Sonja Wilde-Devries, Surety for Quinton William Dunn v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky
• Decided: July 11, 2025
• Docket: 2024-CA-0213
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RENDERED: JULY 11, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals

NO. 2024-CA-0213-MR

SONJA WILDE-DEVRIES, SURETY FOR QUINTON WILLIAM DUNN APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE SUSAN SCHULTZ GIBSON, JUDGE CASE NOS. 22-CR-002602 & 23-CR-002252

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

OPINION AFFIRMING

** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; KAREM AND TAYLOR, JUDGES

KAREM, JUDGE: Sonja Wilde-Devries1 appeals from a Jefferson Circuit Court

order directing the forfeiture of a $100,000 bond2 she posted to secure the release

1 We are using the spelling of the appellant’s surname as it appears in the notice of appeal. 2 The terms “bond” and “bail” are used interchangeably. of a criminal defendant, Quinton Dunn. Wilde-Devries argues that (1) she was not

afforded adequate due process prior to the order of forfeiture; (2) she was unjustly

held responsible for Dunn’s behavior; and (3) the amount of the forfeiture was

excessive. Upon careful review, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In December 2022, Dunn was indicted in Jefferson County on

seventeen counts of robbery in the first degree, two counts of wanton

endangerment in the first degree, and one count of possession of a handgun by a

convicted felon. His bond was set at $100,000, full cash, with the condition that he

have no new arrests or violations of the law. Because Dunn was on parole for

previous robbery convictions at that time, the indictment caused his parole to be

revoked. Thus, Dunn served the remainder of the sentence and was released on

October 12, 2023. However, he remained in custody on the charges arising out of

the December 2022 indictment wherein the judge had set a $100,000 conditional

bond. On the next day, October 13, 2023, Wilde-Devries posted the $100,000

bond. She signed an AOC 365.1 form which listed the conditions of Dunn’s

release. These included: no further violations of law and no illegal use/possession

of firearms or other deadly weapons. The form also stated that if Dunn failed to

comply with the conditions of release, the court could order forfeiture of the bond.

Wilde-Devries signed the signature box which contained the statement “I

-2- undertake that [Dunn] will appear and be amenable to the orders and process of

this and any other court in which this proceeding may be pending[.]”

On October 28, 2023, Dunn was arrested in Todd County for

conspiring with an incarcerated acquaintance to escape. He was arraigned on

October 30, 2023. Wilde-Devries posted his bond of $2,500 and signed another

AOC 365.1 form. Dunn was then out of custody once more.

Based on the Todd County charges, the Commonwealth in Jefferson

County moved to forfeit the $100,000 bond and to increase the bond amount. The

circuit court scheduled a bond forfeiture hearing for December 4, 2023. In the

meantime, from November 10 to 15, 2023, Dunn allegedly committed fifteen

additional armed robberies. He was indicted on fifteen new counts of robbery, one

count of being a felon in possession of a handgun and being a first-degree

persistent felony offender.

At the hearing on December 4, 2023, Dunn’s counsel acknowledged

the new indictment in Jefferson County, stipulated that Dunn had violated the

conditions of his bond, and agreed to a bond increase. Dunn’s bond was increased

to $500,000, full cash. Wilde-Devries was present for the hearing with her

attorney but did not object or seek to participate in any way. The circuit court

passed the forfeiture decision to a combined pretrial conference/bond forfeiture

hearing.

-3- At that hearing, which was conducted on January 12, 2024, Dunn’s

counsel informed the court that a global plea agreement to resolve the charges in

both Jefferson County cases was almost complete. Dunn and his attorney were

thereafter excused, and the forfeiture hearing proceeded.

Wilde-Devries’s counsel argued that Dunn’s stipulation was

insufficient evidence to support forfeiture and that an adversarial hearing was

required at which the detectives and police officers involved in the case would be

required to testify about the violation. He argued that Dunn could not waive

Wilde-Devries’s right to this type of hearing, and Dunn’s stipulation could not bind

her.

The circuit court found that Dunn’s stipulation that he had violated the

conditions of his bond by getting arrested for additional crimes obviated the need

for such an evidentiary hearing. The court found, by clear and convincing

evidence, a willful violation of the conditions of the bond. The court then heard

mitigating evidence regarding whether the bond should be revoked.

