[Cite as Solon v. Moore, 2025-Ohio-2446.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
CITY OF SOLON, :
Plaintiff-Appellant, : No. 114160 v. :
DAWN M. MOORE, :
Defendant-Appellee. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 10, 2025
Criminal Appeal from the Bedford Municipal Court Case No. 23TRC06951
Appearances:
Lon D. Stolarsky, for appellant.
Marein & Bradley, LLC, Steven L. Bradley and Michael I. Marein, for appellee.
LISA B. FORBES, P.J.:
Appellant, the City of Solon (“the City”), appeals a judgment of the
Bedford Municipal Court granting defendant-appellee, Dawn M. Moore’s (“Moore”)
motion to suppress evidence obtained during an OVI investigation. For the reasons
that follow, we reverse the trial court’s decision. I. Facts and Procedural History
On December 11, 2023, around 11:00 a.m., Solon Police received a
9-1-1 call from Moore’s son, reporting that his mother had left their home and was
“drunk driving” to get more alcohol. Officers found Moore in her vehicle at a nearby
Giant Eagle Market District. After a brief interaction, she was asked to perform
field sobriety tests. Thereafter, she was arrested on suspicion of operating a vehicle
while intoxicated (“OVI”). At the station, Moore — already on probation for a prior
OVI — refused a breathalyzer and was charged with OVI under R.C. 4511.19(A)(2).1
Moore filed a motion to suppress, seeking the exclusion of all
evidence obtained as a result of her performance of the field sobriety tests. She
asserted that the police lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion to lawfully
administer the tests, thereby violating her rights under the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, as well as Ohio Const. art. I, § 14, which protect
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Moore also challenged the manner in
which the police conducted the field sobriety tests and argued that, because the tests
were not properly administered, Solon police lacked probable cause to arrest her
and charge her with OVI.
1 Under R.C. 4511.19(A)(2), a person is prohibited from refusing a chemical test for
drugs and alcohol after they have been arrested for OVI if they have been previously convicted of an OVI offense within 20 years. At the time of her arrest, Moore was subject to probation for an OVI conviction she obtained six months earlier. A. Suppression Hearing
On May 15, 2024, the trial court held a suppression hearing. Four
prosecution witnesses testified: Moore’s 17-year-old son who called 9-1-1, and three
Solon police officers who had been involved in the OVI investigation.
1. Moore’s Son
Moore’s son testified that on December 11, 2023, he was living with
his mother at their home on SOM Center Road, when he called 9-1-1 to report her to
police. The prosecution then played an audio recording of the 9-1-1 call for the court.
The most relevant portions of that call are as follows:
Dispatch: 9-1-1. Where is your emergency?
Son: Solon, Ohio.
Dispatch: What is the address?
Son: It’s not exactly an address, my mom just left. She’s on SOM Center Road. She’s drunk driving. I don’t know like if there’s anything you can do. I just know the car is — .
...
Dispatch: What kind of vehicle is she driving?
Son: Cadillac SRX. It’s an SUV.
Dispatch: What color?
Son: Silver. There’s a dent on the front left.
Dispatch: How long ago did she leave?
Son: Like maybe two to three minutes ago. She just relapsed from like six months of no alcohol but now she’s like tripping. I don’t even know what to do.
Dispatch: What’s your mom’s name? Son: It’s Dawn Moore.
Dispatch: Do you know which direction she went?
Son: Um, if . . . I think she turned left out of my driveway. So, it would be towards the highway, but she is not getting on the highway. Just like . . . I know she’s going to the store for more beer probably. But I don’t think she’ll come back here.
Dispatch: Do you know what store?
Son: There’s a convenience store called D & M.
Dispatch: Hang on one second.
Son: Yeah. Thank you. I had no one else to call.
[break in conversation]
Dispatch: Were you two having an altercation or anything like that?
Son: Um, I came home. Honestly, I just came home, and I saw she was drunk. So, I tried to talk to her but she wouldn’t listen to me. So, I dumped the alcohol out. And that she is probably just going to get some more probably.
Dispatch: Okay. Do you know your mom’s date of birth?
Son: Uh, 6/29/79.
Dispatch: What is your name?
Son: [states name].
Dispatch: Okay. If she returns give us a call back. I have officers in the area going to look for her, okay.
Son: Okay. I appreciate it. I didn’t know who else to call or what else to do. After the 9-1-1 call was played in open court, the son testified that he
had not actually seen his mother drinking that morning. Instead, he explained that
he assumed she had been drinking because there was a bottle of alcohol in the house.
