6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 7 AT SEATTLE 8
9 DENA SOLT, an individual, Case No. 2:24-cv-00112-RSM 10 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 11 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT v. 12
13 CSA AMERICA TESTING & CERTIFICATION LLC, d/b/a CSA GROUP, 14 a foreign limited liability company, et al.,
15 Defendant. 16
17 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant CSA America Testing & Certification 18 (“CSA”)’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. #71. Plaintiff Dena Solt has filed an opposition 19 brief. Dkt. #85. Neither party has requested oral argument. For the reasons below, the Court 20 GRANTS CSA’s Motion. 21 22 Plaintiff Solt worked for Defendant CSA from 2019 until her termination in April of 23 2023. She alleges wage claims for overtime and unpaid meal periods and rest breaks, breach of 24 contract, promissory estoppel, a hostile work environment, sex and age discrimination in 25 violation of RCW 49.60.180, and retaliation. See Dkt. #29. 26 27 Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine 28 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). Material facts are 1 2 those which might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 3 248. In ruling on summary judgment, a court does not weigh evidence to determine the truth of 4 the matter, but “only determine[s] whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Crane v. Conoco, 5 Inc., 41 F.3d 547, 549 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. O’Melveny & Meyers, 6 969 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir. 1992)). 7 8 On a motion for summary judgment, the court views the evidence and draws all 9 reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. 10 at 255; Sullivan v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 365 F.3d 827, 832 (9th Cir. 2004). However, the 11 nonmoving party must make a “sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with 12 13 respect to which she has the burden of proof” to survive summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. 14 Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of 15 the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could 16 reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251. 17 The Court will address each claim below. 18 19 A. Overtime Claim and Administrative Exemption 20 The Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) deals with overtime and minimum wage 21 requirements for employees. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219. Washington’s Minimum Wage
22 Requirements and Labor Standards, formerly known as the Minimum Wage Act (“MWA”), is 23 based upon the FLSA, and federal authority under the FLSA often provides helpful guidance. 24 25 Drinkwitz v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 140 Wn.2d 291, 298, 996 P.2d 582, 586 (2000). “The 26 FLSA requires employers to pay overtime to covered employees who work more than 40 hours 27 in a week.” Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 584 U.S. 79, 81 (2018) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 28 207(a)). However, the FLSA exempts from overtime pay “any employee employed in a bona fide 1 2 executive, administrative, or professional capacity.” 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). 3 An employee qualifying for the administrative exemption must (1) be compensated not 4 less than $455 per week; (2) perform as her primary duty “office or non-manual work related to 5 the management or general business operations of the employer or the employer's customers;” 6 and (3) have as her primary duty “the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with 7 8 respect to matters of significance.” McKeen-Chaplin v. Provident Sav. Bank, FSB, 862 F.3d 847, 9 850-51 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a)). “These three conditions are explicit 10 prerequisites to exemption, not merely suggested guidelines.” Id. at 851. The defendant bears 11 the burden of proving the exemption applies. Id. The “question of how an employee spends his 12 13 or her workday is one of fact, while the question of whether his or her activities exclude him or 14 her from the overtime-pay requirement is one of law.” Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 15 635 F.3d 383, 391 (9th Cir. 2011). 16 CSA paid Solt an annual salary of $135,000 as a Certifier III, which increased to $141,075 17 upon her promotion to Certification Specialist in January 2021. Dkt. #79 (“KC Fletcher Decl.”), 18 19 ¶ 3; Dkt. #115 at 2. Solt was paid on a biweekly basis. Dkt. #82, Ex. 2, (“Solt Dep.”) at 245:12- 20 17. The amount of compensation received by Plaintiff at all relevant times exceeded the $455 21 per week threshold, thus satisfying the first prong. 22 The parties dispute whether Solt’s primary duties were directly related to the management 23 or general business operations of CSA or its customers. To meet this requirement, the employee 24 25 “must perform work directly related to assisting with the running or servicing of the business, as 26 distinguished, for example, from working on a manufacturing production line or selling a product 27 in a retail or service establishment.” 