Wilde-Devries testified that she and Dunn had been married by a

minister, but the legal paperwork had not yet been filed. She was earning $18.60

per hour as an assistant instructor for Jefferson County Public Schools. She and

Dunn lived together after she posted the bond, but she was unaware he had planned

a new crime spree and stated that if she had known, she would have tried to stop

-4- him. She testified she would have to sell her house to pay back the money she had

borrowed for the bond. On cross-examination, she testified she met Dunn in 2022

when he was on parole for robbery convictions. She testified that she discussed

with Dunn his plan to enter a guilty plea to the charges and that she had signed a

form when posting his bond stating the conditions of his release. She

acknowledged she was aware he was to have no new violations of the law and that

she took that risk by posting the money for him. She also admitted she did not

expect to get the bond money back.

The circuit court entered written findings of fact, conclusions of law,

and ordered the $100,000 bond to be forfeited. The court held that counsel for the

surety had provided no authority for the proposition that the surety has an

independent right to a presentation of evidence regarding the alleged violation of

the conditions of the bond, noting that the surety and her counsel were present at

the hearing at which Dunn had stipulated that he had violated the conditions of his

bond and had raised no objection to the stipulation. The court found ample

justification for the revocation of the full amount of the bond, $100,000, finding

that Wilde-Devries, with full knowledge that Dunn had violated the conditions of

his bond, posted another bond in Todd County, and thereby made possible the

commission of fifteen additional armed robberies.

This appeal by Wilde-Devries followed.

-5- As a preliminary matter, the Commonwealth requests us to strike the

appellant’s brief or, in the alternative, to review her arguments for palpable error

only, because the brief fails to comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure

(RAP) in two significant respects: it contains no preservation statement as

required by RAP 32(A)(4) and it does not make ample references to the record as

required by RAP 32(A)(3) and (4). Compliance with these promotes “meaningful

and efficient review by directing the reviewing court to the most important aspects

of the appeal[,] [such as] what facts are important and where they can be found in

the record[.]” Koester v. Koester, 569 S.W.3d 412, 414 (Ky. App. 2019) (citation

omitted). “[A]n appellant preserves for appellate review only those issues fairly

brought to the attention of the trial court. . . . A new theory of error cannot be

raised for the first time on appeal.” Elery v. Commonwealth, 368 S.W.3d 78, 97-

98 (Ky. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

“Our options when an appellate advocate fails to abide by the rules

are: (1) to ignore the deficiency and proceed with the review; (2) to strike the brief

or its offending portions, [RAP 31(H)(1)]; or (3) to review the issues raised in the

brief for manifest injustice only[.]” Barnette v. Evans, 697 S.W.3d 749, 755 (Ky.

App. 2024) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

The record in this case is relatively small. Wilde-Devries presented

her arguments regarding her right to an evidentiary hearing and the alleged

-6- excessiveness of the bond in her arguments before the trial court at the forfeiture

hearing, and they will be reviewed here. But we have not been able to determine,

in our review of the record, where or if she argued she was improperly being held

responsible for Dunn’s behavior. Consequently, this argument will be reviewed

for manifest injustice only. And, counsel should note, such lax adherence to the

rules may not be so leniently dealt with in the future.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Bonds are permitted by the court for the convenience of a person not

yet proved to be guilty, and to protect the state against the expense of keeping such

persons in jail.” Clemons v. Commonwealth, 152 S.W.3d 256, 258-59 (Ky. App.

2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A surety is “a person other

than the defendant who executes a bail bond and assumes the obligations therein.”

Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 4.00(g). If a criminal defendant

“neglect[s] to comply with the obligations of the bond, it [is] proper for the lower

court to order a forfeiture thereof.” Briggs v. Commonwealth, 185 Ky. 340, 214

S.W. 975, 979 (1919). “Bonds are discretionary, and the decision to impose,

forfeit, or remit bonds lies solely with the trial court.” Clemons, 152 S.W.2d at

259 (citations omitted). A trial court abuses its discretion in revoking a bond if its

ruling is “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal

principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).