When asked why he had made that assumption, the son responded: “My emotions,
just a lot of emotions and stuff. I don’t know.” In response to a question from the
prosecution about whether he had been arguing or experiencing other issues with
his mother, he stated, “No, not really . . . . I don’t recall. I don’t know.”
2. Officer Balli
Officer Balli, a police officer with the Solon Police Department,
testified that while on patrol on the morning of December 11, 2023, he received a
dispatch alert about a possible impaired driver near D & M and the Giant Eagle
Market District. Using the vehicle description provided, Officer Balli located the car
parked in the Market District lot.
He observed that the vehicle was running but improperly parked,
occupying two spaces as the rear tires extended into an adjacent spot. Moore was
seated in the driver’s seat of the vehicle. Officer Balli approached the vehicle to
speak with her.
Footage recorded from Officer Balli’s body camera — played in court
during the suppression hearing and admitted into evidence — captured the full
interaction. The video showed Officer Balli addressing Moore by her first name and
introducing himself. He informed her that her son had contacted the police out of concern for her well-being. When he asked where she was coming from, Moore
replied that she had come from her home on SOM Center Road.
Officer Balli told Moore that her son mentioned she had been
drinking, which Moore denied. When asked what she was doing at Market District,
Moore looked to her right, gestured down at something beside her in the car, and
stated that she had just “gotten a bottle.” She continued to deny having consumed
any alcohol that day.
At that point, Officer Balli asked Moore for her driver’s license, stating
that he was observing “some indicators [of impairment].” Moore handed over her
license and responded, “no sir,” in reference to his observation.
When asked at the hearing about his initial interaction with Moore
and what he had specifically observed, Officer Balli testified that he noticed signs of
possible impairment, including bloodshot, watery eyes and mumbled speech.
Officer Balli testified that he did not, however, detect an odor of
alcohol on Moore. He further stated that Moore was able to retrieve her driver’s
license from her wallet promptly and without difficulty.
As captured by body-camera footage, after reviewing Moore’s driver’s
license, Officer Balli stepped away to confer with Sergeant Horvath, another Solon
police officer who had arrived at the scene. Officer Balli informed Sergeant Horvath
that he had observed some signs of impairment but did not detect the odor of
alcohol. He asked Sergeant Horvath to speak with Moore to determine whether he could detect any such odor. After speaking with Moore, Sergeant Horvath returned
and told Officer Balli that he “thought he smelled something.”
Officer Balli then conducted “pre-exit tests,” which are sobriety
assessments performed while the person is still inside the vehicle. Specifically,
Officer Balli asked Moore to recite the alphabet from the letter D to R and to count
backward from 69 to 51.
Officer Balli testified that Moore struggled with these tests. She failed
to correctly recite the specified section of the alphabet correctly and she was unable
to count backward as instructed. As more specifically shown in the body-camera
footage, Officer Balli instructed Moore to recite the alphabet beginning with the
letter “D” and ending with the letter “R.” Moore acknowledged this request by
repeating the instructions. Despite this, she began reciting the alphabet from the
letter “A.” Moore also exhibited noticeable difficulty staying focused on the task.
She would pause and then start giggling. She proceeded through the alphabet only
as far as the letter “P,” skipping or mumbling the letter “Q” unintelligibly. She then
continued with “R-T-U-V,” overshooting the instructed stopping point and omitting
the letter “S.”
With regard to the counting task, the body-camera footage shows that
Moore, in counting backwards from 69, repeated the numbers 66 and 65 twice and
only got to 62 before stopping and exclaiming “what?” — having apparently
forgotten what she was supposed to be doing. Both Officer Balli’s testimony and the body-camera footage confirm
that following the results of the pre-exit tests, Moore was asked to exit the vehicle to
perform standardized field sobriety tests.
3. Officer Stephens
Officer Stephens, who also responded to the scene, conducted the
standardized field sobriety tests. Officer Stephens testified that he conducted three
tests: the horizontal gaze nystagmus, the walk-and-turn, and the one-leg stand. He
testified that Moore failed all three tests. Officer Stephens further stated that during
the administration of these tests, Moore exhibited slurred speech, an odor of alcohol,
and slightly red, glossy eyes — all indicators of possible impairment.
Moore’s performance on the field sobriety tests was captured on
Officer Balli’s body-camera footage. The footage was also presented during the
suppression hearing and admitted into evidence.