29 C.F.R. 541.201(a). “Work directly related to management 28 or general business operations includes, but is not limited to, work in functional areas such as tax; 1 2 finance; accounting; budgeting; auditing; insurance; quality control; purchasing; procurement; 3 advertising; marketing; research; safety and health; personnel management; human resources; 4 employee benefits; labor relations; public relations, government relations; computer network, 5 internet and database administration; legal and regulatory compliance; and similar activities.” 29 6 C.F.R. 541.201(b). 7 8 CSA cites to the job description for Certifier III, which states the primary function of the 9 role is to “provid[e] certification services,” which requires the “interpretation of standards, 10 processes and procedures, as well as providing technical guidance; analysis; product testing 11 information; compliance and maintenance recommendations; technical reviews and independent 12 13 checks.” Dkt. #79-1 at 2. The Certification Specialist job description expands on these duties by 14 adding that the employee will “make[] technical decisions based on a high degree of knowledge, 15 training and professional experience to maintain the integrity of CSA’s global certification 16 programs.” Dkt. #79-2 at 2. CSA then lists Solt’s responsibilities described by her supervisor. 17 See Dkt. #71 at 10-11. According to her supervisor, Solt: 18 19 • Interviewed candidates and provided feedback based on interviews. Dkt. #73-1, (“KC 20 Fletcher Dep.”), 218:14-16. 21 • Contributed to the development and “continuous improvement of [CSA’s] service.” Id. 22 at 219:16-19. 23 24 • Drafted quality documents and suggested policy changes. Id. at 220:1-11. 25 • Evaluated product functionality to determine any modifications needed for the project 26 specific tracking sheet. Id. at 222:2-19. 27 28 • As the senior member of the ELD (“Electronic Logging Device”) program, influenced its 1 2 operations. Id. at 223:16-20. 3 • Designed and modified testing procedures for efficiency. Id. at 224:1-3, 225:11-18. Her 4 recommendations were provided to the PTL for publishing. Id. at 225:22-226:2. 5 • Created systems for storing project data, such as screen snaps, reports, and other items 6 7 generated by the ELD. Id. at 229:8-11. 8 • Was able to modify or deviate from testing procedures with PTL approval. Id. at 232:11- 9 17. 10 • Informed customers of non-compliance issues. Id. at 231:21-232:4. 11 12 • Coordinated with internal teams, including CSA's Technical Management Team, 13 salespeople, and the commercial unit, to ensure departments were aligned; outside 14 regulators to determine expectations; and customers regarding projects. KC Fletcher 15 Decl. at ¶¶ 15-16. 16 • Was qualified to, and did make, final decisions on whether a product should be certified 17 18 or not. Id. at ¶17. 19 • Independently identified issues and developed solutions before consulting her supervisor 20 with proposed solutions. Id. at ¶20. 21 Solt does not dispute that she performed office work, but she argues that her work was not 22 23 directly related to the management policies or general business operations of CSA or CSA’s 24 customers. Dkt. #86, (“Solt Decl. II”), ¶29. Solt contends that her “primary” duty was solely to 25 “take test results received from ELD testers and indicate whether that test result passed or failed 26 Transport Canada’s mandatory thresholds.” Dkt. #85 at 13. 27 28 The following facts are undisputed. Solt performed certification services of ELDs, which 1 2 required her to review ELD test results and compare the results to regulatory standards to 3 determine whether the device complied. Dkt. #85 at 3. Solt conducted three interviews of job 4 candidates for CSA and provided her feedback of said candidates. Solt Decl. II at ¶ 22. Solt 5 informed customers whether an ELD passed certification. Dkt. #72, (“Solt Decl.”), ¶ 24. Solt 6 advised management on issues within the ELD program concerning testing and certification 7 8 process. Solt Decl. II at ¶¶ 25, 28-29. Solt made recommendations to the PTL. Solt Dep. at 9 305:25-306:2. Solt conducted technical reviews to ensure that CSA quality procedures were 10 followed. Solt Decl. II at ¶ 23. Solt assisted in developing a spreadsheet to make ELD testing 11 easier. Dkt. #85 at 14; KC Fletcher Dep. at 105:20-106:5. Finally, Solt participated in the process 12 13 for CSA to become accredited to certify ELDs, which included being interviewed by the 14 Standards Council of Canada, sitting in on discussions on developing the ELD testing and 15 certification program, and providing input and recommendations on the development of the 16 program. Solt Decl. at ¶ 18. 17 Solt acknowledges that she performed some administrative duties, however, she argues 18 19 that those duties were “fringe or infrequent tasks” and were not her “primary responsibility.” Dkt. 20 #118 at 2. Solt seems to interpret the language “primary duty” to exclusively mean one specific 21 task that an employee performs the majority of their time. See Dkt. #85. at 14–15 (“Solt spent 22 the overwhelming majority – at least 70% – of her time assigning pass/fail designations to ELD 23 test results, while other tasks directly related to the business operations of CSA were few and far 24 25 between.”); (“Solt’s primary duty was only to assign a pass/fail designation to test results received 26 from ELD testers”). The regulations do not define “primary duty” so narrowly. WAC 296-128- 27 505(1)(b) reads: 28 “The amount of time spent performing exempt work can be a useful guide in 1 determining whether exempt work is the primary duty of an employee. 