Sonjhai Meggette v. Capital One Auto Finance, et al.

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: February 27, 2026
• Docket: 3:25-cv-10370
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 SONJHAI MEGGETTE, Case No. 3:25-cv-10370-JSC

8 Plaintiff, ORDER RE: PENDING MOTIONS v. 9 Re: Dkt. Nos. 14, 21, 23 10 CAPITAL ONE AUTO FINANCE, et al., Defendants. 11

12 13 Plaintiff, who is proceeding without an attorney, filed this action in the Alameda County 14 Superior Court alleging breach of contract and related claims based on repossession of a vehicle. 15 (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 13.1) Defendant Capital One Auto Finance, a division of Capital One, N.A., 16 removed the action to this Court based on federal question jurisdiction. (Dkt. No. 1.) Defendant 17 now moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim. (Dkt. No. 21.) After carefully considering the 18 parties’ briefs and the relevant legal authority, the Court concludes oral argument is unnecessary, 19 see Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), VACATES the March 5, 2026 hearing, GRANTS the motion to dismiss as to 20 the federal claims, and defers ruling on the state law claims as discussed below. 21 BACKGROUND 22 Defendant removed this action to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction 23 because “[i]n Plaintiff’s complaint, she alleges that Capital One violated the ADA.” (Dkt. No. 1, 24 Notice of Removal, ¶ 7 (citing Ex. A. at 17.) Plaintiff’s Complaint, however, pleads a single claim 25 for breach of contract based on the allegation “Defendants wrongfully repossessed and withheld 26 the 2020 Nissan Altima, trust property of the Estate of Sonya Meggette, without lawful notice of 27 1 judicial process. Capital One Auto Finance and Daybreak Metro LLC breached contractual” and 2 seeks $40,000 in damages. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 13-14.) The document Defendant refers to was filed 3 the same day as the Complaint and is entitled “Ex Parte Application for Emergency Relief (Breach 4 of Peace, Conversion, And Unlawful Repossession of Trust Property).” (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 16.) This 5 document lists several state law causes of action including conversion and unlawful repossession, 6 as well as a cause of action under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12312. 7 (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 17.) 8 The “[w]ell-pleaded complaint” rule requires a federal question to be present on the face of 9 the complaint at the time of removal for federal question jurisdiction to exist. Duncan v. Stuetzle, 10 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996). It is unclear if Plaintiff’s reference to the ADA in the filing 11 submitted at the same time as the Complaint falls within the scope of this rule. It is unnecessary to 12 reach this question, however, because, following removal, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint 13 which brings several claims under state law as well as claims under the ADA, the Fair Credit 14 Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, and due process claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth 15 Amendments. (Dkt. No. 13.) See Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 30 16 (2025). (“When a plaintiff amends her complaint following her suit’s removal, a federal court’s 17 jurisdiction depends on what the new complaint says.”). 18 The same day Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint, she filed a motion for a preliminary 19 injunction seeking to have her vehicle returned to her. (Dkt. No. 13.) Defendant then filed the 20 now pending motion to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 21.) Plaintiff thereafter filed an untimely opposition to 21 the motion, which only addresses dismissal of her state law accounting/contract based claims. 22 (Dkt. No. 26.) Plaintiff has also filed a motion to amend the caption, which Defendant did not 23 oppose. (Dkt. No. 23.) 24 DISCUSSION 25 Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint as frivolous and for failure to 26 state a claim. Defendant insists Plaintiffs’ allegations “boil down to meritless sovereign citizen 27 claims [which] Courts have rejected … ‘as utterly meritless arguments premised on such 1 937 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986)).) Defendant emphasizes statements Plaintiff makes alleging she is an 2 “Indigenous, American National, Aboriginal people, not a citizen of the United States” and her 3 submission of a declaration of nationality. (Dkt. No. 13 at 1, 17.) To the extent Plaintiff is 4 alleging her identity as a Moor gives her immunity from paying the loan and prevents Capital One 5 from repossessing her vehicle, courts have indeed uniformly rejected “any argument that one’s 6 status as a Moor makes him or her a sovereign citizen who is immune from otherwise generally 7 applicable law.” Bey v. Dimon, No. 19-CV-07122-PJH, 2020 WL 999548, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 8 2020) (collecting cases). 9 However, because it appears Plaintiff is attempting to allege claims predicated on other 10 basis as well, the Court proceeds to analyze whether her allegations state a claim independent of 11 her sovereign citizen theories. The Court begins with Plaintiff’s federal claims as those are the 12 basis for the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction here. 13 A. No Basis for ADA Claim 14 “[T]he ADA forbids discrimination against disabled individuals in major areas of public 15 life, among them employment (Title I of the Act), public services (Title II), and public 16 accommodations (Title III).” PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 675 (2001) (footnotes 17 omitted). Plaintiff initially appeared to bring an ADA claim under Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 18 (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 18.) Her Amended Complaint appears to bring a claim under Title III, 42 U.S.C. 19 § 12182. (Dkt. No. 13 a 4.) Plaintiff has not alleged a claim under either basis. 