequent supplemental certification amended the amounts she sought to $43,927.62 in unpaid child support, $77,605 in unpaid child educational costs, and $34,780 for her share of the stock options. A-3277-24 5 The trial court issued a case management order appointing an appraiser to
appraise the marital residence and requiring the parties to exchange financial
information and an accounting of the credits plaintiff sought in her cross-motion.
Plaintiff submitted a supplemental certification pursuant to the court's order, in
which she provided financial documentation and an accounting of the credits
against defendant's share of the marital home sale proceeds sought in her cross -
motion.
On May 2, 2025, following oral argument, the trial court rendered an oral
ruling. It found an "operating event" under the MSA occurred when the younger
daughter married and moved out of the parties' marital home in November 2023,
triggering the contractual requirement the home be sold. The court determined
plaintiff violated the MSA because there was "nothing in her certification or . . .
any evidence" showing she elected to buy out defendant's share of the home
prior to the operating event. Accordingly, it ordered the marital residence to be
listed for sale within five days of that date. The court denied plaintiff's requests
to deny defendant's motion and to buy out defendant's interest in the marital
home.4
4 Plaintiff's reply brief notes this part of the trial court's order was not preserved for appeal and is "moot[,] as the house is under contract to be sold." A-3277-24 6 As to the division of the sale proceeds, the court found the mortgage
balance at the time the parties entered the MSA was "about [$]155,000" and
noted their agreement defendant would make direct payments toward the
mortgage, in lieu of child support and alimony payments to plaintiff. It agreed
plaintiff was entitled to the credit for half the paydown of the mortgage,
reasoning it would be unfair for defendant "to receive a credit for the paydown
of the mortgage, in essence, refunding . . . [d]efendant all of the money that was
paid towards child support and alimony."
Next, the court concluded laches barred plaintiff's requests for child
support and education expenses. Although it acknowledged the laches issue
requires a hearing, the court stated: "This is the hearing. And oral argument on
the issue is satisfied under the case law." The court further reasoned plaintiff
never notified defendant or asserted a claim he was in default regarding child
support or tuition payments over the approximate twenty years since the MSA's
execution, and it would prejudice defendant's ability to defend against those
claims to allow plaintiff to now advance them.
Similarly, the court found the doctrine of laches barred plaintiff's request
for the stock option credits because, pursuant to the MSA, the options were to
be exercised within 180 days of the agreement's execution in 2005, but plaintiff,
A-3277-24 7 since that time, never asserted a claim to the proceeds. It explained the
documentation provided, without an expert evaluation of the stock options '
worth, did not allow the court to properly assess how much, if anything, plaintiff
was owed. The court concluded defendant was prejudiced because no
documentation was available proving whether or not he fulfilled the
requirements, given the amount of time that had passed since the MSA's
execution.
II.
Plaintiff argues the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of laches
without first conducting a plenary hearing. She asserts the parties' certifications
referenced numerous disputed facts regarding her claims defendant breached the
MSA, specifically defendant's statements: disavowing knowledge of any of
plaintiff's claims unrelated to the sale of the marital home; asserting plaintiff
never sought a share of the options and her valuations were incorrect; and
plaintiff's claims were "essentially manufactured." Plaintiff emphasizes none of
those disputed facts were the subject of direct or cross-examination and contends
the court was not in a position to make credibility findings. She emphasizes the
court acknowledged a hearing was required to apply laches but erred in
concluding oral argument sufficed.
A-3277-24 8 Plaintiff further argues the court abused its discretion by failing to conduct
a plenary hearing pertaining to defendant's sale of the stock options, particularly
because the identification and valuation of the options were disputed. She
claims the court improperly bypassed the issue by "folding it into an overbroad
laches ruling," leaving the issue unresolved, rather than taking testimony so she
could establish the stock options' value and compelling the production of
applicable records.