2 Employees who spend more than fifty percent of their time performing exempt work will generally satisfy the primary duty requirement. Employees 3 who do not spend more than fifty percent of their time performing exempt duties may meet the primary duty requirement if the other factors support 4 such a conclusion.” 5 An administrative employee's “primary duty” does not consist of one specific task but 6 rather the performance of “exempt work” or “exempt duties.” Therefore, Solt’s attempt of 7 8 rejecting administrative duties as part of her primary duty simply because she spends the majority 9 of her time interpreting ELD test results is not dispositive. 10 Solt asserts that because she performed certification services that CSA offered to its 11 customers, her primary duty concerned “production” and not “administrative” tasks. Dkt. #70 at 12 13 13. The Court finds this argument unpersuasive. 14 The administrative/production dichotomy distinguishes between work related to the goods 15 and services which constitute the business marketplace offerings and work that contributes to 16 “running the business itself.” Mckeen-Chaplin v. Provident Sav. Bank, FSB, 862 F.3d 847, 851 17 (9th Cir. 2017). Solt cites to Bothell to support this proposition, however, Bothell demonstrates 18 19 that this dichotomy is not generally applicable and is worth employing “only to the extent it 20 clarifies the analysis.” Bothell v. Phase Metrics, Inc., 299 F.3d 1120, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002). Most 21 importantly, although Bothell discusses the dichotomy, the Ninth Circuit ultimately did not use it 22 in deciding whether Bothell was exempt. The Ninth Circuit rejected the district court’s 23 misapplication of the dichotomy and instead considered the nature of Bothell's employment 24 25 duties. Id. at 1127. Notably, the Bothell decision states “[i]ndeed, some cases analyze the primary 26 duty test without referencing the dichotomy at all” and that this is appropriate because “the 27 dichotomy is but one analytical tool, to be used only to the extent it clarifies the analysis.” Id. 28 Further, “[o]nly when work falls ‘squarely on the “production” side of the line,’ has the dichotomy 1 2 been determinative.” Id. at 1127. 3 The Court finds that Solt’s primary duty – providing certification services – was “directly 4 related to the management or business operations of the employer or the employer’s customers.” 5 WAC 296-128-520(1)(a) (emphasis added). CSA’s customers were not in the business of 6 providing certifications services. Instead, they sold products that required certification in order 7 8 to reach the market. KC Fletcher Decl. at ¶¶4-5. Employees do not fall outside the administrative 9 exemption simply because they provide the service their company is hired to provide. 10 Heffelfinger v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 580 F. Supp. 2d 933, 956 (C.D. Cal. 2008), aff’d in part, 11 rev’d in part, 492 F. App'x 710 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Webster v. Public School Employees of 12 13 Washington, Inc., 247 F.3d 910, 916 (2001) (noting that a “sensible application of the 14 administrative work/production dichotomy” supported a finding that a labor union field 15 representative, who assisted bargaining units that were his employer’s clients negotiate collective 16 bargaining agreements, was engaged in administrative work because “the purpose of the 17 dichotomy is to clarify the meaning of ‘work directly related to the management policies or 18 19 general business operations,’ not to frustrate the purpose and spirit of the entire exemption”). 20 Accordingly, the Court finds her position does not fall squarely on the production side of the line. 21 Solt cites to only one case to support the assertion that her role was not directly related to 22 the management or general business operations of CSA or its customers. Solt claims her primary 23 duty was similar to Bothell’s, where his role entailed installation, troubleshooting, and 24 25 maintaining equipment. Dkt. #70 at 13 (“Solt spent her time much like Bothell did. . .”); Bothell, 26 299 F.3d at 1128. However, these primary duties are easily distinguishable from Solt’s as based 27 on her own testimony. Solt was not a repairman, nor did she perform manual work. 28 Next, throughout her brief, Solt repeatedly asserts that a specific duty is not “directly 1 2 related to management or general business operations” and cites to 29 CFR §541.201(b) to 3 support that assertion. This regulation provides a list of duties that are “directly related to 4 management or general business operations,” however, it is not exhaustive as made evident by 5 the language “but is not limited to” and “similar activities.” Id. Moreover, the regulation does 6 list similar duties that Solt performed such as auditing, quality control, and regulatory compliance. 7 8 29 CFR §541.201(b). Accordingly, Solt’s attempt to reject the characterization of duties simply 9 because they are not explicitly listed within 29 CFR §541.201(b) is unpersuasive. 10 Next, CSA must show that there is no genuine dispute of material fact that Solt’s primary 11 duty “includes the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of 12 13 significance.” WAC 296-128-520(1)(b). Exercising discretion and independent judgment 14 “involv[es] the comparison and the evaluation of possible courses of conduct, and acting or 15 making a decision after the various possibilities have been considered.” WAC 296-128- 16 520(3)(b). This implies that the employee has the authority to make an independent choice, free 17 from immediate direction or supervision. Id. However, employees can exercise discretion and 18 19 independent judgment even if their decisions or recommendations are reviewed at a higher level. 