20 Title II provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such 21 disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or 22 activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 23 12132. For purposes of Title II, a “public entity” is “(A) any State or local government; (B) any 24 department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local 25 government; and (C) the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter authority.” 26 Id. § 12131. Defendant Capital One Finance is not “public entity” for purposes of Title II of the 27 ADA under any of the categories set forth in § 12131. See Blair v. Bank of Am., NA, 573 F. App’x 1 Americans with Disability Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12132). Because Plaintiff cannot bring a Title 2 II claim against Capital One Finance, to the extent her ADA claim is predicated on a violation of 3 Title II, it is dismissed with prejudice. 4 The elements of a Title III claim are: (1) plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the 5 ADA; (2) the defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public 6 accommodation; and (3) the plaintiff was discriminated against by the defendant because of 7 plaintiff’s disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a); Arizona ex rel. Goddard v. Harkins Amusement 8 Enterprises, Inc., 603 F.3d 666, 670 (9th Cir. 2010). In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges 9 she “is a qualified person with a disability within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities 10 Act and relied on access to an essential conveyance as necessary for daily living, access to 11 services, medical needs, and reasonable accommodations.” (Dkt. No. 13 at 4.) Defendant “carried 12 out the repossession and continued deprivation of Plaintiff’s conveyance without providing 13 reasonable accommodation, without engaging in a lawful interactive process, and without offering 14 alternative access or modification of their practices.” (Id.) This “conduct denied Plaintiff full and 15 equal access to services and benefits and constituted discrimination and failure to provide 16 reasonable accommodation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, including 42 17 U.S.C. § 12182.” (Id.) 18 These allegations fail to state a claim under Title III. First, Plaintiff’s conclusory 19 allegation that she is a qualified person with a disability is insufficient. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 20 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 21 conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). An individual is disabled under the ADA if they have “a 22 physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such 23 individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). Second, Plaintiff appears to allege her personal vehicle is a 24 “public accommodation,” but there is no legal support for this claim. “To the extent plaintiff is 25 attempting to argue that his own property is a place of public accommodation, this claim fails 26 because a private residence is not a place of public accommodation.” Baker v. Zipline Int’l Inc, 27 No. 2:25-CV-01063-DC-CKD (PS), 2025 WL 1765975, at *5 (E.D. Cal. June 26, 2025) 1 Inc., No. 2:25-CV-01063-DC-CKD (PS), 2025 WL 2306980 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2025). “[P]laces 2 of public accommodation” include “inns, hotels, motels, restaurants, cafeterias, lunch rooms, 3 lunch counters, soda fountains, retail establishments, gas stations, movie houses, theaters, concert 4 halls, sports arenas and stadiums.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 755 (9th Cir. 5 1994) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000a); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (listing private entities considered 6 public accommodations). Finally, Plaintiff has not alleged Defendant discriminated against her 7 because of her disability. Rather, Plaintiff alleges Defendant repossessed her vehicle which she 8 relied on for assorted activities—this does not state a claim under Title III. 9 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s ADA claim is dismissed. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend her 10 Title III claim to the extent she has a good faith basis for alleging (1) is a qualified person with a 11 disability; (2) Defendant owns, leases, or operates a public accommodation other than her personal 12 vehicle; and (3) Defendant discriminated against her because of her disability. 13 B. FCRA Claim 14 The FCRA imposes certain obligations on persons who furnish information to credit 15 reporting agencies (“CRAs”). See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s–2. Furnishers have an initial duty to provide 16 accurate information to CRAs, as well as an additional series of duties once a furnisher receives 17 notice from a CRA that a consumer disputes the accuracy of the furnisher’s reporting. See 15 18 U.S.C. §§ 1681s–2(a), (b). Plaintiff alleges Defendant reported information to CRAs that was 19 “inaccurate, misleading, incomplete, and legally inconsistent,” and upon receiving notice of her 20 dispute of this information failed to investigate her dispute, and follow reasonable procedures to 21 maintain the accuracy of her credit information.2 (Dkt. No. 13 at 6-7.) 22 To state a reinvestigation claim under Section 1618s-2(b), a plaintiff must show: “(1) [s]he 23 found an inaccuracy in [her] credit report; (2) [s]he notified a CRA; (3) the CRA notified the 24 furnisher of the information about the dispute; and (4) the furnisher and/or CRA failed to 25 reasonably investigate the inaccuracy.” Torion v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, No. 17-CV- 26 00422-PJH, 2017 WL 2986250, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2017) (citing Biggs v. Experian Info. 27 1 Sols., Inc., No. 5:16-CV-01507-EJD, 2016 WL 5235043, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2016); 2 Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1154-57 (9th Cir. 2009)). Plaintiff’s 3 conclusory allegations are insufficient to establish a reinvestigation claim. 