Solter v. MacMillan

128 A. 356, 147 Md. 580, 1925 Md. LEXIS 130
CourtCourt of Appeals of Maryland
DecidedFebruary 26, 1925
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 128 A. 356 (Solter v. MacMillan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Solter v. MacMillan, 128 A. 356, 147 Md. 580, 1925 Md. LEXIS 130 (Md. 1925).

Opinion

*582 Adkins, J.,

delivered tibe opinion of the Court.

The appellant is the trustee in -bankruptcy of the Delion Tire and -Rubber Company, and 'the appellee is the assignee of a mortgage from that company to the Atlantic Trust Cbmpany, trustee, dated Eehruary 1st, 1922. ,The company Was, on December 274, 1923, adjudicated a bankrupt on the petition of creditors filed December 2-6th, 1923, and its answer filed the following day -admitted its insolvency.

The mortgage to the trust company conveyed all o-f the real estate o-f the mortgagor.

“Also all and singular the buildings, structures, and improvements located on the above described premises, all machinery, equipment, and fixtures in said buildings and structures, and on said premises * * * , now owned by the company or which it may hereafter acquire.
“Also all patents, patent rights and licenses, licenses under patents, trade marks, trade names, inventions, improvements, formulas, patterns, secrets and other processes now belonging to the company or which it may hereafter acquire.
“And all other property, real, personal and mixed, which the company may hereafter acquire, except the merchandise, materials, supplies, manufactured goods, goods in the course of manufacture, automobiles, automobile trucks, stocks of corporations, bonds and other securities, except notes and accounts receivable, hills of exchange, trade choses in action and except cash other than that due and payable to the trustee under any of the provisions hereof.”

'This mortgage Was -duly recorded in b-oith the land and chattel rectord-si -of Baltimore City. On default under the covenants and conditions of said mortgage, appellee, on Dteteember 22nd, 1923, instituted foreiafosiur© proceedings, and on Eehruary 6th, 1924-, .-after due advertisement, slold to tibe International Blank of Washington, Dl -0., the -holder of a majority of the mortgage bond's!, for $65,000, “all of the real and' leasehold estate, plant, equipment, structures, improve- *583 meats, nmchinery, fixtures, patents and all other property covered by said mortgage, being, -and constituting the plant of 'the Delion Tire -and Eubber Company.”

Included in the machinery and equipment wére certain articles purchased after the date of the mortgage, which appellant claimed were personal Chattels, and which had subsequently been conveyed to the mortgagee, ¡and to these he publicly claimed title -at the sale and protested ¡against their sale by appellee. O-n the sale being reported he filed exceptions to- its ratification. •

The trial court in its opinion -separated these articles into three Masses, as follows:

1. Machinery and equipment physically affixed to the realty casting $2,628.33.

2. Eings, molds -and cores, -costing $11,126.50.

3. Furniture and -office fixtures -and equipment costing $419.52.

The first and second classes the learned chancellor held to be fixtures, which went with the real estate under the mortgage. The third he held to be merely personal -chattels not subject to the mortgage, and he found the value thereof to be $315, and announced that if the purchaser at- the sale would pay or secure the payment of that sumí to- the trustee in bankruptcy he would overrule the -exceptions and ratify -the sale. This having been arranged, the sale wais ratified.

This -appeal is from the order overruling the exceptions and ratifying the sale.

It is conceded that the ruling, of the -chancellor was correct -as to the first and third Masses.

The sole question is: Did title to the artieles in the second Mass pass under the mortgage or -did it go> to- the- trustee in bankruptcy ? The determination of this question depends upon, whether -at the 'díate -of ithie institution of the bankruptcy proceedings these articles Were fixtures or metfely personal -chattels.

There is much discussion in the briefs .as to the effect of the -amendment of 1910 tot the Bankruptcy Act, Vesting a *584 trustee in bankruptcy “with all the rights, remedies and powers .of a creditor' ■ holding a, lien by legal or equitable proceedings * * * and with raid the rights., remedies and powers of a judgment creditor holding an execration duly returned unsatisfied * *

Giving that .amendment its utmost effect, the position of such trustee could not be better than, would have been that of a judgment creditor with an execution duly levied on the property in question at the date of the bankruptcy. And even if it were conceded, which we do. not decide, that the trustee in this easel held such a, position, our question would not be answered, because the relative positions of the mortgagee and such a judgment creditor, if there were any, would still depend upon whether the articles in question were covered by the mortgage of -an earlier date than that of the execution. It would be different if the controversy were between' .a trustee in bankruptcy and one holding .a defective mortgage. Most of the eases cited deal with situar tioms of that kind, and do not help, us in the present situation.

Here the question is the legal character of the articles in controversy as between the mortgagor and mortgagee.

There is no. subject as to. which the authorities are more hopelessly in conflict. But the law in Maryland on this subject was settled, in principle, by the ease of Dudley & Carpenter v. Hurst, Miller & Co., 67 Md. 44. In the much earlier ease of Kirwan v. Latour, 1 H. & J. 289, it had been held that in order to constitute a fixture a chattel must be .actually fastened to the soil. In the later ease, this Court, in overruling the earlier one, said:

“This ease was decided in 1802. But since the decision of that ease the doctrina of constructive .annexation has been much discussed. From the general current of decisions, the following principle seems clearly deduoiblei.
That where in the ease of machinery the principal part becomes a fixture by actual annexation to. the soil, such part of it as mlay be not so physically annexed, but which if re *585 moved would leave rthe principal thing unfit for use, and would not of itself and ¡standing alone be well adapted for general us© elsewhere, is considered constructively annexed.
Thus the key of a lock, the sail of a wind-mill, the leather belting of a saw-mill, although .actually severed from the principal thing, and stored elsewhere, pass by 'constructive annexation. They must bei .such as go> to complete the machinery, which is affixed to the land, and. which, if removed, would leave /the principal ¡thing incomplete .and unfit for use.”

And then, applying the principle .announced to the facts of that case, the Oourt continues:

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Bluebook (online)
128 A. 356, 147 Md. 580, 1925 Md. LEXIS 130, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/solter-v-macmillan-md-1925.