20 Id. The decisions made as a result of the exercise of discretion and independent judgment may 21 consist of recommendations for action rather than the actual taking of action. 29 C.F.R. 22 §541.202(c). The fact that an employee’s decision may be subject to review and that, upon 23 occasion, the decisions are revised or reversed after review does not mean that the employee is 24 25 not exercising discretion and independent judgment. Id. Exemptions are not available for 26 employees who simply apply “well-established techniques, procedures or specific standards 27 described in manuals or other sources.” WAC 296-128-520(3)(b). Lastly, the exercise of 28 discretion and independent judgment does not include clerical or secretarial work, recording or 1 2 tabulating data, or performing other mechanical, repetitive, recurrent or routine work. Id. 3 CSA argues that, as a matter of law, Solt’s primary duties included the exercise of 4 discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance. CSA argues that 5 Solt qualifies as an administrative employee, based on similarities between Solt’s primary duties 6 and those of Williams-Bell, where the Northern District Court of Illinois upheld the exempt status. 7 8 Williams-Bell v. Brit. Standards Inst., Inc., 532 F. Supp. 3d 640 (N.D. Ill. 2021). 9 In Williams-Bell, the plaintiff conducted certification audits for her employer’s clients. To 10 perform these audits, Williams-Bell was obligated to follow the structures and procedures within 11 the employer’s manual. 532 F. Supp. 3d at 644. Because of this, Williams-Bell argued that she 12 13 did not exercise discretion and independent judgment because she did nothing more than “follow 14 [her employer’s] strict, step-by-step policies from start to finish.” Id. at 649. However, the district 15 court stated that obligation to follow a framework in an employer’s manual did not preclude one 16 from such discretion and judgment. Id. at 650. The court held that the factual record showed 17 Williams-Bell was able to exercise discretion and independent judgment before, during, and after 18 19 her audits while still adhering to the guidelines in the employer’s manual. Id. 20 Similar proclamations have been made in the Seventh and Fifth circuit courts. See 21 Kennedy v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 410 F.3d 365, 374-75 (7th Cir. 2005) (that employee 22 must follow “a highly regimented set of rules” does not prevent employee from exercising 23 discretion and independent judgment); Owsley v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 187 F.3d 521, 24 25 526 (5th Cir. 1999) (existence of standard procedures and guidelines does not mean employee's 26 responsibilities do not require exercise of independent discretion). 27 28 According to Solt, her primary duty – interpreting ELD test results and comparing them 1 2 to the standards of Transport Canada’s standards – was simply her applying established 3 techniques and procedures. Solt claims that she could not modify or deviate from these standards 4 without approval from the PTL. Dkt. #85 at 14. Evidence in the record appears to conflict with 5 this assertion. Solt states that at times she and the other certifiers would be inconsistent with how 6 they would handle certain challenges. See Solt Dep. at 308:11-16. (“Hey, here's a challenge. 7 8 Would this work? How about we do this? … ‘Hey, you know, this is how John’s been doing it, 9 this is how Allen’s been doing it. This is how Dena’s been doing it.’” and “The three of us would 10 talk. ‘Hey, ... what do we do here so it’s consistent?’”). 11 Next, Solt claims that interpreting whether a test result passed or failed was mainly 12 13 quantitative, such as whether a test result indicated that a warning icon appeared on the dashboard. 14 Dkt. #85 at 13. Because the decisions were largely binary – the light appeared/did not appear – 15 she claims she was not exercising discretion. However, the next portion of that deposition states 16 “there were a handful that required some amount of qualitative evaluation.” KC Fletcher Dep. at 17 78:24-79:1. Further, when questioned on whether she made recommendations and suggestions, 18 19 Solt responded, “All of us would ask questions and/or make a suggestion or whatever . . . 20 Sometimes . . . all three of us together [would say] ‘Hey, we're experiencing this problem,’ 21 because there were a lot of challenges with this stuff.” Solt Dep. at 340:16-22. 22 Next, Solt claims her recommendations and feedback to management were routinely 23 ignored. For example, Solt interviewed potential candidates for ELD positions and provided 24 25 recommendations, however she claims her recommendations were not followed. Dkt. #85 at 13. 26 Solt suggested improvements to the certification process, but she was told “not to fix” the issue. 27 KC Fletcher Dep. at 219:16-20. 28 Viewing the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to 1 2 the non-moving party, the Court finds that no genuine dispute of material fact precludes a 3 determination as a matter of law that Solt’s primary duty included the exercise of discretion and 4 independent judgment with respect to matters of significance. This is based on Solt’s own 5 deposition testimony characterizing her job. Given all of the above, the administrative exemption 6 applies and the Court grants CSA’s motion for summary judgment on this claim. 