Somerville v. St. Louis M. & M. Co.

127 P. 464, 46 Mont. 268, 1912 Mont. LEXIS 115
CourtMontana Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 26, 1912
DocketNo. 3,241
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 127 P. 464 (Somerville v. St. Louis M. & M. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Montana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Somerville v. St. Louis M. & M. Co., 127 P. 464, 46 Mont. 268, 1912 Mont. LEXIS 115 (Mo. 1912).

Opinion

MR. JUSTICE HOLLOWAY

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The St. Louis Mining and Milling Company is- a domestic corporation, organized under the provisions of Chapter 25, Division 5, General Laws, Compiled Statutes of 1887, wúth a capital stock of $5,000,000, represented by 500,000 shares of the par value of $10 each. The certificate of incorporation and every stock certificate issued prior to 1901 recites that the stock of the corporation is nonassessable. In 1901 a meeting of the stockholders of the corporation was held, at which 304,680 shares were represented in person, and 52,590 shares by proxy. William Mayger was present, representing in person 152,780 shares, and, with proxies held by him, voted 184,020 shares. Charles F. Mayger was present, representing in person 151,900 shares, and, with proxies held by him, voted 173,050 shares. At the time 44,000 shares of the capital stock were held in- the treasury of the company. At this meeting 357,070 shares were voted by William and Charles F. Mayger, in person and by proxies, in-favor of changing the capital stock from nonassessable to assessable stock, and' there were not any votes cast against the proposition. William Mayger, as the holder of 184,020 shares in person and by proxy, gave his consent in writing, spread upon the corporation’s records, to the change, and Charles F. Mayger, as the holder of 173,050 shares in person and by proxy, gave the like consent. Due notice was given of the meeting, and the proper certificates were prepared and filed, certifying to the change. Assuming to act upon the authority thus conferred, several assessments were levied and collected without [273]*273protest. On June 6,1912, another assessment was levied. These plaintiffs, as stockholders, refused to pay the assessment and brought this action to restrain the officers, directors and agents of the company from selling their stock upon which the assessment was delinquent. The district court refused to grant an injunction after a hearing, and plaintiffs appealed from the order.

At the time the defendant corporation was organized, there were in force Chapters 25 and 26, Division 5, Compiled Statutes, above. Chapter 25 deals with the formation and government of industrial corporations generally, while Chapter 26 deals with the subject “Assessments upon the Stock of Corporations.” Section 466 of Chapter 25 provides: “The legislature may at any time alter, amend or repeal this Chapter.” Chapter 26 provides generally for levying and collecting assessments upon corporate stock. Section 512 of that chapter declares: “The provisions of this Chapter shall only apply to such corporations hereafter formed, as shall specify in its articles of incorporation the fact that the stock of such corporation shall be assessable; and any company or corporation hereafter formed, that wishes to avail itself of the provisions of this Chapter, and render its stock assessable, shall specify in its articles of incorporation, in addition to the statement now required by law, a statement to the effect that the stock of such corporation is assessable. ’' Section 2, Article XV, of our state Constitution, reads as follows: “No charter of incorporation shall be granted, extended, changed or amended by special law, * * * but the legislative assembly shall provide by general law for the organization of corporations hereafter to be created: provided, that any such laws shall be subject to future repeal or alterations by the legislative assembly.” Section 394, Civil Codes of 1895 (Rev. Codes, sec. 3809), declares: “Every grant of corporate power is subject to alteration, suspension or repeal, in the discretion of the legislative assembly.” By an Act approved March 7, 1893 (Laws 1893, p. 92), it is provided: “Any corporation heretofore formed under the laws of this state, may, by and with [274]*274the consent of the stockholders holding two-thirds of the stock of the company, in writing, spread upon the records of such corporation, render its stock assessable, under the provisions of this Chapter.” This last Act was brought forward into the Codes of 1895 as section 511 (Rev. Codes, sec. 3888), and was in full force and effect at the time the stockholders’ meeting was held in 1901.

1. The proceedings of the stockholders’ meeting are attacked, and it is said that the consent of the holders of two-thirds of the capital stock was not given to the change, (a) because the proxies held by William and Charles F. Mayger only authorized the holders to vote the stock, and did not authorize them to consent to this change; and (b) if this be so, then the holders of only 304,680 shares gave such consent. It is unnecessary to determine the effect of the proxies; for at the time the meeting was held 44,000 shares, of the capital stock were in the treasury [1] of the corporation, leaving only 456,000 shares outstanding. When the statute (sec. 511, Civil Code) speaks of two-thirds of the stock of the corporation, it refers to outstanding, votable stock. (Market St. Ry. Co. v. Hellman, 109 Cal. 571, 42 Pac. 225; 2 Cook on Corporations, 6th ed., see. 613.) The two Maygers represented in person more than two-thirds of the 456,000 shares outstanding, 'and each votéd his stock in favor of the change and consented in writing to the change. So far as disclosed by the record, the proceedings taken to render the stock assessable were taken in compliance with the law and were effective for the purpose, if the statute under which the change was sought to be made was valid.

2. Certain principles of the law relating to corporations are so well settled that, as to them, there is not any difference of opinion. (1) The charter granted by a state to corporation, when accepted, becomes a “contract” within the meaning of the contract clause of the federal Constitution. (Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 4 L. Ed. 629.) (2) Such contract operates in a threefold relationship, viz.: (a) Between the state and the corporation; (b) between the corporation and [275]*275its stockholders; and (c) between the stockholders inter sese. (3) A state may reserve the right to alter or amend the charter of a corporation, or to alter, amend, or repeal the laws under which the corporation was organized. And (4) the provisions of our state Constitution and the statutes referred to above constitute such a reservation of power and authority.

Counsel for appellants insist, however, that this reserved [2 and 3] power can be invoked to affect the contract, only as it exists between the state and the corporate entity, and that if, by enacting section 511, Civil Code above, it was the purpose of the legislature to provide for a change in the contract so far as it exists between the corporation and its stockholders, or between the stockholders inter sese, then the Act operates to impair the obligation of such contract and is void as contravening the provisions of section 10, Article I, of the Constitution of the United States. New questions have vexed the courts and text-writers more than the one arising over the construction to be given the reservation which the states make respecting corporations organized under their respective laws. If the question was an open one in this jurisdiction, its discussion might lead to fruitful results; but in Allen v. Ajax Min. Co., 30 Mont. 490, 77 Pac. 47, the contention here made was considered at length and the entire subject fully discussed. .

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
127 P. 464, 46 Mont. 268, 1912 Mont. LEXIS 115, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/somerville-v-st-louis-m-m-co-mont-1912.