Officer Stephens acknowledged that at the time he administered the
tests he was still in training and had been directed to the scene by Sergeant Horvath,
his field-training officer, in order to gain experience in conducting field sobriety
tests. Officer Stephens admitted that his interaction with Moore was the first time
he had performed any field sobriety tests and that he was receiving real-time
guidance from Sergeant Horvath during the process. He also conceded that certain
aspects of the tests were not conducted properly. 4. Sergeant Horvath
Sergeant Horvath testified that, upon being asked by Officer Balli to
speak with Moore, he detected the odor of alcohol. He explained that it is not
uncommon for one officer to notice a smell that another might miss, as individuals
vary in their sensory perception and sensitivity. Sergeant Horvath further noted
that he has extensive experience as a field-sobriety test instructor. While he
acknowledged that Officer Stephens may not have administered the field sobriety
tests flawlessly, he testified that, based on his observations, the tests were conducted
in a manner sufficiently compliant to establish probable cause to arrest Moore for
OVI.
B. Decision Granting Motion to Suppress
On July 5, 2024, the trial court granted Moore’s motion to suppress.
In doing so, it framed the central issue as “whether the Officer[s] had a reasonable
and articulable suspicion based on reasonable and articulable facts to extend a
traffic stop into an OVI investigation.” The court ultimately determined that the
evidence presented at the suppression hearing failed to establish sufficient signs of
impairment to provide the officers with the reasonable suspicion required to justify
administering field sobriety tests.
The City now appeals from that decision by raising the following
assignment of error: “The trial court committed error prejudicial to the prosecution
when it granted Defendant’s Motion to Suppress.” II. Law and Analysis
A. Standard of Review
“Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question
of law and fact.” State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. When ruling on a motion
to suppress, “the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is therefore in the
best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.”
Id., citing State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366 (1992). “Consequently, an appellate
court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by
competent, credible evidence.” Id., citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20
(1982). “Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must then independently
determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts
satisfy the applicable legal standard.” Id., citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio
App.3d 706 (4th Dist. 1997).
B. Reasonable Suspicion
Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Ohio Const. art. I, § 14 prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Mays,
2008-Ohio-4539, ¶ 7. An investigatory stop is permissible if a law enforcement
officer has a reasonable suspicion that the individual to be stopped may be involved
in criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968). Reasonable suspicion
requires that the officer “point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion.” Id. at
21. “The propriety of an investigative stop by a police officer must be viewed in light of the totality of the surrounding circumstances.” State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177
(1988), paragraph one of the syllabus, cert. denied 488 U.S. 910 (1988).
“Furthermore, these circumstances are to be viewed through the eyes of the
reasonable and prudent police officer on the scene who must react to events as they
unfold.” State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87-88 (1991), citing United States v.
Hall, 525 F. 2d 857, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
In this case, the trial court framed the issue on the motion to suppress
as “whether the Officer[s] had a reasonable and articulable suspicion based on
reasonable and articulable facts to extend a traffic stop into an OVI investigation.”
However, this framing is inaccurate, as there was no initial traffic stop for one
purpose that later evolved into an investigation for another. This case deviates from
the scenario often seen in an OVI investigation where a police encounter begins with
a traffic infraction or accident that establishes probable cause to initiate a stop,
which leads to police interaction with the driver, which then leads to suspicion of
OVI based on the officer’s observations. Here, by contrast, Officer Balli located
Moore’s vehicle in direct response to a dispatch report concerning a suspected
impaired driver in the area. From the outset, the sole purpose of the stop was to
investigate the OVI allegation.
The Ohio Supreme Court has held that a citizen informant’s telephone
tip — if found to be sufficiently reliable — can, on its own, establish reasonable
suspicion to justify an officer’s investigative stop of a motorist suspected of operating
a vehicle under the influence. See Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 296 (1999). However, the Court has also made clear that once a lawful and constitutional
stop has been initiated, both the driver and the vehicle may only be detained for as
long as reasonable suspicion of a legal violation persists. State v. Chatton, 11 Ohio
St.3d 59, 62-63 (1984), overruled on other grounds.
With these principles in mind, we consider whether the
administration of field sobriety tests was supported by reasonable suspicion.
1. Reasonable Suspicion to Detain Moore in Her Vehicle
We find that the initial detention of Moore in her vehicle was justified
by reasonable suspicion based on the 9-1-1 call from Moore’s son and the subsequent
police dispatch based on that call.