7 8 B. Related Wage Claims 9 Because the Court concludes that Solt is subject to the administrative exemption, her 10 related wage claims fail. CSA was not obligated to pay for meal periods, rest breaks, or travel 11 time. See WAC § 296-126-002; Dkt. #71 at 13–14. 12 13 C. Paid Leave 14 Solt alleges that “Defendants CSA America Testing and CSA Group were obligated to 15 track and report accrual and usage of paid leave and did not accurately do so” and that she 16 “worked and was deducted for paid leave for the same time.” Dkt. #29 at 19. CSA characterizes 17 Solt’s deposition testimony as stating that she was obligated to finish assignments by deadlines 18 19 and chose to work from home on days that she had taken paid leave. See Dkt. #71 at 14–15. In 20 response, Solt argues that she was terminated in part for complaining about paid leave practices, 21 but this is more properly dealt with in the retaliation section below. Dkt. #85 at 16–17. She 22 argues that CSA failed to track and report her paid leave but does not provide specifics. Id. The 23 Court finds that this claim is properly dismissed on summary judgment. 24 25 D. Actionable Deductions 26 CSA states that on March 15, 2024, CSA offered to reimburse Solt the $83.36 that was 27 improperly deducted from a health savings account. Dkt. #116, Ex. D at 2-3. This $83.36 was 28 identified in initial disclosures as the amount at issue. See Dkt. #116-3 at 8. CSA states that Solt 1 2 has never responded to the offer, which still stands ,and that the claim is not actionable. Plaintiff 3 asserts that this offer does not cure the conduct and that summary judgment is improper. Dkt. 4 #85 at 17. 5 Plaintiff’s opposition fails to adequately articulate a remaining dispute. If one does exist, 6 it is over less than a hundred dollars. The Court assumes that CSA will honor its offer to 7 8 reimburse this amount. Accordingly, this claim will be dismissed as moot. 9 E. Breach of Contract 10 The Amended Complaint alleges that CSA “made enforceable promises to Ms. Solt that 11 they did not perform, including pay, overtime pay, training, reimbursement for travel expenses, 12 13 and promises of compensatory paid leave instead of overtime pay.” Dkt. #29 at 20. CSA argues 14 that this claim is “nebulous,” that she was properly classified as exempt, and that it paid her 15 properly for overtime and other expenses according to its own policies. Dkt. #71 at 15–16. 16 Under Washington law, an employer can pay overtime to exempt employees without 17 waiving their exemption status. RCW § 49.46.130(2)(a) (“The payment of compensation or 18 19 provision of compensatory time off in addition to a salary shall not be a factor in determining 20 whether a person is exempted under RCW 49.46.010(3)(c)”); see also Drinkwitz v. Alliant 21 Techsystems, Inc., 140 Wn.2d 291, 303, 996 P.2d 582, 588 (2000) (“paid overtime or comp time 22 for work in excess of forty hours per week cannot be considered as a factor in determining whether 23 an employee is ‘exempt.’”). 24 25 In her opposition brief, Solt argues in a few terse sentences, without citation to the record, 26 that she failed to get paid for agreed-upon overtime. Dkt. #85 at 17 (“In April 2023, CSA 27 promised Solt that she would receive time and a half pay hours worked during a period of 28 increased business demand. Solt worked those hours. CSA did not pay her.”). Earlier in the 1 2 opposition brief, Solt contends that she did not receive promised overtime pay in December 2022 3 and April 2023, with citations to specific emails. Id. at 8–9. She does not respond to CSA’s 4 arguments about the difference between her manager planning to offer overtime versus her 5 personally being approved for overtime. See Dkt. #71 at 16. CSA points out in its Reply that 6 Solt’s initial disclosures show she did receive at least some overtime pay in December 2022 and 7 8 April 2023. Dkt. # 115 at 10 (citing Dkt. #116-3). 9 Solt contends that she did not get paid an estimated $1,500 in travel expenses despite 10 CSA’s policies allowing for reimbursement. Dkt. #85 at 17–18. She also says she was instructed 11 not to submit those claims. CSA argues that it was not bound by its own policies to approve every 12 13 travel expense, that the record shows these expenses were not approved, and that in any event 14 Solt submits no receipts to prove these expenses. See Dkt. #115 at 10. 15 Finally, Solt maintains in her opposition that: 16 Solt was promised support to attain her Certified Information 17 System Security Professional (CISSP) license as well as continuing education to maintain her cybersecurity certificate, yet CSA failed 18 to fulfill this obligation. Solt Decl. at ¶ 40. CSA made this promise 19 to Solt on her hiring, an attractive promise to Solt as she sought to maintain and improve her cybersecurity credentialing. Id. at ¶ 38. 20 Dkt. #85 at 18. On reply, CSA argues: 21 22 Solt again does not identify any document where the promise of “supporting” her pursuit of her Certified Information System 23 Security Professional (CISSP) license was offered. Only by scouring her declaration will the Court find that Solt maintains an 24 “oral promise” was made on an unspecified date during the 25 recruiting process. Solt Dec. ¶ 38. Additionally, her reference to her Development Dialogue does not make her claim actionable. In the 26 Dialogue, she describes obtaining the licensure as her “goal,” and 27 that it is “important to me” to receive the certification. Id. at Ex. 7. Nowhere does she cite to any document where such a promise was 28 made and, in fact, she concedes that approval of the support was a decision within management’s discretion. Id. (“Assuming it is 1 supported by management…”). Indeed, because the alleged promise 2 was oral, her claim would be time-barred, as it was made “during the recruitment process” in 2019, more than three years before she 3 filed her Complaint. See RCW 4.16.080(3) (three-year statute of limitations for non-written contracts). 4
