Sonny Marquez v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: January 17, 1991
• Docket: 10-90-00111-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Sonny Marquez

NO. 10-90-111-CR

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE

TENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT WACO

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

          SONNY MARQUEZ,

                                                                                            Appellant

          v.

          THE STATE OF TEXAS,

                                                                                            Appellee

From 54th Judicial District Court

McLennan County, Texas

Trial Court #90-199-C

O P I N I O N

* * * * * * *

          Appellant was convicted by a jury on a plea of not guilty of the offense of burglary of a habitation, for which he was sentenced to imprisonment for ten years and one day in the Texas Department of Corrections.

          Appellant has filed a request in this court, personally signed by Appellant and his attorney, to have his notice of appeal withdrawn. No decision of this court having been delivered prior to the receipt of this request, Appellant's request is granted. The appeal is dismissed.

                                                                                                     PER CURIAM

Before Chief Justice Thomas, Justice Cummings

          and Justice Vance

Dismissed

Opinion delivered and filed January 17, 1991

Do Not Publish

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From the 176^th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court # 835558

      Appellant Hymon Augusta Walker was convicted of the offense of sexual assault of a child, and after the jury found that he had previously been convicted for the offense of sexual assault, he was sentenced to confinement for life. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 22.011(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2002). Six points are presented on appeal: (1) the trial court abused its discretion at the guilt/innocence stage of the trial when it permitted the State to introduce a poem written by the victim; (2)-(4) the statutory punishment guideline under which appellant was sentenced was unconstitutional because it constituted cruel and unusual punishment under our federal and state constitutions, and violated his right to due process under the federal constitution; (5) appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (6) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the definition of the term “reasonable doubt.” We will affirm.

      We begin with a brief review of the testimony. Fifteen year-old Tina Williams testified that on the night of February 2, 2000, she was sexually assaulted by appellant while she was babysitting for a neighbor. Appellant, who was known to Tina by the nickname “Bear,” lived in the residence and was supposed to take over Tina’s babysitting duties when he returned home. Tina described the sexual assault in detail and testified she was initially afraid to tell her mother what happened. She also testified she was sexually assaulted by appellant again the following evening when she returned to the residence to babysit. After the second assault, Tina phoned a friend and, after telling her about the incident, asked the friend to inform her mother. Following the outcry, investigating law enforcement authorities arrested appellant. At the punishment stage of the trial the State produced evidence showing that appellant had previously been convicted of the offense of sexual assault.

      In point one, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion at the guilt/innocence stage of the trial when it permitted the State to introduce, over objection, a poem written by Tina approximately nine months after the sexual assault. The poem reads:

      My Story

      The story of a girl so sad with her head hung low

      Is undergoing more pain than anyone could ever know

      The feelings she feels inside are of emptiness and sorrow

      Hoping the sun will shine through the clouds of tomorrow

      This story is of my life and how I see me

      Sometimes you can’t be what people expect you to be.

      The handwritten poem was introduced as an exhibit at trial and was again read by the prosecutor at the closing of jury argument at the guilt/innocence stage of the trial. Appellant argues the poem was not relevant to any issue in the case and was used by the State to “inflame and arouse” the passions of the jury. The State responds that appellant’s trial objection did not preserve his complaint on appeal and that the error was waived when other evidence about sad poetry written by the victim was introduced without objection. The State also argues the poem was relevant because “writing sad poems has a tendency to make the existence of the facts and circumstances of the sexual assault more probable than it would be without the evidence.” Finally, the State argues any error in the admission of the poem was harmless.

      Whether defense counsel’s trial objection was sufficient to preserve his “relevance” complaint on appeal presents a close question. At the time the State moved for its introduction, defense counsel stated “[w]e would object to the introduction of the poem. It doesn’t have any evidentiary weight as to the charges that we’re dealing with.” While we believe that this objection was somewhat awkwardly worded, we conclude it was sufficient to put the trial court on notice that counsel’s objection questioned the relevance of the poem to the charges at guilt/innocence. See Tex. R. Evid. 103(a)(1) (requiring the party complaining of the admission of evidence to make a timely objection or motion to strike, stating the specific ground of the objection, if the specific ground is not apparent from the context); see also Gonzales v. State, 868 S.W.2d 854, 856 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, no pet.) (holding objection sufficient where it is clear the parties and trial court knew its nature).

