Soltis v. Tasir

469 A.2d 1157, 79 Pa. Commw. 551, 1984 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 1128
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJanuary 13, 1984
DocketAppeal, No. 2492 C.D. 1982
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 469 A.2d 1157 (Soltis v. Tasir) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Soltis v. Tasir, 469 A.2d 1157, 79 Pa. Commw. 551, 1984 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 1128 (Pa. Ct. App. 1984).

Opinion

Opinion by

Judge Baebiebi,

Appellants, residents in the immediate vicinity of property owned by the appellees, A. E. Tasir and Joyce Wahlah, appeal from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County which affirmed a decision of the Zoning Board of Adjustment (Board) of the City of Pittsburgh (City), granting the appellees’ request for a special exception1 to enlarge and rehabilitate their nonconforming structure. We reverse.

[553]*553The appellees are owners of property located in an area of the city zoned as a “R-2 Two Family Residence District,” permitting one or two family dwellings.2 The subject property is a three story brick residential structure whose history predates the City’s original zoning ordinance, passed in 1923, when the property was used as a private hospital/ sanitarium, a use continued until 1936, when the then owners of the property requested from the Board permission to convert the use of their property to that of a six family dwelling unit. The Board granted this request, noting that the City’s zoning ordinance provided at that time that a nonconforming use could be changed to another nonconforming use of the same or higher classification as a matter of right, without Board approval. It is undisputed that the use of the subject property as a hospital/sanitarium and as a six family unit, constituted a valid nonconforming use until 1936.

Subsequent to the owners’ request in 1936, later that same year, the owners requested from the Board that they be given permission to convert their property to that of a conforming use, a two family dwelling. This request was granted by the Board, although the Board found in the present proceedings, that the appellees’ property was never used as a two family dwelling, but rather continued as a six family unit. The Board also found that by 1950, four rooming quarters had been installed in the subject property, which under the City’s ordinance at that time, were permitted as of right in a six family unit.

In November 1981, the appellees applied to the Board for a special exception to enlarge and rehabili[554]*554tate their structure pursuant to Section 909.06(b) (17) of the City’s ordinance, which permits by way of a special exception, the enlargement and/or rehabilitation of a nonconforming structure or nonconforming use. Specifically, the appellees sought to:

1. Erect a one-story extension to the front of the existing building,
2. Erect a two-story extension to the rear of the existing building,
3. Occupy the structure as a ten unit multiple family dwelling with ten parking stalls,3
4. Reduce the front, yard requirement from 30' to 19.25',
5. Reduce the rear yard requirement from 30' to 20', and to
6. Reduce one side yard requirement from 15' to 6.27'.

The Board granted the appellees’ request,4 noting that a conversion to ten full units would not be more intensive than the existing use. The appellants, residents in the immediate vicinity of the appellees’ property, appealed this decision to the court of common pleas, which affirmed the Board’s decision, and the present appeal followed.

[555]*555Our scope of review where, as in the present case; no additional evidence was received by the trial court, is to determine whether the zoning board committed an abuse of discretion, or an error of law. Smith v. Board of Zoning Appeals of the City of Scranton, 74 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 405, 459 A.2d 1350 (1983).

While the appellants do not dispute the fact that the use of the appellees’ property was a valid nonconforming use from 1923 until 1936, it is the appellants’ position that the present owners were not entitled to a special exception under Section 909.06(b) (17) of the City’s ordinance since the Board’s second decision in 1936, approving a conforming use for the structure, operated as an abandonment of the nonconforming six family use.

In Marchese v. Norristown Borough Zoning Board of Adjustment, 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 84, 277 A.2d 176 (1971), we stated that

[t]he abandonment of a nonconforming use and the consequent termination of any legal rights thereto results from a concurrence of facts, circumstances, and the intention of the owner of the premises or other person entitled to the use. Intention with respect to the abandonment of a nonconforming use is to be ascertained from overt acts, a failure to act, as well as from statements.

Id. at 95, 277 A.2d at 183. See also Schaefer v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of the City of Pittsburgh, 62 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 104, 435 A.2d 289 (1982). Applying Márchese to the present case, we cannot accept the appellants’ position that the nonconforming use of the subject property was abandoned by virtue of the Board’s decision in 1936 approving a conforming use for the subject property, where no evidence was introduced and accepted by the Board to show [556]*556that a conforming nse was ever actually put into effect. Rather, the facts, circumstances, and actions in this case, as found by the Board and supported by substantial evidence, establish that the appellees’ property has been continuously used as a nonconforming use from 1936 until the present. As such, the appellees were entitled to apply for a special exception pursuant to Section 909.06(b)(17) of the City’s ordinance.

Our dismissal of the appellants’ first contention does not, however, determine whether or not the Board correctly granted the appellees’ request for a special exception. In this regard, the appellants argue that the proposed enlargement and rehabilitation of the appellees’ structure does not meet all the necessary requisites under Section 909.06(b) (17) for the granting of a special exception. We agree.

Section 909.06(b) (17) provides in pertinent part as follows:

C. In addition to the provision of Section 985.04, the proposed enlargement shall comply with all provisions including height, applicable to a similar conforming structure, and in no case shall there be a greater height or provision of less yard space for the enlarged portion than required for a conforming structure in the applicable district; (Emphasis added.)

Additionally, in the “R-2” district, wherein the appellees’ property is located, Section 931.04 of the City’s ordinance, pertaining to area requirements, provides in part that:

For the uses listed in Section 931.02 , . . there shall be provided and maintained a lot area, yards and other open spaces not less than prescribed in this section.
[557]*55730 feet
Front yard depth
Rear yard depth
Side yard width; each of two required Two-family dwelling

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Related

Repko v. Zoning Hearing Board
517 A.2d 1028 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 1986)

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Bluebook (online)
469 A.2d 1157, 79 Pa. Commw. 551, 1984 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 1128, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/soltis-v-tasir-pacommwct-1984.