Sommer Corporation v. United Fruit Company, Defendant-Third Party v. Panama Canal Company, Third Party

Third Circuit

Sommer Corporation v. United Fruit Company, Defendant-Third Party v. Panama Canal Company, Third Party

479 F.2d 1131, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 9788, 1973 A.M.C. 1884

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit

DecidedMay 23, 1973

Docket73-1147

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 479 F.2d 1131 (Sommer Corporation v. United Fruit Company, Defendant-Third Party v. Panama Canal Company, Third Party) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Sommer Corporation v. United Fruit Company, Defendant-Third Party v. Panama Canal Company, Third Party, 479 F.2d 1131, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 9788, 1973 A.M.C. 1884 (3d Cir. 1973).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Sommer Corporation sued United Fruit Company to recover damages to cargo shipped aboard United’s vessel, the HAR BOKER. Damage to at least one piece of cargo occurred during loading operations by stevedores and longshoremen in the employ of the Panama Canal Company. United tendered defense of Sommer’s suit to the Canal Company but this offer was rejected. United then impleded the company as third party defendant.

The United States District Court for the Canal Zone ruled that under the Carriage of Goods at Sea Act United’s liability was limited to $500.00, and further held that United was entitled to recover any amount due Sommer from the Canal Company. As part of these indemnity damages, the district court allowed United to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee of $500.00.

The Panama Canal Company appeals from that part of the district court’s judgment which permitted United to recover attorney’s fees. In support of its position, the company relies solely on the prohibition in 28 U.S.C. § 2412 which forbids the awarding of attorney’s fees as costs against the United States. We affirm the district court.

It is well-established that attorney’s fees are a part of the damages in a ship owner’s indemnity action. Strachan Shipping Co. v. Koninklyke Nederlandsche S.M., N.V., 5 Cir. 1963, 324 F.2d 746; T. Smith & Son v. Skibs A/S Hassel, 5 Cir. 1966, 362 F.2d 745. *1133 Furthermore, the Panama Canal Company is obligated to indemnify a ship owner for its negligence just as a private stevedore would be. Sandoval & Panama Canal Co. v. Mitsui, 5 Cir. 1972, 460 F.2d 1163.

Thus, the attorney’s fees allowed in this case were damage items arising from an indemnity obligation, not fees taxed as “costs” within the meaning of that term in 28 U.S.C. § 2412. The bar to the recovery of attorney’s fees found in that section is therefore inapplicable and the order of the district court requiring the Canal Company to pay United a reasonable figure for attorney’s fees is

Affirmed.

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