      Another close question is presented by the State’s claim that similar evidence was introduced by the State without objection from appellant. The evidence considered “similar” by the State was Tina’s testimony that she suffers from depression and sometimes writes sad poetry to express her feelings. While it is true appellant did not object to this testimony, we see a distinction between general testimony that Tina wrote poetry to express her sadness, and the introduction of a specific poem written by her. Under the particular circumstances present in this case, we do not find appellant waived his complaint by failing to object to other general testimony relating to poetry.

      The State next argues the contents of the poem made the facts and circumstances of the offense more probable than had the poem not been admitted. In other words, the State argues the poem was relevant to prove appellant’s guilt. See Tex. R. Evid. 401. We do not agree. Although the poem may have been admissible as victim impact evidence at the trial’s punishment stage, we believe the poem had no relevance to any issue at guilt/innocence and should not have been admitted.

      The fact that Tina’s poem was irrelevant to any issue in our case, in part, leads us to conclude that the error was harmless. The improper admission of evidence at trial court requires the harm analysis for non-constitutional error. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b); see also Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). A criminal conviction should not be overturned for non-constitutional error if the appellate court, after examining the record as a whole, has fair assurance that the error did not influence the jury, or had but a slight effect. Id., citing King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Tina’s poem contains no reference to appellant or any circumstance of the offense. Nor did it have a tendency to make the victim any more believable. In light of the record as a whole, we are satisfied the error did not influence the jury. Point one is overruled.

      Points two, three, and four concern appellant’s contention that the sentencing scheme adopted by our legislature in Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 12.42(c)(2)(A)(i) and (B)(ii) (Vernon Supp. 2002), is unconstitutional because his conviction in the instant case, coupled with his prior conviction for sexual assault, made his life sentence mandatory. Appellant argues the statute violates his right to due process under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment prohibited under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 13, of the Texas Constitution.

      We reject appellant’s due process complaint because we find the State has a rational basis–the protection of society from sexual predators–for instituting a punishment scheme under which a life sentence is mandatory for a second sexual assault conviction. See Williams v. State, 10 S.W.3d 370, 372 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1999, pet. ref’d) (reviewing federal and state cases relating to mandatory sentences for repeat offenders).

      We similarly reject appellant’s complaints that a life sentence for sexual assault constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Reviewing courts must grant substantial deference to the legislature in determining whether a particular sentence is impermissibly cruel and unusual. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-291, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3009-3010, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983). Factors to be considered include the gravity of the offense, the harshness of the offense, and sentences imposed in other jurisdictions. Id. In Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 285, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 1145, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980), the United States Supreme Court rejected a similar complaint and upheld the mandatory life sentence required by a Texas recidivist statute. Sexual assaults are considered very serious offenses in every jurisdiction, and the fact that appellant was a repeat sexual offender makes his conduct all the more grave. Under these circumstances, we find no violation of our state or federal constitutions on grounds that a life sentence for a recidivist sexual offender is cruel and unusual.

      In point five, appellant contends counsel rendered ineffective assistance at the punishment phase by failing to object when the prosecutor’s questions incorporated details of his prior sexual assault in the form of “have you heard” questions to character witnesses testifying on appellant’s behalf. We reject appellant’s argument for two reasons. First, the admission of such evidence was proper. See Haney v. State, 951 S.W.2d 551, 555 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no pet.). Second, even if the admission of the evidence was improper, appellant cannot clear the second hurdle of the test for ineffective assistance–the requirement that appellant show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Because he was a repeat sexual offender, appellant’s life sentence was mandatory. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 12.42(c)(2)(A)(i) (Vernon Supp. 2002). Therefore, whether or not the jurors learned the details of the prior offense was ultimately irrelevant. Point five is overruled.

      In point six, appellant argues the trial court erred in overruling his request for a jury instruction on the term “reasonable doubt.” Showing high regard for his ethical obligations, counsel admits that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision in Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), controls the issue against him. As an intermediate level appellate court we are duty bound to follow Paulson. We therefore hold that the trial court did not err in failing to provide the instruction requested. Point six is overruled.

      Appellant’s conviction is affirmed.

DAVID L. RICHARDS

                                                                       Justice

Before Chief Justice Davis,

          Justice Vance, and

          Justice Richards (Sitting by Assignment)

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed October 9, 2002

[CRPM]