5 Dkt. #115 at 11. 6 The Court has thoroughly reviewed the briefing and the cited exhibits for this contract 7 claim and agrees with CSA that there are no genuine disputes of material fact here and that 8 Plaintiff Solt has failed to set forth a valid claim. Her initial disclosures show she received 9 10 overtime pay in December 2022 and April 2023, and she does not make a sufficient showing of 11 breach as to specific terms of a contract related to overtime. She fails to make a sufficient showing 12 that she incurred travel expenses that CSA agreed to reimburse. She fails to make a sufficient 13 showing of an actionable claim for “support” for CISSP training. Without such, the Court is left 14 with the impression that CSA’s actions disappointed Solt but did not breach any contract between 15 16 the parties. This claim is properly dismissed on summary judgment. 17 F. Promissory Estoppel 18 The Amended Complaint alleges that CSA “made specific promises to Ms. Solt that they 19 did not perform, including overtime pay, training, reimbursement for travel expenses, and 20 promises of compensatory paid leave instead of overtime pay.” Dkt. #29 at 20. 21 22 A promissory estoppel claim requires three elements: 1) that statements amounted to 23 “promises of specific treatment in specific situations”; 2) that Plaintiff “justifiably relied on any 24 of these promises”; and 3) that those promises were breached. Bulman v. Safeway, Inc., 144 25 Wn.2d 335, 27 P.3d 1172, 1174-75 (2001). 26 27 CSA argues Solt fails the first two elements. CSA asserts that the overtime policy clearly 28 states that all overtime must be approved by a supervisor and that it was not guaranteed. Dkt. #71 at 17 (citing Dkt. #81-3). Likewise, CSA says the travel policy is clear that not all travel expenses 1 2 may be reimbursed. Id. citing Dkt. #81-4. CSA maintains that Solt cannot point to any overtime 3 premium or travel reimbursement that was not paid when it was properly submitted and approved, 4 and that she has provided no evidence or examples of training that was promised, that she relied 5 upon promises of such training, and that such training was not provided. 6 In response, Solt claims she can point to specific instances where CSA failed to honor its 7 8 promises to Solt’s detriment, but she fails to cite to evidence in her argument section, requiring 9 the Court to piece together facts stated earlier in briefing. As with the previous claim of breach 10 of contract, ultimately Solt fails to connect the dots to specific instances of promised overtime, 11 work performed, and a failure to uphold that promise considering that she did receive at least 12 13 some overtime pay in December 2022 and April 2023. 14 The Court finds that Solt has failed to identify sufficient evidence to preclude this claim 15 from summary judgment. 16 G. Hostile Work Environment 17 A hostile work environment claim under the Washington Law Against Discrimination 18 19 (“WLAD”) is largely the same as under Title VII. Diemert v. City of Seattle, 689 F. Supp. 3d 20 956, 962 (W.D. Wash. 2023); Arthur v. Whitman Cnty., 24 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1033 (E.D. Wash. 21 2014). To succeed on a Title VII hostile work environment claim based on sex, a plaintiff must 22 prove the employee was subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, that the 23 conduct was unwelcome, and that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the 24 25 terms and conditions of her employment and create an abusive work environment. Fried v. Wynn 26 Las Vegas, LLC, 18 F.4th 643, 647 (9th Cir. 2021). “[I]t is well established that an employer can 27 create a hostile work environment by failing to take immediate and corrective action in response 28 to a coworker’s or third party's sexual harassment or racial discrimination the employer knew or 1 2 should have known about.” Id. To determine whether an environment is sufficiently hostile or 3 abusive to violate Tile VII, we consider “all the circumstances, including the frequency of the 4 discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere 5 offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work 6 performance.” Id. at 648 (citing Christian v. Umpqua Bank, 984 F.3d 801, 809 (9th Cir. 2020)). 7 8 “Not every insult or harassing comment will constitute a hostile work environment.” Ray v. 9 Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000). The standard for judging hostility is meant to 10 “ensure that Title VII does not become a ‘general civility code.’” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 11 524 U.S. 775, 788, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 141 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1998) (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner 12 13 Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80, 118 S. Ct. 998, 140 L. Ed. 2d 201 (1998)). The Supreme 14 Court has explained that, properly applied, this standard “will filter out complaints attacking the 15 ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive language, gender- 16 related jokes, and occasional teasing.