-7- ANALYSIS

Wilde-Devries argues that the trial court’s reliance on Dunn’s

stipulation that he violated the terms of his probation infringed on her due process

rights because she should have been afforded a separate evidentiary hearing to

contest the finding. She contends that the stipulation was part of Dunn’s counsel's

strategy in resolving the two individual indictments and that her rights as the surety

should have been considered separately. At the forfeiture hearing, her attorney

argued that she should have been allowed to call the investigating police officers as

witnesses to testify about Dunn’s new offenses.

The Rules of Criminal Procedure do not provide for a separate “surety

hearing.” Before bail may be forfeited, RCr 4.42 requires the trial court to conduct

an adversary hearing for the defendant and the surety which comports with due

process:

Before the court may make the findings required for change of conditions or forfeiture of bail under this rule, the defendant and the defendant’s surety or sureties shall be granted an adversary hearing comporting with the requirements of due process. Whenever the court changes conditions of release (except upon motion of the defendant) or orders forfeiture of bail, it must furnish the defendant and the defendant’s surety or sureties with written reasons for so doing.

RCr 4.42(5).

-8- “[T]he Due Process Clause provides that certain substantive rights –

life, liberty, and property – cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally

adequate procedures.” Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metropolitan Government v.

Moore, 701 S.W.3d 335, 345-46 (Ky. 2024) (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.

Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 84 L. Ed. 2d 494 (1985)). “The

essential requirements of due process . . . are notice and an opportunity to

respond.” Id. (quoting Dep’t of Revenue, Finance and Admin. Cabinet v. Wade,

379 S.W.3d 134, 138 (Ky. 2012)). “The hearing at which the individual can

respond ‘must be “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”’” Id.

(citation omitted).

Wilde-Devries and her counsel were present at the hearing at which

Dunn’s attorney made the stipulation, but they did not challenge it. She now

implies that the stipulation was a strategic decision made solely in the context of

Dunn’s criminal cases and cannot be used in her case. Further, although she

demands a full evidentiary hearing, she cautions that Dunn cannot be asked to

testify as it might implicate his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.

Although due process requires notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard, it

does not require a mini-trial, complete with witnesses, to determine whether a

defendant is actually guilty of committing a criminal offense before bond may be

forfeited. Wilde-Devries was provided with ample notice that Dunn had stipulated

-9- to violating the conditions of his probation. She was present in the courtroom,

with her counsel, when Dunn’s attorney informed the court of the stipulation. She

does not dispute that she was provided with notice of that hearing and of the

forfeiture hearing. She raised no objection to Dunn’s stipulation, nor did she seek

to call additional witnesses at the forfeiture hearing. The requirements of due

process were met because she was afforded ample notice and an opportunity to

respond.

Wilde-Devries’s next argument is unpreserved and will be reviewed

for manifest injustice only. She contends that the primary purpose of a bond is to

ensure the defendant’s appearance in court, and that she was improperly held

responsible for Dunn’s behavior because she had no control or ability to prevent

him from being charged with a new offense. She argues that, traditionally,

subsequent incarceration exonerated the surety and contends that our more recent

cases reflect a misguided belief that the surety has some extra authority over a

defendant.

A surety is defined as “a person other than the defendant who

executes a bail bond and assumes the obligations therein.” RCr 4.00(g)

(emphasis supplied). Our Court has expressly held that the General Assembly

intended the courts to have the option to forfeit for non-financial violations:

KRS 431.545 plainly states that bond forfeiture is appropriate if a defendant “shall willfully fail to appear

-10- or shall willfully fail to comply with the conditions of his release . . . .” Likewise, RCr 4.42 states:

(1) If at any time following the release of the defendant and before the defendant is required to appear for trial the court is advised of a material change in the defendant’s circumstances or that the defendant has not complied with all conditions imposed upon his or her release, the court having jurisdiction may order the defendant’s arrest and require the defendant or the defendant’s surety or sureties to appear and show cause why the bail bond should not be forfeited or the conditions of release be changed, or both.

Clemons, 152 S.W.3d at 259 (emphasis in the original) (citations omitted).

Wilde-Devries posted bond for Dunn twice, in full awareness of his

criminal history. On both occasions she signed a form indicating she understood

the bond could be forfeited if Dunn violated the terms of his release. The terms of

release were clearly stated on the form. She does not claim she was coerced or

misled or did not understand what she was signing. We are not at liberty to ignore

KRS 431.545 or our case law, which clearly contemplate the forfeiture of the bond

if the conditions of release are violated. The trial court’s decision to order

forfeiture of the bond was fully supported by our legal precedent and by the facts

of this case, and certainly did not rise to the level of manifest injustice.

