Songhui Martin v. Department of Defense

Merit Systems Protection Board·Decided April 29, 2026·No. SF-0752-22-0196-I-2·Unpublished

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

SONGHUI MARTIN, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, SF-0752-22-0196-I-2

v.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DATE: April 29, 2026 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Bradley R. Marshall , Mt. Pleasant, South Carolina, for the appellant.

Douglas Frison , Esquire, APO, APO/FPO Pacific, for the agency.

BEFORE

Henry J. Kerner, Vice Chairman James J. Woodruff II, Member

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed this appeal asserting that the appellant’s September 2020 resignation was involuntary. The initial decision dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, while also finding the appeal untimely. On petition for review, the appellant argues, among other things, that she made a nonfrivolous allegation of an involuntary

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

resignation entitling her to a hearing and that she showed good cause to excuse her delay in filing her appeal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 1 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW The appellant failed to establish jurisdiction. On review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge improperly denied jurisdiction based on a summary review of the evidence, in which he weighed evidence in violation of Ferdon v. U.S. Postal Service, 60 M.S.P.R. 325, 329 (1994). Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 12-13, 16-17. In Ferdon, 60 M.S.P.R. at 329, the Board stated that in determining whether an appellant has made a nonfrivolous allegation of jurisdiction, an administrative judge may consider an agency’s documentary submissions, but to the extent that the agency’s evidence constitutes mere factual contradiction of the appellant’s otherwise adequate prima facie showing of jurisdiction, the Board may not weigh

1 The appeal of the appellant’s rescinded removal, Martin v. Department of Defense, MSPB Docket No. SF-0752-19-0687-I-4, will be adjudicated in a separate decision. 3

evidence and resolve conflicting assertions of the parties and the agency’s evidence may not be dispositive. It is apparent that the administrative judge centered his denial of jurisdiction on his review of the appellant’s pleadings and evidence. Martin v. Department of Defense, MSPB Docket No. SF-0752-22- 0196-I-2, Appeal File, Tab 7, Initial Decision (ID) at 13-20. Although the administrative judge considered the agency’s evidence, ID at 16-19, we discern no instance in which he violated the proscriptions in Ferdon and find the appellant’s claim to be without merit. Next, we find that the appellant’s claim that the administrative judge improperly relied on whistleblower reprisal cases also lacks merit. PFR File, Tab 1 at 15. We fail to see any instance in which the administrative judge relied on inapplicable case law concerning whistleblower reprisal in denying jurisdiction. ID at 13-20. Finally, we need not consider the new evidence the appellant files on review, including the information contained in her declaration, because she fails to show that it was unavailable, despite the exercise of due diligence, before the record closed below. Grassell v. Department of Transportation, 40 M.S.P.R. 554, 564 (1989); Avansino v. U.S. Postal Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 213-14 (1980); PFR File, Tab 1 at 22-28. In any event, we fail to discern how the evidence would establish jurisdiction. Accordingly, the appellant affords no basis to disturb the administrative judge’s denial of jurisdiction.

The appellant failed to establish good cause for her untimely filing of her appeal. To support her claim that good cause excused the untimely filing of her appeal, the appellant argues on review that a case the administrative judge relied upon in finding her appeal untimely filed, Gordy v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 736 F.2d 1505 (Fed. Cir. 1984), is inapplicable. PFR File, Tab 1 at 11. To the extent the appellant argues that there is a material difference between the facts of Gordy and her case, we agree. The petitioner’s appeal in Gordy was found untimely filed because he was aware that the Board was the proper forum for his appeal over 3 months before he filed his Board appeal. 736 F.2d at 1508. 4

In contrast, the appellant’s failure to meet her burden of showing diligence was due to her failure to present any evidence on appeal regarding when she learned of her appeal rights. Thus, although Gordy can be distinguished from the present case, the administrative judge’s reliance on Gordy does not warrant disturbing his ultimate conclusion that the appeal was untimely filed. Finally, among other new evidence she files on review, the appellant submits a sworn declaration in which she claims not to have learned that she could file a constructive removal appeal until she was so informed by her current representative in “late December, 2021.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 23. Again, we need not consider the information contained in the declaration because the appellant fails to show that it was unavailable, despite the exercise of due diligence, before the record closed below. Grassell, 40 M.S.P.R. at 564. Assuming, however, it is true that the appellant only became aware of her appeal rights in late December 2021, she fails to state when she learned of her appeal rights with sufficient precision to have shown good cause. The Board has found that appellants who were not afforded official notices of their appeal rights but who filed appeals within 30 days of discovering those rights showed sufficient diligence to establish good cause. See, e.g., Carroll v. U.S. Postal Service, 87 M.S.P.R. 570, ¶¶ 7, 11 (2001); O’Leary v. Office of Personnel Management, 86 M.S.P.R. 87, ¶¶ 13-14 (2000). However, the Board has upheld dismissals of appeals or petitions for review filed as little as 1 day late absent good cause. Lands v. Department of the Air Force, 95 M.S.P.R. 593, ¶¶ 2-3, 6-7 (2004); Davis v. Department of the Navy, 52 M.S.P.R 450, 453 (1992); McAdory v.

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