Sonia Feldman v. Mark Anthony Sawyer, et al.

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 * * *

4 SONIA FELDMAN, Case No. 2:24-cv-00526-JCM-MDC

5 Plaintiff, ORDER 6 v.

7 MARK ANTHONY SAWYER, et al.,

8 Defendants. 9 10 Presently before the court is plaintiff Sonia Feldman’s motion for attorney fees. (ECF No. 11 57). Defendants Mark Anthony Sawyer and Jennifer Ann Sawyer have not responded, and the time 12 to do so has now passed.1 13 Also before the court is plaintiff’s bill of costs. (ECF No. 58). No objection or tax bill of 14 costs was filed. 15 I. Background 16 Plaintiff Feldman invested in defendant Mark Sawyer’s purported “bridge loan program” to 17 the tune of $1,176,337.13. (ECF No. 56 at 1). To convince her to invest in the program, Sawyer 18 impressed upon Feldman that he would be more than able to double her money; however, upon 19 receipt, he spent it on personal matters. (Id.). 20 After repeated failed attempts to get Sawyer to pay back even a fraction of her money, 21 Feldman filed suit in Los Angeles Superior Court and then in this court. (Id. at 2). The promissory 22 notes litigated in this action contain a California choice of law provision. (ECF No. 57). 23 Specifically, the notes provide that the validity, enforceability, and interpretation of the agreement 24 are governed by California law. (Id.). 25

1 While defendant has failed to respond to the motion, that failure to respond does not constitute a consent to its 26 granting since the underlying motion is for attorney fees. See LR 7-2(d) (“The failure of an opposing party to file points and authorities in response to any motion, except a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 or a motion for attorney’s fees, 27 constitutes a consent to the granting of the motion.”). This court’s order granting default judgment stated that plaintiff 1 The court granted default judgment in favor of plaintiff on March 25, 2026, and judgment 2 has been entered in this case. (ECF No. 56). The only issues remaining are attorney fees and costs. 3 On April 14, 2026, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for contractual attorney fees in the 4 amount of $162,540.000. (ECF No. 57). Two days after the response deadline, on April 30, 2026, 5 defendants filed a notice that they are currently subject to bankruptcy proceedings, pursuant to 11 6 U.S.C § 362. (ECF No. 62). 7 II. Legal Standard 8 The filing of a bankruptcy petition triggers the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C § 362(a). The 9 court may determine the amount of fees and costs owed by the parties, but any enforcement or 10 collection of the award must be stayed unless and until the bankruptcy stay is lifted or otherwise 11 terminated. NRS 18.010. 12 “In an action involving state law claims, we apply the law of the forum state to determine 13 whether a party is entitled to attorneys’ fees, unless it conflicts with a valid federal statute or 14 procedural rule.” MRO Commc’ns, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 197 F.3d 1276, 1282 (9th Cir. 1999); 15 see also Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 259 (1975). When there is a valid 16 choice of law provision in a contract, the chosen state’s laws, including statutes and caselaw 17 interpreting those statutes, will control the action. Soro v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 411 P.3d 358, 18 363 (Nev. Ct. App. 2017). Under both California and Nevada law, reasonable attorney fees are 19 available when authorized by contract. NRS 18.010; Flamingo Realty, Inc. v. Midwest Dev., Inc., 20 879 P.2d 69, 73 (Nev. 1994); LCM Grp., Inc. v. Drexler, 997 P.2d 511, 515 (2000). 21 “In Nevada, the method upon which a reasonable fee is determined is subject to the discretion 22 of the court, which is tempered only by reason and fairness.” Shuette v. Beazer Homes Holdings 23 Corp., 124 P.3d 530, 549 (Nev. 2005). A court may “begin with any method rationally designed to 24 calculate a reasonable amount.” Id. Similarly, in California, “the amount to be awarded in attorney 25 fees is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.” PLCM Grp., Inc. v. Drexler, 997 P.2d 511,518 26 (Cal. 2000); see also Vella v. Hudgins 198 Cal. Rptr. 725 (Cal. App. 1984). 27 1 III. Discussion 2 Here, the promissory notes memorializing Feldman’s investment with Sawyer provide that 3 “attorney’s fees and costs … shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing parties.” 4 (ECF No. 56, Exs. 1 and 2). 5 “When calculating the amount of attorney fees to be awarded in litigation, the district court 6 applies the lodestar method, multiplying the number of hours expended by a reasonable hourly rate.” 7 Ryan v. Editions Ltd. W., Inc., 786 F.3d 754, 763 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 8 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). The reasonableness of the requested fee is then determined with reference to 9 the twelve Kerr factors:

10 (1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the 11 preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations 12 imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the 13 ‘undesirability’ of the case, (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar cases. 14 15 Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975). A district court may 16 reduce the amount of requested fees to reflect a party’s limited degree of success, to account for 17 block billing, or to deduct hours deemed excessive as long as it provides an adequate explanation 18 for its fee calculation. Ryan, 786 F.3d at 763. 19 A. Rate Requested 20 The controlling test for determining a reasonable hourly rate requires the rate to be “in line 21 with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable 22 skill, experience and reputation.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n.11 (1984); Welch v. Metro. 23 Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 946 (9th Cir. 2007). As a general rule, the court considers the reasonable 24 hourly rate in the relevant community, which is the forum in which the district court sits. Camacho 25 v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008). 26 Here, plaintiff’s counsel, Michael Michat, charged an hourly rate of $250, but requests the 27 court grant an hourly rate of $600. (ECF No. 57 at 8); (ECF No. 57-1 ¶ 17). He argues that this 1 reasonable in the related case, Feldman v. Sawyer, No. 23STCV26012. (ECF No. 57 at 7). But this 2 is not the rate at which he charged plaintiff for his work in this case. 3 Accordingly, the court will reduce the requested amount to reflect the $250 hourly rate agreed 4 upon by plaintiff and her counsel. 5 A $250 hourly rate is reasonable in Las Vegas, Nevada. For the Las Vegas market, this court 6 has regularly awarded fees where the hourly rates at issue were between $200 and $600. See, e.g., 7 Gibbs v. Rivers Transp. Grp., Inc., No. 2:13-cv-00935, 2014 WL 204928, at *3 (D. Nev. Jan. 17, 8 2014) (finding a $250 hourly rate reasonable in Las Vegas); Nicks v. PlusFour, Inc., No. 2:22-cv- 9 01683, 2023 WL 7042026, at *1 (D. Nev. Oct. 24, 2023) (finding a $475 hourly rate reasonably for 10 an experienced consumer-finance attorney within the context of a default judgment); United States 11 ex rel. Cretney-Tsosie v. Creekside Hospice II, LLC, No. 2:13-cv-00167, 2018 WL 4409367, at *4 12 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2018) (finding hourly rates between $250 and $630 reasonable in Las Vegas, 13 awarding $600/hour only at the very top of that documented range for a highly experienced attorney); 14 Lewis v. Caesars Entm’t Corp., No. 2:16-cvv-02787, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63188, at *28 n.10 (D. 15 Nev. Apr. 11, 2019) (finding a $200 hourly rate reasonable in Las Vegas in a default judgment 16 context involving state-law contract claims where the court independently assessed the rates as 17 reasonable ). 18 B. Hours Expended 19 The court must also determine whether the hours expended were reasonable. Hours that are 20 excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary should be excluded from the fee award. McCown v. 21 City of Fontana, 565 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009). The prevailing party bears the burden of 22 submitting billing records sufficient to establish that the hours requested were reasonably expended. 23 Gonzales v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1202–03 (9th Cir. 2013). 24 After reviewing the billing records submitted to the court, the court finds the 135.9 hours 25 expended on this case to be reasonable. 26 Plaintiff also requests that the court grant $81,000 in attorney fees for the time expended on 27 litigation in the related case in Los Angeles Superior Court. The court denies this request because 1 attorney’s fees for the work performed in the California action and awarded those fees on December 2 6, 2024. (ECF No. 57, Ex. 3). Thus, plaintiff’s counsel has already recovered reasonable attorney’s 3 fees for the work performed in that case. 4 IV. Conclusion 5 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the case be 6 stayed. 7 IT IS ALSO ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees (ECF No. 57) be, and the 8 same hereby is, GRANTED in part. 9 Plaintiff is awarded attorney fees in the amount of $33,975.00 for the services provided by 10 Machat & Associates, PC. The amount of $33,975.00 is calculated by multiplying 135.9 hours by 11 $250. Pursuant to the stay on this case, payment shall be withheld pending the resolution of the 12 bankruptcy proceedings. Upon resolution of such proceedings, the parties are ORDERED to provide 13 notice to the court of such resolution and a copy of the bankruptcy court’s order along with any other 14 relevant documents. 15 Dated this 26th day of June, 2026. 16

17 JAMES C. MAHAN 18 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27