Finally, Wilde-Devries argues that the forfeiture of the entire amount

of the bond was excessive. She contends that the decision failed to meet the

-11- factors for determining the amount of a forfeiture outlined in an unpublished

opinion of this Court, Martin v. Commonwealth, No. 2002-CA-002288-MR, 2003

WL 22681798 (Ky. App. Nov. 14, 2003). After making the initial determination

that the violation was willful, the court may consider the following factors:

the seriousness of the condition violated; the deterrence value of the forfeiture; the cost, inconvenience, prejudice, or potential prejudice suffered by the Commonwealth as a result of the breach; whether forfeiture will vindicate a serious injury to the public interest; the appropriateness of the amount of the bond; and any mitigating factors presented by the defendant.

Martin, 2003 WL 22681798 at *2.

The trial court made the following findings to support its decision to

forfeit the bond, and in the full amount:

The Court has found by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant willfully violated the conditions of bond, based on the subsequent offenses for which Defendant stands charged. The Court finds ample justification for the revocation of the full $100,000 posted by Ms. Wilde- Devries. The Court has been presented with no authority that it is required to consider the financial circumstances of the surety when making a decision as to bond forfeiture. While counsel for Ms. Wilde-Devries argued that she would lose her home and it was implied that the “borrowed” money would need to be paid back, Ms. Wilde-Devries made no such claims. In fact, her testimony was very precisely worded so as not to support those inferences. In any event, Ms. Wilde-Devries, with full knowledge that Defendant had violated the conditions of bond in this case, willingly posted another bond in Todd County rather than petitioning this Court to return the posted $100,000 once Defendant was back in

-12- custody. In doing so, Ms. Wilde-Devries made possible fifteen additional armed robberies, all the while knowing that Defendant had no concern for the conditions of his bond.

Wilde-Devries argues that the trial court failed to make a finding by

clear and convincing evidence that Dunn willfully violated a condition of the bond

in a forfeiture hearing. As we have already determined, the trial court’s reliance on

Dunn’s stipulation did not violate Wilde-Devries’s due process rights. His

stipulation, and the evidence of the new charges against him, constituted clear and

convincing evidence to support the finding that his violation of the terms of his

release was willful.

Devries acknowledges that the probation condition Dunn violated was

one the court “appears to find quite serious,” but argues that none of the other

factors weigh in favor of forfeiture. She contends that taking her money will not

deter criminal behavior on the part of the defendant; that the Commonwealth will

suffer almost no cost, inconvenience, or prejudice; there was no serious injury to

the public interest; and the forfeiture simply punishes her for attempting to aid a

loved one. She contends that the forfeiture of the entire amount will have a

chilling effect on future sureties and places the jail system at risk of further

overcrowding.

The Commonwealth argues that the Martin factors all support the trial

court’s decision to forfeit the entire amount. It contends that Dunn’s commission

-13- of multiple armed robberies was a serious violation; that the forfeiture will have

the positive effect of deterring sureties from posting bond for crimes committed

while on parole and for crimes that violate the conditions of the first bond; that the

posting of the bonds allowed Dunn to commit multiple additional offenses that the

Commonwealth had to investigate and charge; that Dunn’s multiple offenses were

a serious injury to the public; and finally, that Wilde-Devries chose to post Dunn’s

bond twice even though she was familiar with his past criminal history.

In ordering the forfeiture of the entire bond, the trial court emphasized

the seriousness of Dunn’s violations; noted that Wilde-Devries chose to post bond

in Todd County with the knowledge that Dunn had violated his probation; and

emphasized that the posting of the bonds allowed Dunn to commit multiple

additional offenses. The trial court’s ruling is fully supported by clear and

convincing evidence; it is neither arbitrary, unreasonable, nor unfair, and it will not

be disturbed on appeal.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Jefferson Circuit Court

granting the motion for bond forfeiture is affirmed.

ALL CONCUR.

-14- BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE

Kevin M. Glogower Russell M. Coleman Louisville, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky

Shawn D. Chapman Deputy Solicitor General Frankfort, Kentucky

-15-