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A hostile work 17 environment “must be both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable person 18 19 would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did perceive to be so.” Id. at 787. 20 Solt’s opposition brief points to the following facts: 21 After joining CSA, Solt’s cybersecurity manager’s manager, Laura 22 Elan, exposed herself to Solt. Rocke Decl., Ex. 7; Solt Dep. at 92:17- 19. Following this incident, Elan called Solt a “prude” during calls 23 with others and in-person. . . Solt Decl. at ¶ 3-4. Elan also referenced “not wearing tights or nylons or . . . pantyhose” to Solt in the 24 presence of others, suggesting that she and Solt go to buy a pair for 25 Elan. Solt Dep. at 98:11-16. Solt repeatedly told Elan that the comments made her uncomfortable, but Elan continued. Solt Dep. 26 at 101:7-12. Sometimes the harassment occurred several times a 27 week, but other weeks Solt was not harassed. Solt Dep. at 105:20- 24. CSA understood that Elan’s conduct constituted harassment, 28 substantiating “certain of Plaintiff’s allegations.”. See Rocke Decl., 1 Ex. 1. 2 Dkt. #85 at 6. Solt complained to her manager and Elan’s employment was terminated in 2020. 3 Solt Dec. at ¶ 7. She was not sexually harassed after Elan’s termination. Solt Dep. at 123:3-6. 4 5 Solt also states that another employee told her that he would need to speak with the technology 6 “guys” because they “actually know about this stuff,” and that she was reassigned on multiple 7 occasions to different projects. Dkt. #85 at 6 (citing Solt Decl. at ¶ 8). Further facts are not 8 referenced in argument. 9 10 The allegations of harassment in the record do not rise to the level of severe or pervasive 11 conduct sufficient to alter the terms and conditions of her employment. Furthermore, CSA 12 eventually dealt with the situation by terminating the alleged harasser in 2020. The Court agrees 13 with CSA that even if she had an actionable claim for a hostile work environment, it is time- 14 barred. This claim is properly dismissed on summary judgment. 15 16 H. Unlawful Discrimination 17 The Amended Complaint fails to discuss this claim beyond mere labels and conclusions. 18 See Dkt. #29 at 22 (“CSA America Testing discriminated against Ms. Solt based on sex and age 19 in violation of RCW 49.60.180. Ms. Solt was given different work because of her sex.”). She 20 pleads that, “[i]n December 2022, Solt’s manager told her she could return home from the Dallas 21 22 lab because he had found ‘two younger and smarter’ guys and he was flying them in to work on 23 the ELD projects.” Id. at 12. In briefing, Solt points to the “younger and smarter” comment, 24 being reassigned multiple times, and “discriminatory comments from a [coworker/supervisor] 25 when he, for example, told Solt that he would need to speak with the technology ‘guys’ because 26 27 they ‘actually know about this stuff.’” Dkt. #85 at 21. Solt argues that these events resulted in 28 “adverse opportunities for work and ultimately informing her termination as a ‘poor cultural fit.’” 1 2 Id. 3 On Reply, CSA states: 4 Solt’s only example of age discrimination is that she was “replaced” 5 in Texas by two “younger and smarter” men. Opp. p. 21. In addition to providing no evidence that anyone made that statement, she 6 ignores the undisputed evidence that she was: 1) offered the chance to go home from Dallas for the holidays; because 2) her supervisor 7 had located two graduate interns to take over and relieve her team; 8 and 3) she suffered no adverse action for volunteering to go home. Fletcher Dec. ¶¶ 24-27. 9 10 Likewise, her singular incident of alleged sex discrimination is an innocuous comment from her PTL that he would need to speak to 11 the technology “guys” because they “actually know about this stuff.” Opp. p. 21. To call this a stray remark would be straining the 12 concept. “Guys” is a frequently used and often genderless term used 13 to denote a group of persons, plural. Guys, Merriam-Webster.com. 2025. https://www.merriam-webster.com (17 Feb. 2025). 14 Moreover, Solt has cited no evidence that the technology members were not more knowledgeable about the issue (which is not dated or 15 even described) than her. She cites no record evidence of 16 opportunities denied, and her assertion that “these actions did not occur” for her younger, male coworkers is speculation. 17 Dkt. #115 at 13–14. 18 19 As for Solt’s eventual termination, this occurred in February of 2023. KC Fletcher Dep. 20 62:8-13. 21 Under the WLAD, an employer may not “discharge or bar any person from employment 22 because of age [or] sex” or “discriminate against any person in compensation or in other terms or 23 conditions of employment because of age [or] sex.” RCW 49.60.180(2), (3). In analyzing claims 24 25 under the WLAD, Washington courts look to federal courts for interpretation and use the 26 McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis used to assess Title VII claims. See Duplessis v. 27 Golden State Foods, No. C06-5631RJB, at *3, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27851 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 28 16, 2007) (citing Hill v. BCTI Income Fund-I, 144 Wn.2d 172, 23 P.3d 440, 445-46 (2001)). The 1 2 McDonnell Douglas analysis has three components. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 3 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973). First, the plaintiff must present a 4 prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 802. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in presenting a 5 prima facie case, there is rebuttable presumption of discrimination and the burden of production 6 shifts to the employer to produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse 7 8 employment action. Robinson v. Pierce Cty., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1326 (W.D. Wash. 2008) 9 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). And third, if the employer presents a legitimate, 10 nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show 11 that the employer’s reason is merely pretext for unlawful discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas, 12 13 411 U.S. at 804. 14 An employer is entitled to summary judgment if the plaintiff cannot present sufficient 15 evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that the employer’s stated reasons are 16 pretextual. Robinson, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 1326. “Summary judgment to an employer is seldom 17 appropriate in the WLAD cases because of the difficulty of proving a discriminatory motivation.” 18 19 Scrivener v. Clark Coll., 181 Wn.2d 439, 334 P.3d 541, 545 (2014). “To overcome summary 20 judgment, a plaintiff only needs to show that a reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff's 21 protected trait was a substantial factor motivating the employer’s adverse actions.” Id. 22 Washington courts describe a plaintiff's burden at this stage as one of “production, not 23 persuasion,” which may be proved through direct or circumstantial evidence. Id. But where “the 24 25 plaintiff has produced no evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that an employer’s 26 decision was motivated by an intent to discriminate, summary judgment is entirely proper.” 27 Kuyper v. State, 79 Wn. App. 732, 904 P.2d 793, 797 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995). 28 Under the above standards, the Court finds that Plaintiff Solt has failed to make a prima 1 2 facie case of discrimination based on age or sex. Her evidence of being replaced for a work 3 activity and the stray remarks above do not causally relate to an adverse employment action. 4 Assuming Plaintiff could put together a prima facie case, the Court finds that she has failed to 5 present sufficient evidence that CSA’s stated reasons for termination or other adverse 6 employment actions were pretextual. This claim will be dismissed on summary judgment. 7 8 I. Retaliation 9 For Plaintiff to prevail on a claim of retaliation under the WLAD, she must show that 1) 10 she was engaged in a protected activity; 2) that she suffered an adverse employment action; and 11 3) that there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the employment action. 12 13 Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 965 (9th Cir. 2004); Lodis v. Corbis Holdings, 14 Inc., 292 P.3d 779, 786 (Wn. App. 2013). Under the WLAD, Plaintiff needs to show that her 15 protected activity was a “substantial factor” in the employer’s decision to take the adverse 16 employment action. Allison v. Housing Auth. of City of Seattle, 821 P.2d 34, 42-43 (1991). 17 Solt claims she was fired in retaliation for engaging in protected activity. She points to 18 19 the 2020 complaint she made about her coworker Elan and argues that “[c]ausation may be 20 inferred based on temporal proximity alone in the context of a retaliation claims.” Dkt. #85 at 22 21 (citing Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1244 (9th Cir. 2000)). CSA argues she was terminated 22 because CSA was in a “retraction phase,” because of “behavior issues and failure to provide 23 timelines for projects,” and because her salary “was higher than her peers or supervisor’s.” Dkt. 24 25 #71 at 7 (citing, e.g., KC Fletcher Dep. 62:8-13 and at 47:20-23.). 26 The Court agrees with CSA that the three years that passed between the 2020 complaint 27 about Elan and Solt’s February 2023 termination is too long a period to infer causation based on 28 temporal proximity. See Dkt. #71 at 23. Furthermore, during these three years Solt may have 1 2 received a negative performance review, but she was also promoted and given a raise. KC 3 Fletcher Dec. at ¶ 3; KC Fletcher Dep. at 181:6-9. CSA has put forth other reasons for her 4 termination as stated above. Ultimately, to survive summary judgment Solt needs to make a 5 sufficient showing that her protected activity was a “substantial factor” in the employer’s 6 decision, and she fails to do so. This claim will be dismissed. 7 8 Having reviewed the relevant pleadings, the declarations and exhibits attached thereto, 9 and the remainder of the record, the Court hereby finds and ORDERS that Defendant’s Motion 10 for Summary Judgment, Dkt. #71, is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED. 11 Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Dkt. #70, is DENIED given the above rulings. 12 13 All other pending Motions are STRICKEN as MOOT. This case is CLOSED. 14 DATED this 24th day of September, 2025. 15 A 16
17 RICARDO S. MARTINEZ 18 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 19 20 21
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