The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that a telephone tip can,
standing alone, create reasonable suspicion justifying an investigative stop if the tip
has sufficient indicia of reliability. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d at paragraph one of the
syllabus. Under these circumstances, the determination of reasonable suspicion is
limited to an examination of the weight and reliability of the tip. Id. The focus is on
“whether the tip itself has sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the investigative
stop.” Id. The most important factors in determining the reliability of an
informant’s report are “the informant’s veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge.”
Id., citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328 (1990).
In assessing the reliability of the informant’s tip, the Court in Weisner
stated that it is useful to categorize informants according to their typical
characteristics. Weisner at 300. It has generally been accepted that there are three classes of informants: the anonymous informant, the known informant, and the
identified citizen informant. Id. The Court explained:
While the United States Supreme Court discourages conclusory analysis based solely upon these categories, insisting instead upon a totality of the circumstances review, it has acknowledged their relevance to an informant’s reliability. The court has observed, for example, that an anonymous informant is comparatively unreliable and his tip, therefore, will generally require independent police corroboration. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. at 329. The court has further suggested that an identified citizen informant may be highly reliable and, therefore, a strong showing as to the other indicia of reliability may be unnecessary: “If an unquestionably honest citizen comes forward with a report of criminal activity — which if fabricated would subject him to criminal liability — we have found rigorous scrutiny of the basis of his knowledge unnecessary.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233-234 (1983)
Id.
Additionally, the Court in Weisner clarified that it is not necessary for
all the facts relayed to the dispatcher to be included in the actual dispatch in order
to establish that the stopping officer had reasonable suspicion to make the stop.
Weisner at 297. Instead, the key inquiry is whether, based on the totality of the
information available at the time, the dispatcher would have had reasonable
suspicion to make the stop themselves, if in the position of the officer. Id.
Applying Weisner to the facts at hand, it is evident that the 9-1-1 call
and the resulting police dispatch was sufficiently reliable such that it provided
officers with reasonable suspicion to initially detain Moore. The 9-1-1 call carried
heightened reliability, as the caller was not only an identified citizen informant but
also Moore’s son. This familial relationship gave him personal knowledge of the situation, enabling him to provide dispatch with a sufficiently detailed description
of Moore’s vehicle and its suspected location, which allowed officers to locate it. See
Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d at 302 (basis of knowledge also furthers credibility of the
tip). Additionally, Moore’s son informed dispatch that his mother had stopped
drinking six months earlier but had recently relapsed. Moore’s son further relayed
to dispatch that based on his direct interaction with his mother that morning, he
believed she had left the residence while intoxicated to purchase more alcohol. See
id. (personal observations and immediate reporting of events lends credibility). The
discovery of Moore’s vehicle at a location where additional alcohol could be
purchased further reinforced the son’s credibility as a citizen informant, as did the
overall tone and tenor of the call, as a genuine request for assistance made out of
concern for his mother and the wellbeing of others on the road. Accord Weisner at
302 (where informant’s primary motivation for the call was safety, it lends
credibility to the reliability of the tip because it dispels concerns over dishonest and
questionable goals).
On appeal, Moore argues that the 9-1-1 call should be deemed
unreliable based on statements made by her son during the suppression hearing —
specifically, that he did not observe Moore consuming alcohol that morning (a claim
her son never made during the 9-1-1 call), and that he was experiencing “a lot of
emotions and stuff” at the time of the incident. Moore contends that, pursuant to
State v. Kepford, 2004-Ohio-6486 (3d Dist.), her son’s credibility must be
established at the suppression hearing in order for the call to have been considered reliable. We disagree. Unlike here, Kepford involved an anonymous tipster whose
reliability had not been established at the time of the call, thus requiring
corroboration at the hearing. In contrast, Moore’s son was an identified citizen
informant, and as such, his reliability is properly assessed based on the
circumstances surrounding the 9-1-1 call and the information known and available
to dispatch and responding officers at that time. See Weisner at 298 (facts
precipitating the dispatch are what are assessed for reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity).
Considering the totality of the circumstances known to dispatch and
Officer Balli at the time, we conclude that Officer Balli had reasonable suspicion to
detain Moore in her vehicle upon locating it just minutes after the dispatch call.
