Sophia Terry v. William Powley.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: March 9, 2026
• Docket: 25-P-0938
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-938

SOPHIA TERRY

vs.

WILLIAM POWLEY.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The father, William Powley, filed a complaint for contempt

against the mother, Sophia Terry, alleging that she violated a

Probate and Family Court order requiring that the father have

regular supervised parenting time with the parties' two minor

children. After the father amended his complaint, a judge held

an evidentiary hearing and then issued findings and a judgment

concluding that the mother was not in contempt. On the father's

appeal, we affirm the judgment.

To hold a party in civil contempt there must be "clear and

convincing evidence of disobedience of a clear and unequivocal

command." Birchall, petitioner, 454 Mass. 837, 853 (2009). "We

review the judge's ultimate finding of contempt for abuse of discretion, but we review underlying conclusions of law de novo

and underlying findings of fact for clear error" (citation

omitted). Jones v. Jones, 101 Mass. App. Ct. 673, 688 (2022).

Here, the judge found that the parties' son often refused to

spend scheduled parenting time with the father and "bolted" from

the supervision center where the visits were to occur. The

parties' daughter usually cut her visits short after twenty to

thirty minutes.

Although the father attempted to hold the mother

responsible for the children's behavior, the judge expressly

credited a visitation supervisor's testimony that the mother was

making a genuine effort to facilitate parenting time with the

father. The judge also credited the mother's testimony that the

mother was making efforts to get professional guidance about the

difficulties surrounding the children's parenting time with the

father. The judge expressly declined to credit the opinion of

the supervision center's founder that the mother did not support

the father's relationship with the children. The judge did so

because the founder had supervised only two visits with the

father, whereas the visitation supervisor had been involved with

the family for one and one-half years.

On appeal, the father essentially attacks the finding that

the mother tried to facilitate the father's parenting time. The

father, however, has failed to support his argument with record

2 citations. Moreover, "[w]e accord the credibility

determinations of the judge who 'heard the testimony of the

[witnesses] . . . [and] observed their demeanor' . . . the

utmost deference." Ginsberg v. Blacker, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 139,

140 n.3 (2006), quoting Pike v. Maguire, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 929,

929 (1999). "In a bench trial credibility is 'quintessentially

the domain of the trial judge [so that (her)] assessment is

close to immune from reversal on appeal except on the most

compelling of showings.'" Prenaveau v. Prenaveau, 81 Mass. App.

Ct. 479, 496 (2012), quoting Johnston v. Johnston, 38 Mass. App.

Ct. 531, 536 (1995). The father has offered no reason for us to

disregard the judge's credibility findings here. We therefore

see no abuse of discretion in the judge's conclusion that the

mother was not in contempt. See Jones, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at

688.

We briefly address the father's argument that contempt is

the only way of changing the mother's approach to parenting

time, including what the father describes as her repeated

refusals to allow his parenting time to occur "someplace fun" in

the community rather than in the supervision center. We take

judicial notice that on the same day the judge issued her

contempt decision, she issued a further temporary order

authorizing the professional parenting time supervisor "to make

the determination whether the parenting time takes place in a

3 [visitation] center or in the community after assessing the

needs and preferences of the children." In light of that order,

the father's claim that he is pursuing this appeal because he

has no remedy other than contempt is baseless.

The mother requests an award of her appellate attorney's

fees, on the ground that the father's appeal is frivolous. "An

appeal is considered frivolous when the underlying case law is

settled and there is no reasonable expectation of a reversal."

Pierce v. Clark, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 912, 915 (2006). See Mass.

R. A. P. 25, as appearing in 481 Mass. 1654 (2019). Although

this appeal comes close to meeting that standard, we deny the

request for fees, at the same time cautioning the father that

further appeals of this nature may lead to fees being awarded.

Judgment dated May 29, 2025, affirmed.

By the Court (Sacks, Hodgens & Toone, JJ.1),

Clerk

Entered: March 9, 2026.

1 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.