Plaintiff also claims the court "did not identify any prejudice suffered by
[d]efendant," emphasizing the mere passage of time is insufficient to show
prejudice. She asserts the court failed to find defendant suffered any material
harm due to her alleged delay in asserting her claims, including detrimental
reliance, loss of evidence, change in position, unavailability of witnesses, or an
inability to defend against her claims. Plaintiff further notes there was no
evidentiary hearing and thus no way to prove whether any evidence was
unavailable. Accordingly, she contends the court misapplied the case law it
cited to bar her claims under the doctrine of laches. Plaintiff also contends
defendant benefited from her delay by not complying with the MSA and
concealing the sale of the options.
A-3277-24 9 Plaintiff further argues the court erred in its laches analysis because a
proper application of the facts to the doctrine would have led to a contrary result.
She maintains the court's focus on the MSA's age was misplaced, because many
of defendant's obligations only arose recently as their children grew older,
including child support adjustments and education-related costs like tuition, and
thus, she contends the timing of her claims was reasonable. Plaintiff also asserts
the timing of her claims was consistent with the parties' understanding there
would be an accounting at the time of the marital home buyout or disposition
and defendant had continued making mortgage payments in accordance with that
understanding.
Plaintiff also argues the court's application of laches to her child support
and alimony claims contravened state law and public policy. Relying on
N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.23(a), she asserts the court erred in retroactively nullifying
defendant's accrued child support obligations, which had already attached by
operation of law. She contends the court's blanket dismissal of her claims to
child support and education expenses was improper, emphasizing a child's right
to support is not subject to waiver or equitable forfeiture, and each child support
obligation is a separate, vested judgment, enforceable upon accrual.
A-3277-24 10 An appellate court defers to the family court's findings of fact "when
supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence" in the record. Cesare v.
Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998). We afford deference in light "of the family
courts' special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters." Id. at 413.
However, its "legal conclusions, and the application of those conclusions to the
facts," are reviewed de novo. Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 568 (App.
Div. 2013).
As is the case with any contract, we review a settlement agreement de
novo because the interpretation of a contract is a legal question. Quinn v. Quinn,
225 N.J. 34, 45 (2016) ("An agreement that resolves a matrimonial dispute is no
less a contract than an agreement to resolve a business dispute."). "Accordingly,
we pay no special deference to the [family] court's interpretation and look at the
contract with fresh eyes." Kieffer v. Best Buy, 205 N.J. 213, 223 (2011). A
court's decision to grant or deny enforcement of a matrimonial agreement,
including the entry of relief to secure compliance with equitable distribution
orders, is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Quinn, 225 N.J. at 42-43.
The application of laches "depends upon the facts of the particular case
and is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court." Mancini v. Twp.
of Teaneck, 179 N.J. 425, 436 (2004) (quoting Garrett v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
A-3277-24 11 844 F.2d 559, 562 (8th Cir. 1988)). We review the application of the laches
doctrine under the abuse of discretion standard. See United States v. Scurry,
193 N.J. 492, 504 (2008). So too is the denial of a plenary hearing, which will
be upheld unless the court abused its discretion by refusing to consider
genuinely disputed issues of material facts. See Harrington v. Harrington, 281
N.J. Super. 39, 47 (App. Div. 1995).
The equitable doctrine of laches is applicable in divorce proceedings.
Schlemm v. Schlemm, 31 N.J. 557, 572 (1960) (quoting Judkins v. Judkins, 22
N.J. Super. 516, 537 (Ch. Div. 1952)). The policy underlying the doctrine is to
discourage stale claims. Gladden v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys., 171 N.J.
Super. 363, 371 (App. Div. 1979). The doctrine is properly "invoked to deny a
party enforcement of a known right when the party engages in an inexcusable
and unexplained delay in exercising that right to the prejudice of the other
party." Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169, 180-81 (2003). "The key factors . . . are
the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, and the 'changing conditions
of either or both parties during the delay.'" Id. at 181 (quoting Lavin v. Bd. of
Educ., 90 N.J. 145, 152 (1982)). Generally, where a party asserts laches as an
issue in the proceeding, a "full factual hearing on both sides is usually required."
A-3277-24 12 Dorchester Manor v. Borough of New Milford, 287 N.J. Super. 163, 173 (Law
Div. 1994), aff'd, 287 N.J. Super. 114 (App. Div. 1996).