2. Reasonable Suspicion to Conduct Field Sobriety Tests
Having concluded that the 9-1-1 call and the corresponding police
dispatch furnished the requisite reasonable suspicion to justify the initial
investigatory stop of Moore and her vehicle, the dispositive issue becomes whether
the facts developed during the stop undermined the original basis for suspecting an
OVI offense, thereby rendering the administration of field sobriety tests
constitutionally impermissible. See State v. Angers, 2021-Ohio-3640, ¶ 12-15 (3d
Dist.) (holding that an initial stop based on a citizen-informant’s tip was lawful, but
subsequent interaction dissipated reasonable suspicion, rendering further detention
for sobriety testing unlawful). As a preliminary matter, it is well established that field sobriety
testing constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment; however, it is deemed a
limited intrusion requiring only reasonable suspicion, not probable cause, to be
constitutionally valid. See, e.g., State v. Keserich, 2014-Ohio-5120, ¶ 8 (5th Dist.)
Reasonable suspicion is defined as something more than a mere hunch, yet less than
the level of certainty required for probable cause. See State v. Ciminello, 2018-Ohio-
467, ¶ 16 (5th Dist.); Cleveland v. Martin, 2018-Ohio-740, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.) (“The
city’s burden to demonstrate reasonable and articulable suspicion of driving while
under the influence of alcohol is not a high one.”).
Courts have recognized a nonexhaustive list of factors that may
contribute to a reasonable suspicion of impairment, including:
(1) the time and day of the stop (Friday or Saturday night as opposed to, e.g., Tuesday morning); (2) the location of the stop (whether near establishments selling alcohol); (3) any indicia of erratic driving before the stop that may indicate a lack of coordination (speeding, weaving, unusual braking, etc.); (4) whether there is a cognizable report that the driver may be intoxicated; (5) the condition of the suspect’s eyes (bloodshot, glassy, glazed, etc.); (6) impairments of the suspect’s ability to speak (slurred speech, overly deliberate speech, etc.); (7) the odor of alcohol coming from the interior of the car, or, more significantly, on the suspect’s person or breath; (8) the intensity of that odor, as described by the officer (“very strong,” “strong,” “moderate,” “slight,” etc.); (9) the suspect’s demeanor (belligerent, uncooperative, etc.); (10) any actions by the suspect after the stop that might indicate a lack of coordination (dropping keys, falling over, fumbling for a wallet, etc.); and (11) the suspect’s admission of alcohol consumption, the number of drinks had, and the amount of time in which they were consumed, if given.
State v. Evans, 127 Ohio App.3d 56, 63, fn. 2 (11th Dist. 1998). None of these factors
are to be considered “in isolation,” see State v. Null, 2020-Ohio-3222, ¶ 19 (3d Dist.), and no single factor is determinative, Evans at 63, fn. 2. “However, courts generally
uphold ‘an officer’s decision to conduct roadside sobriety tests . . . where the officer
bases his decision on a number of factors.’” Angers at ¶ 27, quoting Evans at 63.
Here, the trial court determined that, post-stop, Officer Balli lacked
reasonable suspicion to justify conducting field sobriety tests.2 The court
emphasized that Moore did not exhibit erratic driving and that Officer Balli did not
detect the odor of alcohol. While Officer Balli testified that Moore’s speech was
slurred — a pertinent indicator of impairment — the court rejected this assertion,
finding it unsupported by video evidence, though it did not elaborate on how the
video contradicted the testimony.
The trial court also highlighted certain factors it viewed as
inconsistent with impairment: Moore denied consuming alcohol, the stop occurred
at approximately 11:00 a.m., she was cooperative, and she retrieved her driver’s
license without difficulty.
2 In granting the motion to suppress, the trial court addressed whether pre-exit, nonstandardized field sobriety tests — like their standardized counterparts — require a preliminary showing of impairment before they can be administered. The court concluded that because these tests serve as investigative tools to assess a suspect’s sobriety during an OVI investigation, they may only be conducted when reasonable suspicion of OVI exists. On appeal, we find it unnecessary to revisit the trial court’s determination. Regardless of whether reasonable suspicion is required prior to administering pre-exit, nonstandardized tests, the officers in this case already possessed reasonable suspicion of OVI at the time the tests were performed. Therefore, any issue concerning whether such tests may be used to develop reasonable suspicion is moot, and further discussion on this issue would be purely advisory. Accord see State v. Elston, 2006-Ohio-3733, ¶ 5 (8th Dist.) (appellate courts should refrain from issuing advisory opinions on questions of law nonessential to the outcome on appeal). Ultimately, the court found that the field sobriety tests were based
solely on: (1) a tip from a known citizen informant and (2) the observation that
Moore’s eyes were bloodshot. The court noted that even if it were to consider
Sergeant Horvath’s comment that he thought he smelled “something” resembling
alcohol, this, together with the informant’s tip and Moore’s bloodshot eyes, did not
rise to the level of reasonable suspicion supported by specific and articulable facts
sufficient to warrant OVI testing.