4 First, an actual inaccuracy is a required element of an FCRA claim. Carvalho v. Equifax 5 Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 890 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1163 (“[A] 6 furnisher does not report ‘incomplete or inaccurate’ information within the meaning of § 1681s– 7 2(b) simply by failing to report a meritless dispute.”). Plaintiff’s allegations as to the inaccuracy 8 of the information reported are conclusory: she alleges Defendant reported the account at issue “as 9 charged off,” and then alleges the information reported after the charge off was “inaccurate, 10 misleading, incomplete, and legally inconsistent, including but not limited to reporting balances, 11 delinquency status, or enforcement activity without accurate disclosure of the account’s true 12 status, ownership, or verification.” (Dkt. No. 13 at 6.) To be inaccurate, information must be 13 either “patently incorrect” or “misleading in such a way and to such an extent that it can be 14 expected to adversely affect credit decisions.” Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1163. To the extent Plaintiff’s 15 untimely opposition contends the inaccurate statement related to Defendant failure to record her 16 tender of $5,000 as a down payment, this is not alleged in her Amended Complaint, and even if it 17 were, Plaintiff does not allege this amount was reported to a CRA. (Dkt. No. 26.) Plaintiff’s 18 vague allegations are insufficient to support an inference of an actual inaccuracy. 19 Second, in determining whether a furnisher’s investigation was reasonable, “[t]he pertinent 20 question is ... whether the furnisher’s procedures were reasonable in light of what it learned about 21 the nature of the dispute from the description in the CRA’s notice of dispute.” Gorman, 584 F.3d 22 at 1157. Plaintiff has not alleged any facts supporting an inference Defendant’s investigation was 23 unreasonable. See O’Connor v. Cap. One, N.A., No. CV 14-00177-KAW, 2014 WL 2215965, at 24 *7 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2014) (dismissing where plaintiff “failed to offer any factual allegations 25 supporting his contention that Defendant’s investigation of his disputed account was 26 unreasonable” and collecting cases re: same). 27 As Plaintiff’s FRCA claim is predicated on conclusory allegations, Defendant’s motion to C. No Other Basis Federal Question Jurisdiction 1 Plaintiff’s remaining federal claims also fail. Plaintiff’s fifth claim for injunctive and 2 declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 are improper as these are remedies not a 3 standalone claim. See Riganian v. LiveRamp Holdings, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1095 (N.D. 4 Cal. 2025) (dismissing cause of action for declaratory and injunctive relief with prejudice as 5 subsumed within the prayer for relief and “not[ing] that [plaintiffs] may still seek declaratory and 6 injunctive relief should they prevail on their claims.”). Plaintiff’s tenth claim for deprivation of 7 property without due process in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is likewise 8 improper. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 930 (1982) (“the Due Process Clause 9 protects individuals only from governmental and not from private action”); Jackson v. Metro. 10 Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974) (“the Fourteenth Amendment offers no shield” against 11 “private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful”). 12 D. State Law Claims 13 The Court declines to address Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s remaining claims 14 which all arise under state law. Defendant removed this action to federal court based on federal 15 question jurisdiction and this is the sole basis for the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.3 (Dkt. 16 No. 1 at ¶ 7.) “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject 17 matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). That is, if Plaintiff cannot 18 plead a viable federal claim, then the action must be remanded to state court. Royal Canin U.S.A., 19 Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 30 (2025) (holding if the federal law claims that enabled 20 removal are dismissed “leaving only state-law claims behind, the court’s power to decide the 21 dispute dissolves. With the loss of federal-question jurisdiction, the court loses as well its 22 supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims.”). 23 E. Other Pending Motions 24 Plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction with her Amended Complaint. (Dkt. No. 25 14.) The motion is predicated on her likelihood of success on her ADA claim. (Id. at 2.) Because 26 27 1 the Court dismisses this claim, Plaintiff cannot show a likelihood of success and thus the motion 2 || for preliminary injunction is denied. See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 3 2015) (“Because it is a threshold inquiry, when a plaintiff has failed to show the likelihood of 4 || success on the merits, we need not consider the remaining three Winter elements.”) (cleaned up). 5 Plaintiff's unopposed motion to amend the caption to change the Plaintiff to 6 || “Sonjhai Meggette Living Trust, by its Trustee sonjhai meggette el” is granted. (Dkt. No. 23.) 7 CONCLUSION 8 For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to □□□□□□□□□□□ 9 || federal claims. This dismissal is without leave to amend except as to Plaintiffs Title II] ADA 10 || claim and her FCRA claim. Alternatively, Plaintiff may elect not to amend these claims and 11 instead proceed on her state law repossession related claims in state court. Plaintiff shall file an 12 || amended complaint or a statement that she does not intend to amend by March 26, 2026. Plaintiff 13 may not add new claims or parties without first obtaining permission from the Court. 14 Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED. (Dkt. No. 14.) 3 15 Plaintiff's motion to amend the caption is GRANTED. (Dkt. No. 23.) 16 This Order disposes of Docket Nos. 14, 21, 23. oi IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 || Dated: February 27, 2026

20 me JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLE 2] United States District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28