A plenary hearing is necessary "'when the submissions show there is a
genuine and substantial factual dispute[,]' which the trial court must resolve."
Llewelyn v. Shewchuk, 440 N.J. Super. 207, 217 (App. Div. 2015) (alteration
in original) (quoting Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J. Super. 102, 105 (App. Div. 2007)).
Where the need for a plenary hearing is not as obvious, the movant must make
a prima facie showing the plenary hearing is necessary. Hand, 391 N.J. Super.
at 106.
Pursuant to these principles, we conclude the trial court misapplied its
discretion by not conducting a plenary hearing regarding the laches issue. We
are mindful plaintiff did not request a plenary hearing. At oral argument, her
counsel stated: "[W]e're not asking for a hearing because we believe on the . . .
face of it, the laches claim should fail and . . . [does] not rise to the level that a
hearing should be required." Counsel nevertheless directed the court to case law
standing for the proposition a hearing is ordinarily required when a court
addresses a laches defense. Notably, the court did not find plaintiff waived a
hearing. Rather, it acknowledged, "[t]he doctrine of laches . . . requires a
A-3277-24 13 hearing" but found the oral argument conducted that day satisfied the need for
one.
The court ultimately concluded plaintiff's delay in bringing her
application equated to having slept on her rights, and the delay prejudiced
defendant. However, it drew this conclusion based on the motion papers alone.
The parties' certifications created a factual dispute regarding when plaintiff
learned of the circumstances that prompted her cross-motion, and the court did
not consider plaintiff's claim she delayed seeking enforcement in good faith
during periods when defendant was unemployed or experiencing financial
difficulties. The record suggests, as recently as 2022, defendant forwarded a
check to plaintiff for over $6,000 for payments he missed in 2007 due to his
unemployment. Moreover, plaintiff notes the MSA encouraged the parties to
"work out . . . modifications themselves," when possible, and asserts the
"trusting generosity" she displayed was "designed to foster an effective co-
parenting relationship."
Plaintiff contends the parties "verbally agreed to defer enforcement" under
the MSA to allow defendant to "re-establish" himself "with the explicit . . .
understanding . . . any underpayments [by defendant] [w]ould be made up" when
the house was sold. She also asserts many of her claims were for relatively
A-3277-24 14 recent education-related expenses incurred by the parties' children—not twenty-
year-old claims. She notes the MSA contains a "no waiver clause" that states:
"The failure of either party to insist . . . upon a strict performance of any
provision[]" of the MSA "shall not be construed as a waiver or a relinquishment
for the future of such provision, but the same shall . . . remain in full force and
effect." The court did not address these contentions.
There are additional significant factual disputes. For example, plaintiff
claims defendant owes $43,927.62 in unpaid child support and $77,605 for his
share of the children's educational expenses. Defendant, on the other hand,
maintains he "paid more than his fair share of child support" and educational
expenses over the years, consistent with the MSA.
The general rule is "the right to child support belongs to the child and may
not be waived" or bargained away by a parent. L.V. v. R.S., 347 N.J. Super. 33,
41 (App. Div. 2002). "For this reason the application of laches to matters of
parent-child relationships have been carefully circumscribed." Ibid. Laches
requires close consideration of a developed factual record. See id. at 39.
Here, the lack of a plenary hearing constrained the court's ability to
consider the laches factors. It had no opportunity, other than at oral argument,
to draw any conclusions, and its decision should have been based on more than
A-3277-24 15 just the parties' conflicting affidavits and certifications. Testimony was
necessary to analyze defendant's laches defense.
Resolution of the factual disputes cannot be made at an oral argument.
Rather, the issues "hinge on factual determinations, credibility and diverse
contentions, [and therefore,] a plenary hearing is required." Dunne v. Dunne,
209 N.J. Super. 559, 571 (App. Div. 1986). Accordingly, we remand for the
court to conduct a hearing on the applicability of defendant's laches defense to
plaintiff's child support, educational expenses, and stock option claims. Nothing
in this opinion should be construed as expressing an opinion on the merits of
any of these claims.
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
A-3277-24 16