While the trial court’s analysis is careful, it gives insufficient weight
to the 9-1-1 call and overlooks material, undisputed facts that significantly bolster
the reasonableness of the officers’ continued investigative detention.
First, while no single Evans factor is dispositive in establishing
reasonable suspicion of impairment, the 9-1-1 call placed by Moore’s son warrants
substantial weight in this case. As discussed above, the call originated from a highly
reliable source — Moore’s own son — who personally observed signs of his mother’s
impairment immediately prior to contacting emergency services. The reasonable
suspicion arising from this call did not terminate upon Officer Balli’s initial
detention of Moore. Rather, it persisted throughout the detention, as the officers’
subsequent observations corroborated the son’s report. See State v. Hughes, 2019-
Ohio-2690, ¶ 27 (7th Dist.) (recognizing that reasonable suspicion to conduct field
sobriety tests must be evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances,
encompassing those occurring both prior to and during the stop). Notably, the trial court failed to address testimony and video evidence
showing that Moore’s vehicle was improperly parked — straddling two parking
spaces in a grocery-store lot. Also unacknowledged was Moore’s admission, during
the stop, that she had just purchased alcohol, as well as her gesture toward the bottle
on the passenger seat. These facts directly corroborated the son’s report that Moore
had been driving while impaired and had gone to buy more alcohol, reinforcing the
officers’ reasonable suspicion and justifying the continued detention and
subsequent OVI sobriety testing. See White, 496 U.S. at 332 (an informant’s ability
to predict a suspect’s future conduct enhances the reliability of the tip and supports
the reasonableness of police reliance).
Although we recognize that it is not our role to second-guess the trial
court’s factual findings when they are supported by competent and credible
evidence, see Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, at ¶ 8, we respectfully disagree with the
trial court’s determination that Officer Balli’s testimony regarding Moore’s slurred
speech was not corroborated by the video evidence. See Middleburg Hts. v.
Wojciechowski, 2015-Ohio-3879, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.) (reversing where video footage
clearly contradicted trial court’s finding). The video recording of Officer Balli’s
initial interaction with Moore reveals slurred speech, thus substantiating his
account rather than undermining it.
We do not dispute that Moore denied alcohol consumption, that she
was cooperative, and that the stop occurred in the late morning. Nor do we ignore
the lack of observed erratic driving. However, these facts, when viewed together and against the backdrop of the totality of the circumstances known to the police officers
at the time, do not overcome the reasonable suspicion of impairment already
established. See State v. Brown, 2016-Ohio-1258, ¶ 11, fn. 3 (2nd Dist.). (“The
possibility of an innocent explanation does not negate the existence of reasonable
suspicion,” citing Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 403 (2014).).
By the time officers proceeded to administer field sobriety tests —
beginning with the alphabet and counting tests — reasonable suspicion of
impairment was supported by the following articulable facts: (1) a highly reliable
9-1-1 call from Moore’s son, reporting that his mother was driving while intoxicated
and had departed to purchase more alcohol; (2) Moore’s presence in the driver’s seat
of her vehicle, which was improperly parked at a grocery store; (3) her admission to
having just purchased alcohol, consistent with the 9-1-1 tip; (4) her slurred speech,
confirmed by video evidence; and (5) her bloodshot and watery eyes.
Taken together and viewed through the eyes of a reasonable police
officer on the scene reacting to events as they unfolded, see Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d
at 87-88, these facts were sufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion of
impairment, thereby justifying the administration of field sobriety testing consistent
with the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., State v. Mapes, 2005-Ohio-3359, ¶ 42 (6th
Dist.) (finding officer had reasonable and articulable suspicion to detain defendant
for sobriety testing when the officer observed an odor of alcohol, bloodshot and
glassy eyes, and slurred speech at two in the morning). Accordingly, the City’s sole
assignment of error is sustained. III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s grant of Moore’s
motion to suppress. We remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded to the trial court for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
Bedford Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
_______________________________ LISA B. FORBES, PRESIDING JUDGE
MARY J. BOYLE, J., and DEENA R. CALABRESE, J., CONCUR